



WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR.

FIRING LINE

Subject: "THE GREEK DILEMMA"

Guest: Andreas Papandreou, author and professor of economics


SOUTHERN EDUCATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION

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SECA PRESENTS

FIRING LINE



Host: **WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR.**

Guest: **Andreas Papandreou, author and professor of economics**

Subject: **"THE GREEK DILEMMA"**

Panelists: **George Bellos
Charles A. Stevenson
Cliff Hackett**

FIRING LINE is produced and directed by WARREN STEIBEL

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MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Andreas Papandreou — did I get that wrong?

MR. PAPANDREOU: No, it's okay.

MR. BUCKLEY: Sorry — was an American citizen for awhile. He was automatically given citizenship when he served in our armed forces during the Second World War and, in any case, he had attended Harvard University and gone on to do graduate work in economics. In fact, he became a professor of economics and headed the department at the University of California at Berkeley, when suddenly he felt the call of Greek politics, ditched it all and went back to Athens in 1959.

A few years later, he was a minister in his father's Cabinet and the leading Greek non-Communist leftist. But late one night in April, five years ago, a group of colonels staged a coup and democratic government, once again, was terminated in Greece. Mr. Papandreou was kept in prison for about eight months and then released.

He is once again a professor of economics, this time at York University in Toronto. He has written a book about his experiences in Greek politics, *Democracy At Gunpoint*, and has another book coming out on what he calls creative capitalism. Meanwhile, he continues to apply such pressures as he can against the government of the colonels.

He is particularly active in the lobby that seeks to influence Congress and the White House to put pressure on the colonels to democratize their government, which seeks also to deprive the Greeks of military aid in the event they do not do our bidding.

I should like to ask Mr. Papandreou: do you believe that the United States Government should deny economic or military aid to all non-democratic powers?

MR. PAPANDREOU: I do not believe that it is for me to judge what the American Government will do.

MR. BUCKLEY: You're not an American citizen again, are you?

MR. PAPANDREOU: No. I am speaking here as a Greek, and when I plead a cause in the United States, I plead this cause because the Government of the United States has decisive influence on the fate of my country.

Of course, as a democrat and as a man who identifies himself with the cause of the people and of freedom, of open society, I

stand against militarism in all its forms. And I consider, indeed, that most of the military programs, east and west, have undermined our freedoms, have sapped the strength of our societies and, sooner or later, will bring us to the brink of another massive confrontation.

On the question of Greece, the main reason that we take such a strong stand on the question of military aid is simply the fact that the only source of strength of this junta in Greece is not its popular appeal or its popular base, but the armed forces. And the armed forces themselves are very much integrated into NATO and into the structure of command that has its apex at the Pentagon.

Now, the cutting off of military aid would have a fantastic symbolic significance.

It would mean that the one source of support that permits them to oppress people in a brutal way would be cut off. And it would be a signal to the Greek officer corps that the Pentagon and NATO, of which they feel very strongly to be a part, no longer approve of what is happening in Greece.

I remember, if I may off the cuff say, that Robert Kennedy, on the very day that he went on television to announce his candidacy, asked me what would do it in Greece, what single action might topple the colonels. My answer was cutting off military aid. And he took that stand publicly, not only privately. And, of course, there are many senators and many congressmen who have taken the same stand—indeed, Congress as a whole has. Were it not for the fact that it has been overruled by the President, this might have come about.

MR. BUCKLEY: You've covered a lot of ground and I'm very anxious to hear more on some of the points that you have raised; but, for instance, I have heard it said that the kind of military aid that the colonels primarily desire is the kind of aid that would be useful to Greece, by no means, in increasing their powers of suppressing their own people, but would be extremely useful in defending the Greek frontier against a possible invasion from a superpower.

As somebody said, "Look, it doesn't matter if you have a World War II tank to keep the citizens of Athens in line, but a World War II tank would not stop the kind of modern equipment that the Soviet Union is in a position to advance." Now, how do you handle that particular argument?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, I shall give you

the answer that Secretary of Defense McNamara gave to me when I put the question to him in June of 1964. He made it very clear he did not expect Greece to really be able to hold the line for more than a few days. He also made it very clear, in case of such a confrontation, that the main burden of the confrontation would be yours in this kind of war. It would fall on the shoulders of the U.S.

It is, for me, inconceivable that the Greek armed forces, 150,000 strong, could do much more than delay for a few days a well-designed attack in the context of a world war. I'm not talking about police actions.

MR. BUCKLEY: How well did you do against the Nazis?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Beautifully.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, why couldn't you do well against the Russians?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, against the Nazis we held five days.

MR. BUCKLEY: You call that beautifully?

MR. PAPANDREOU: No, I was talking about the Fascists. You see, Nazis and Fascists in my mind sometimes get a little confused.

The Fascists, Mussolini's forces, were not only held at bay, but practically thrown into the Ionian Sea. And Hitler had to come down, in fact, delay his whole schedule for attacking the East, in order to confront these literally, practically, unarmed soldiers. It's not very different from Vietnam, by the way. When there is soul in a struggle, the arms might be quite incapable of —

MR. BUCKLEY: Are you suggesting there wouldn't be soul in a struggle against the Soviet Union?

MR. PAPANDREOU: I am not suggesting that. I think there would be soul in Greece in the struggle against any occupation force, whether it was red, blue, green, or white colors. And this is why we are fighting today against what we consider to be a military occupation of Greece, not an internal dictatorship —

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah.

MR. PAPANDREOU: — but a military

occupation of Greece by NATO and under the general guidance of the Pentagon.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah, but you're not suggesting, are you, that if we were to stop military aid, there wouldn't be enough gunpowder for the junta there to continue to stay in charge?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Not at all — no, not at all. You're quite right. By the way, you do know an important fact — that Greece is quite a chosen instrumentality in the Mediterranean for the Pentagon, and that they are now the recipients of 30 Phantoms, highly-prized possessions by any ally. But I don't think they lack bullets to kill Greeks.

MR. BUCKLEY: So, therefore, we are talking about — excuse me.

MR. PAPANDREOU: No, you're quite right. I confirm what you say. The act is symbolic. That is to say, it is not, in fact, those additional guns that are essential to hold the situation in hand. It is a deeper question. That is to say, were it the fact, were it the case, that the administration, the Government of the United States, were to say, "We cut off military aid because this is an oppressive regime," because these would be the grounds, of course, a neo-Fascist regime —

MR. BUCKLEY: Should we cut off military aid to Yugoslavia?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, let me finish my sentence.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Now, let's consider Yugoslavia and how much aid it is getting.

Were your government to do that, it would then say to the Greek officers, "The Western Alliance does not approve of Fascist regimes, of the Portugals, of the Spains, of the Turks, of the Irans and of the Greeces. And in this climate, your officers have to choose between supporting this regime and losing your membership in the alliance of the free world, or really dumping this regime and becoming and staying as members of a truly free world military community."

MR. BUCKLEY: Right. Okay, now let me get into that, but, first of all, let me ask you this. When McNamara was talking to you in 1964, did he tell you for how long West

Germany would be able to withstand, let's say, *blitzkrieg* mounted by 95 Soviet divisions?

MR. PAPANDREOU: No, sir, naturally not. The only question I was authorized to talk about was Greece.

MR. BUCKLEY: Hm mmm. Because I've heard that estimated at two or three days —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Yeah.

MR. BUCKLEY: — but don't we agree that notwithstanding our recognition of *force majeure*, of superior Soviet power, it is also a symbol that NATO seeks in sending tanks, whether to Greece or to Italy or to West Germany, on the basis of which to hold the NATO line so that even a couple of days might be significant.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Yeah, but, really, I don't honestly believe that is the issue, and I don't believe it because the Soviet Union and the United States, in Europe proper, have made an accommodation which has been more or less confirmed now and consolidated by the *Ost Politik* of Chancellor Brandt.

Actually, there is a freeze in Europe. Greece is becoming an American outpost. There are 13 military establishments now. Piraeus, the port facility, has been extended now to the Sixth Fleet. The main reason for this is the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. There is oil in the Middle East. There is the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is essential for the United States military to have a staging base from which to operate. And while this may be said to be very good, short run, hard-headed, military technocratic thinking, one can really ask the question about the long run, the kind of long run that you are facing in the Vietnams of the world.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, now, you speak as a Greek and I —

MR. PAPANDREOU: I have to.

MR. BUCKLEY: Of course, and I can perfectly well understand your desire, in behalf of Greece, to influence the policies of the Western world in such a way as uniquely to enhance the best interests of Greece. However, I have two sub-questions. I, of course, need to question you as an American —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Of course, of course.

MR. BUCKLEY: — and there are an awful lot of Greeks who do not share your particular enthusiasm —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Surely.

MR. BUCKLEY: — for doing this and who are very much puzzled, in the light of your stated preferences for democratic government, that you should pool your resources with Bouloukos, a Communist, and make common cause with him to try to restore order to a country that was very nearly done under by the Communist subversion over a period of four bloody years after the Second World War. Now, is this easy to understand on purely tactical grounds?

MR. PAPANDREOU: It's very easy to understand. First of all, in terms of the facts, I think it's important to mention —

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah.

MR. PAPANDREOU: — that the agreement is an agreement of the summer of the year 1968. That agreement does not relate to two political parties. The distinctions are hard to understand, of course, in a society which is not experiencing dictatorship, suppression of parliamentary procedures and democratic freedoms. This is not an agreement between two parties; it is an agreement between two resistance organizations which have nothing to do with party politics.

The agreement is tactical to the extent that it is viable and valid today. This is not too important a question. It is an agreement as to the manner in which we shall actively combat the occupation forces we see in Greece. To us, it doesn't differ much from the presence of the Nazis in Greece. The memories are the same. Of course, it's true we don't have mass executions, but we have tortures on a mass scale. And we've had imprisonments and the complete death of all kinds of personal freedom and human dignity.

MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Sulzberger says there are 100 political figures in prison. Is that an underexaggeration?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Mr. Sulzberger is a specialist in this. Let's not take my figures, because my figures could be biased and, you know, I'm a partisan. I have a cause. I

believe in my country and I shall fight for it. But, taking the numbers of Ronald Steel, say, in the *New York Review of Books*, there were 30,000 Greeks that had been in jail at the end of the first year of the coup.

MR. BUCKLEY: How many before the coup?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, it depends which years we're looking at.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, the year before.

MR. PAPANDREOU: The year before the coup, I think we had no political prisoners, but there must have been maybe 20 or 30 — I cannot be exact — people committed for actual homicide, not political crimes, but homicide that was connected to political belief.

And, in fact, our government, the government of George Papandreou, put an end to the shameful period — this garrison state that we had in Greece, which gave a lot of economic growth but really at the same time combined it with substantial police.

MR. BUCKLEY: That was Karamanlis' fault?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Yeah — well, fault — whose fault? History's fault. The fact that there had been a civil war in Greece was not Karamanlis' fault. It was the fault of many forces: the Soviet Union, the British, the Communist party, the Nazi collaborators. Who knows who's at fault — all of them jointly.

But there had been a miserable civil war in Greece that ended after the Truman Doctrine with substantial American participation, not in the field, but financial participation — three to four billion dollars on the whole. It ended in 1949 in the defeat of the Communist insurgency, the AMLS forces.

And during the next decade, 14 - 15 years, we had in Greece something of a garrison state. Democracy, yes. The parliament always functioned, by the way. Even when the Communist forces were practically in Athens, the parliament functioned. That is a very, very substantial difference from today. When there was no Communist danger in Greece of any kind — the Communist party being very small and very non-militant and very European in style — we were the danger in Greece this time. We represented 53 percent of the Greek

people, and that is why a dictatorship was necessary to suppress, not us, but the Greek people.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well now, that gets —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Sorry for the speech.

MR. BUCKLEY: That's all right, that's all right. That gets a little bit complicated because I know that your father's party came in with 53 percent of the vote, but it was also dismissed from power a year later as a result of an argument with —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Year and a half.

MR. BUCKLEY: — the king. Year and a half, yeah. And then there were five caretaker governments. Then there was a period during which you were denouncing your father's policies and he was offering support of a particular caretaker government, and a lot of right-wingers got all excited because you were questioning the fidelity to NATO of Greece.

And, in fact, you were on record in your own book as admitting that perhaps, if it hadn't been that you decided to stop teaching economics in California, the Greeks would have a parliament right now.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, that's a bit arrogant. I'm not sure if I put it that way. I'm not sure I'm that important. But let me say this. You've said many things and some of them are valid and some of them are not quite — not intentionally.

I never, during the period of my political life in Greece, stated that Greece ought to be pulled out of NATO or that NATO should leave Greece. What I did say was that Greece belonged to the Greeks; that Greece was an ally but not a satellite. We didn't want to be Washington's Bulgaria or even Czechoslovakia.

MR. BUCKLEY: And who did want that?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, I'm afraid your generals did.

MR. BUCKLEY: What Greek politicians wanted that?

MR. PAPANDREOU: I'm not prepared to name names, but I would say that — well, I shall give one example. I won't mention the name because I respect, today, everyone who is fighting this regime. But there has

been a prime minister in the history of Greece, who, when General Van Fleet stepped down in the airport of Ellinikon turned his head and showed the Greek troops. And he said, "General, here are your troops."

I would never show the Greek troops to any general of a foreign nation, allied or not, and say to him, "Here are your troops." Thieu will do this.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, that's just a form of hospitality, isn't it?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, not the kind that I would buy.

MR. BUCKLEY: After all, Eisenhower managed the movement of a lot of Greek and French and —

MR. PAPANDREOU: He did, by common consent.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, hm mmm.

MR. PAPANDREOU: And he did not think of a French officer as being an American officer.

MR. BUCKLEY: No, but he was simply given — Van Fleet was given the job of heading up the counterinsurgency movement —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Yes.

MR. BUCKLEY: — and he seemed to do rather well. He also left.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, you understand —

MR. BUCKLEY: I'm aware that your —

MR. PAPANDREOU: — that my point is a moral point. It's a moral point.

MR. BUCKLEY: Once again, it's a symbolic point, isn't it?

MR. PAPANDREOU: But life — what is life but a series of symbols?

MR. BUCKLEY: Hm mmm, hm mmm.

MR. PAPANDREOU: In the end, what are we about, for bread alone?

MR. BUCKLEY: No, I don't think so. I

don't think so. But I do think that it probably is instructive, isn't it, to dwell for a moment on the rather distinctive difficulties of Greece during this century?

MR. PAPANDREOU: But —

MR. BUCKLEY: You've had eight military coups d'état in 50 years.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Yes.

MR. BUCKLEY: You've had an average change of government every year. You've had two civil wars. And, under the circumstances, a lot of people seem to me to be rather resigned about the Greek experience, because what they're saying to themselves is, "Well, hell, Greece can't have democracy anymore than Spain apparently could, or Portugal." And I'm not saying this is true or it's not true. But I'm saying that this reasonably occurs to people who contemplate your history over a period of 50 years.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Allow me to make two statements. One is a correction of something I said myself and then the other one is a response to your last very important question — or statement.

I like to be perfectly honest and I would like to say that while my positions at the time were the ones that I have stated to you — following five years of bitter experience when we have seen the West in the context of the NATO alliance, which was presumably established to defend self-determination, integrity and democratic institutions as stated in the preamble of NATO — when we see that this very organization has become the instrument of oppression in Greece, under the guidance of your Pentagon —

MR. BUCKLEY: But you haven't made that plain —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Allow me to complete this, because you want me to answer properly —

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, absolutely —

MR. PAPANDREOU: — and now, I shall.

MR. BUCKLEY: — and dwell on the instrument of oppression.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Why not? It is.

MR. BUCKLEY: Hm mmm.

MR. PAPANDREOU: And I think, of course, we should dwell, but I won't repeat it too often —

MR. BUCKLEY: Sure.

MR. PAPANDREOU: — because time is valuable. Not only in Greece but in Portugal, in Spain, in Turkey, in Iran — and I'm talking about my part of the world. I'm leaving Brazil out of the way.

Now, under those circumstances, when most of southern Europe is practically neo-Fascist — when Italy may soon be — General Vernon Walters is moving up to the second position in the CIA. General Walters, in November, 1961, in Italy, in a staff meeting of the U. S. Embassy, said that if the Socialists were to come close to power in Italy, the American troops in Italy and from Germany should occupy Italy.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, the Socialists did come to power.

MR. PAPANDREOU: No, but Mr. Walters was no longer in Italy.

MR. BUCKLEY: And you think he would have brought the troops?

MR. PAPANDREOU: As a matter of fact, I think it would be very worthwhile for Congress to ask Mr. Walters, today, whether indeed he has repeated the statement now. It would be very, very important for Congress to find out what General Walters thinks about Italy today, and whether, indeed, in Italy a new *Putsch* is not underway.

MR. BUCKLEY: Managed by the CIA?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Managed — well, you know, I get a bit lost because, for instance, there is a man in Greece who played a very important role — Mr. Norbert Anschuetz. He was the *charge d'affaires*.

Actually, I knew him very well and I thought of him as a *charge d'affaires*. Now, it turns out that he was a colonel in the U.S. Army — that's Pentagon.

It turns out he's officially a top CIA agent. And now, he turns out to be the manager of the First National Bank in Beirut. So, you ask me is it the Pentagon, is it the First National Bank, is it the CIA? I just don't know.

MR. BUCKLEY: Do you question the wisdom of our maintaining a central intelligence agency?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Not at all, sir. I do not. But, I don't want it to manage my affairs.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah — well, no, I don't —

MR. PAPANDREOU: I want it to manage yours, if you choose it.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah.

MR. PAPANDREOU: But not mine.

MR. BUCKLEY: Now, you're not — or are you suggesting that Colonel Papadopoulos is an instrument of the CIA?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Oh, but you see, I happen to know this, because it was my very bad luck that I became Minister of State and I was in charge of Greek Intelligence. And I discovered, to my very great surprise, two things — well, one thing; namely, that the Greek CIA, that is KYP, K-Y-P is the acronym, was both fiscally and administratively an appendage of your CIA. This is not surprising because it was built after the civil war by the Office of Strategic Services which preceded the CIA. In fact, you know, that's why we couldn't stop them tapping our telephones, which we tried. You know, I couldn't do that.

But the thing that surprised me — not surprised me, but the thing that I found out then, which had no significance to me then — any kind of significance, but it does now — is that Papadopoulos was the official liaison between the U. S. CIA and the Greek KYP. And what we say in Greece now is that this is the first known CIA agent to become a prime minister of a European country, you know. This is what we say.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, I think it seems to be going a little bit far to say that someone who is in charge of intelligence in a country, which God knows needed an intelligence after the kind of civil war you went through, ended up simply being an agent of the CIA. Mr. Papadopoulos —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, he happened to be — he happened to be, surely.

MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Papadopoulos is primarily condemned, in my experience with

him, as being very provincial, as being very —

MR. PAPANDREOU: This I don't mind. I'm provincial myself.

MR. BUCKLEY: — narrow-minded, of being exclusively concerned for his own country and being a very unreliable ally in the sense that he would play with the Soviet Union even, if necessary —

MR. PAPANDREOU: He never would.

MR. BUCKLEY: — to establish —

MR. PAPANDREOU: No, he never would. That is a little caramel that is distributed by the Pentagon to get funds for him.

But the thing that he was also — and this is something that has been revealed in Congress, I did not know it for a fact myself — he was an agent of the SS during the Nazi occupation in Greece. And I think it is a rather important thing. Nine members of the Greek junta were in the SS, and this is not my information. It is information produced in Washington, for Washington's use.

MR. BUCKLEY: I think probably, since I'm not in a position to —

MR. PAPANDREOU: To deny this or confirm it, sure, sure, sure.

MR. BUCKLEY: I think I probably owe it to viewers here to say that your reliability has been questioned by some reviewers of your book who were not agents of the CIA — for instance, *The New York Times*.

I don't intend anything personal by this, but they say that you are a very passionate man and, as *The New York Times* man said, "oblivious of the fact that opposition accounts could be similarly plausible and persuasive." Or, as another reviewer for *Book World* said, your book merely confirms what, in fact, the Greek politics has demonstrated; namely, a strong disinclination to admit that there are other viewpoints, other interests, other truths than your own.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, you see, of course, I am not going to judge myself. This is an impossibility.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah, it's awfully easy to say about Papadopoulos that he was an ex-Nazi.

MR. PAPANDREOU: No, but you see I didn't make a judgment. No, no, I made a statement of fact. Something that you can confirm or disconfirm, and I stand to be corrected.

I'm saying that your own Congress and your State Department have evidence, and it is official and hard information that he was in the SS during the Nazi occupation. And I say this as a statement of fact, not of belief.

MR. BUCKLEY: Hm mmm, hm mmm.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Now, if this is wrong, then I'm not wrong, but those who have printed it in black and white, you know.

MR. BUCKLEY: How long have you known this — have you had this —

MR. PAPANDREOU: About a month and a half to two months.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah.

MR. PAPANDREOU: I did not know it before.

MR. BUCKLEY: Now, what about the charge that's been leveled about you, since we're exchanging charges —

MR. PAPANDREOU: No, I'm not exchanging charges. I'm stating facts.

MR. BUCKLEY: You're stating something that you've heard, presumably —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, no, something that you can find out too, not hearsay. This is documentary evidence, available on Capitol Hill. I mean, you know —

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah.

MR. PAPANDREOU: — this is not hearsay.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, this is, of course, the way facts are always presented. It's been said —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, I'm sorry, I wasn't told that I should bring documents here.

MR. BUCKLEY: No, that's all right. That's perfectly all right.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Yeah.

MR. BUCKLEY: We've had a lot of facts of this kind alleged. Ten years ago *Life* magazine published the charge that Stalin had been a member of the *Okhrana*, and for all I know it was true. I don't think it greatly influenced Stalin toward pro-czarism after 1917 and I certainly haven't seen any indications of —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, he was ready to become a priest, by the way, which must have meant —

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah.

MR. PAPANDREOU: — at some point that he was part of the establishment in that country, or trying to become a member of the establishment. So, maybe it wasn't so wrong.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, that was really before the nationalization of religion in Russia —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Yeah.

MR. BUCKLEY: — but I haven't seen Papadopoulos urging a Western dominated Nazi regime —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, what is his regime? What is his regime? In fact, he does urge exactly that. In fact, all the editorials of his controlled press point an accusing finger at the Norwegians and the Danes and the Swedes, and they say, "Americans, look, these are not your friends because they are playing around in a coffee shop called democracy. What you need is law and order and responsibility and honest, loyal membership in NATO for the defense of the free world," with concentration camps and torture chambers and prisons and what not.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah, well, it's unfortunately correct that Papadopoulos seems to be a resurrection of something that probably Greeks have gotten awfully used to during this century. When Papadopoulos came out against mini-skirts, it recalled Pangalos doing the same thing in 1924. When he called for national regeneration, it recalled Metaxas doing that in the Thirties.

I don't think, unfortunately, there's anything very new about Papadopoulos from anybody who views the situation a little bit more detachedly than you; by which I mean you were thrown out and, obviously, this was a bruising experience. Lots of people have been thrown out of Greece by the

victors during the eight military coups of the last 50 years, meanwhile —

MR. PAPANDREOU: What's the —

MR. BUCKLEY: — you want us —

MR. PAPANDREOU: — moral of that story? What's the moral of that story?

MR. BUCKLEY: The moral of that story is that you want us to reorient Western policy in NATO in behalf of your feelings about Greece. And I'm trying to say to you that I can share, I hope quite sincerely, your disappointments about the anti-democratic nature of that regime, without, however, feeling that they ought to impose on —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Oh, heaven forbid, no.

MR. BUCKLEY: — an alliance that has kept as much freedom as manages to survive in Western Europe during the last 25 years.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Heaven forbid, no. The last thing I want is for you and the alliance to impose anything on Greece. The most I want — the thing we all wish now in Greece is that we be left alone to run our own home. We have lots of business in Greece —

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah, but you have —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Allow me to finish —

MR. BUCKLEY: Sure.

MR. PAPANDREOU: — unless you —

MR. BUCKLEY: No, go ahead, go ahead, go ahead.

MR. PAPANDREOU: We have much social reform to carry out in Greece. We want to bring democracy to every village. We want to build a Greece that really belongs to the Greeks and to the Greek youth. And I want to be left out of the cold war strategic games that are ruining not only us, but the world and you —

MR. BUCKLEY: But you can't be.

MR. PAPANDREOU: — as well.

MR. BUCKLEY: You can't be left out; you'd be gobbled up.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, look, what do

you think we are now?

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, I think —

MR. PAPANDREOU: We are gobbled up by the Pentagon right now.

MR. BUCKLEY: I think, if I may say so, that's a superstition.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Superstition?

MR. BUCKLEY: Absolute superstition.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Let me give you some facts, sir.

MR. BUCKLEY: Okay.

MR. PAPANDREOU: February, 1967. W. W. Rostow, Sub-Committee of the Security Council of the United States, review of the Greek situation: conclusion, the Center Union and Papandreou will win in '67.

MR. BUCKLEY: Oh, everybody agreed, sure.

MR. PAPANDREOU: That being against the interests of the United States, proceeds Mr. Rostow, it is therefore necessary to move toward a dictatorial solution in Greece. Source — because you like sources: Marquis Childs' syndicated column, plus oral confirmation by Marquis Childs to me, in person, spring 1968. It is available in print.

MR. BUCKLEY: To say that Marquis Childs said it doesn't mean that it's true, but let's —

MR. PAPANDREOU: All right, next —

MR. BUCKLEY: — oblige it. Go ahead.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Who made the coup in Greece? Five men. I can reel off their names. It won't make much sense. Greek names are difficult to pronounce if you're not a Greek; but the five men — I'll reel them off — are Papadopoulos, Mekarezos, Pattakos, Agathangelou, Fthenakis. This is the group. Of the five, four are members of the Greek Intelligence Agency; therefore, of the five, there are four members, necessarily and inevitably, of the CIA. The coup was a CIA coup and it was a Pentagon-supported one.

We hope that by next fall an army officer who has escaped the junta to which he belonged — we hope, I say — will be secure enough abroad to be able to give

testimony to personal participation in Greek uniform of CIA personnel, as in Cambodia and as in Laos.

By the way, it might be of interest to you that the officers who overthrew Sihanouk in Cambodia were trained in Greece by Papadopoulos. Likewise, you may be interested to know that the Italian neo-Fascists, the MSP in Italy, is getting, today, its guidance by the junta and there is now documentary evidence of this in Italy. The famous general who tried the coup a little while back — not general but prince in fact, Borghese — is now in Corfu, working very closely with the Greek junta and preparing the next few moves in Italy. So we're talking about a pattern here.

MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Papandreou, I wish that the CIA were one half as powerful as you depict it as being. We would have much less difficulty throughout the world. I do know that Papadopoulos was investigated as far back as 1958, because it was suspected that he was involved in a coup. And I also know that there were coups in Greece before the CIA was invented.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Yes, yes.

MR. BUCKLEY: It's the ordinary thing in Greece, not the extraordinary thing.

MR. PAPANDREOU: The ordinary thing? Oh, no, sir.

MR. BUCKLEY: They had been going on in Latin America for 150 years before we discovered the existence of Latin America.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Allow me to disagree with you. We can disagree, can't we?

MR. BUCKLEY: Sure.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Are you suggesting that the present Brazilian dictatorship, for instance, is independent of the policies pursued by the Pentagon and the CIA?

MR. BUCKLEY: Of course, I do.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Are you suggesting that the IT&T, for instance —

MR. BUCKLEY: It's highly —

MR. PAPANDREOU: — would not have been involved with the CIA in the overthrow of Allende? Yes or no?

MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Papandreou, if you think this is a dilemma, you have something coming.

MR. PAPANDREOU: No, I want your answer.

MR. BUCKLEY: It's obviously true that there are identities of interest throughout the world. Here, you're about to participate in a great big rally in New York in which you urge action in behalf of policies that you desire. Now, there's no reason in the world why other people don't — and in fact they do — urge action in behalf of policies that *they* desire.

MR. PAPANDREOU: This I understand. Yes, I understand.

MR. BUCKLEY: But the hobgoblinization of international politics on grounds of the old canard that the CIA runs everything is unfortunately an undeserved tribute to the CIA. If they could keep us out of that trouble, we wouldn't have had things like the Vietnam war to worry about.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, they got you there, but they miscalculated, you see —

MR. BUCKLEY: This is sort of a Birchite notion in which CIA is the villain rather than the relevant Communist.

MR. PAPANDREOU: No, it is not. I don't believe, really, that the CIA is the villain. The CIA is the instrument.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah.

MR. PAPANDREOU: You have to look much deeper for the villain.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, maybe the villain is the 20th century superstition that democracy is the natural thing. People talk about Greece being the cradle of democracy; there's been very little democracy in Greece. Isn't that true?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Let me ask one question.

MR. BUCKLEY: Plato's democracy —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Are you prepared —

MR. BUCKLEY: — was based on slaves.

MR. PAPANDREOU: — to lose your freedoms here, Mr. Buckley?

MR. BUCKLEY: No, I'm prepared to —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Are you prepared to lose them?

MR. BUCKLEY: I'm prepared to indulge in a military industrial complex in order to maintain our freedom.

(laughter)

MR. PAPANDREOU: Yeah. Are you prepared, yourself, to see any reduction of your freedoms in this country? Suppose that there is some group that calls for it, what would your stand be? I'd really be interested.

MR. BUCKLEY: I'd ask them what they were talking about. I was inducted into the army in 1943, which was certainly a loss of my freedom.

MR. PAPANDREOU: That's right.

MR. BUCKLEY: On the other hand, I understood this as a necessary corporate effort at the time.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, I volunteered in your navy because I wanted to fight the Nazis.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah.

MR. PAPANDREOU: And I seem to be doing this sort of thing all my life, one way or another. But this time it's not the Nazis, it's the Pentagonists.

MR. BUCKLEY: I know, but there are also people who say that you screwed things up when you went back to Greece.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Oh, I am not claiming that I have been successful.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah, yeah.

MR. PAPANDREOU: The only thing I claim is that I believe in freedom and human dignity.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, do you believe that the United States —

MR. PAPANDREOU: And I'm working for it.

MR. BUCKLEY: Do you believe that the United States — let me ask you a generic question now —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Sure.

MR. BUCKLEY: — should refuse to transact at all with any country that suppresses parliamentary democracy?

MR. PAPANDREOU: No, sir.

MR. BUCKLEY: Because that's — hm mmm.

MR. PAPANDREOU: If you ask me now — you mean put myself in an American statesman's shoes?

MR. BUCKLEY: Sure, sure.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Okay. For that role, I would define what I would do. I would surely not do what you have just suggested. If, in the interests of the nation, this collectivity that you call the United States of America, it is essential that you maintain good relations with China and with the Soviet Union, that is fine.

On the other hand, if you, yourself, are the key member, the senior member, of an alliance, the first rule that should be observed is that you respect the member nations that have joined your alliance to defend their own freedoms and their own integrity, national integrity.

And what I charge, and charge vigorously, is that within this alliance, either you have accepted or you have imposed on some of them very oppressive, militaristic regimes and I have mentioned five in my part of the world. There are many more. But, I'm talking about NATO, and Iran will soon, I think, be in NATO.

To add something else, I would consider that it is very poor politics to attempt to export the American way of life to Vietnam at the cost of defoliation and, really, what amounts to genocide. I consider that these policies are inconsistent with human survival and I would not espouse them. But I would not limit the freedom of an American to make deals in a peaceful context for the maintenance of world stability, of course not.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, do you think that we were wrong in lending American military

force to help you repress the Communist civil war? Should we have said, "No, look after yourself?"

MR. PAPANDREOU: I think on this question, Mr. Buckley, you'll find that most Greeks would say that you were not wrong, that you were right.

MR. BUCKLEY: Including yourself?

MR. PAPANDREOU: I would have definitely said yes, until the thing that you built, which was parliamentary processes that you permitted to survive, you destroyed yourselves —

MR. BUCKLEY: Hm mmm.

MR. PAPANDREOU: — on the night of April 21. Because if I am offered the choice between one tyrant or another, I can make no choice.

We choose freedom. And I can say this with Senator Fulbright, that the Truman Doctrine — after 25 years of cold war, an intervention on a global scale looks much different today than it looked on the day when President Truman on March 12, '47, announced to Congress that the U.S. had to support the Greek Government, to defend its existence and its institutions, the freedom — self-determination and freedom and the democratic institutions. Had this been more than just a slogan by now —

MR. BUCKLEY: Hm mmm.

MR. PAPANDREOU: — I would respect it to date. But it has become a tinny slogan.

MR. BUCKLEY: Right. Now, how do you account for King Constantine's refusal to back your movements in Greece, or Karamanlis' refusals, which leave you as a rather exposed member of the Greek left, with the only ally being the Communists?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, I'm not sure that even the Communists are allies. But, you see, I do not consider that looking at the leadership and saying, you know, "Who's collaborating with whom?" — that this really tells much of a story.

The important thing is what is happening to the Greek people. Where do the Greek people, the anonymous Greek people, the farmers, the workers, the youth, where do they stand? And I say to you —

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, when the king asked them to rise up against the colonels, not one of them did.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Not surprising — I wouldn't have either.

MR. BUCKLEY: Why?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Because the king, you see, prepared a coup himself and everybody knew that. So why choose king's coup versus colonel's coup, you know.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, is the king a CIA agent, also?

MR. PAPANDREOU: No, he is not.

MR. BUCKLEY: Wouldn't it be better to have a non-CIA coup?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, it doesn't mean that the king doesn't lend a very friendly ear. But what I meant to say is he is not an agent in the technical sense, which Papadopoulos is. I don't know why I should prefer a non-CIA dictatorship to a CIA dictatorship; they're all the same. The only thing I'm arguing is that this did happen to be instigated by the CIA, but —

MR. BUCKLEY: You have in the book that when you were taken to prison the king argued very strongly against your being executed. But you say that the person who really kept you from being executed was Lyndon Johnson. And you quote him as saying, "I just told those Greek bastards to lay off that son-of-a-bitch, whatever his name is."

MR. PAPANDREOU: This is what Galbraith told me Johnson said.

MR. BUCKLEY: Hm mmm. Now, did you imply by that that Lyndon Johnson controlled the movements of the colonels —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Yes, yes.

MR. BUCKLEY: — or that it was just his prestige?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Oh, no, he controlled.

MR. BUCKLEY: Does he call them "Greek bastards" — people he controls?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, I suspect that

knowing the quality of the people they are, probably he would, in private.

(laughter)

MR. BUCKLEY: I see. I see.

MR. PAPANDREOU: But he can use them. You know, you can use a gang to do your job, but you don't have to respect them for it.

MR. BUCKLEY: So there's a sense in which you owe your life to the fact that it was CIA agents who did the coup.

MR. PAPANDREOU: By the way, it could be true. And, as a matter of fact, trying to be as proper as I can, after I got out of jail, I went to see Philip Talbot. I asked Philip Talbot to convey to President Johnson, with whom I disagreed profoundly on the Greek issue and many others, my personal thanks for the fact that he really did save my life.

Actually, the people I owe it to are the people in the American economics profession and other, you know — the American Economics Association, united and without one abstention, went to the President, I mean communicated to the President: Paul Samuelson, Galbraith, Walter Heller and so forth. And so, morally, they are the ones I am thanking. But, in fact, were it not for Johnson's intervention, I would not be here on your show today.

MR. BUCKLEY: Or King Constantine.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, I don't know what his power was at the time.

MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Bellos?

MR. BELLOS: I'd like to ask a question as a Greek. You are very anti-monarchist. Why is it so?

MR. PAPANDREOU: For one thing, Mr. Bellos, for the reason that I just gave — that on May 13, '67, King Constantine was planning a coup himself. He was beaten to the punch by the colonels. And I have no reason to believe that his coup would have been any softer or less repressive. That would be reason enough for me.

But, more importantly, and I shall even forget the errors of the past, I shall say that one other thing that has condemned King Constantine to the people is that he has been silent since the day that he got out of

Greece. He draws a salary from the colonels. He does not say that he is with them or against them. He allows some people to think that he is against them and others to think that he is with them. He is living off their budget.

MR. BELLOS: Yeah, but you were against the king way before the coup happened.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Oh, yes, yes.

MR. BELLOS: Well, don't you think that the king is a very stable influence toward Greek politics?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, how stable is he? Did you see what happened with his presence?

MR. BELLOS: Well, isn't it because of the *'esprit d'affaires'* that July, '65, happened?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, would you tell us about it because I think —

MR. BELLOS: Why don't you tell us about it?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, I'd like to know —

MR. BUCKLEY: There are several versions.

MR. PAPANDREOU: — what you mean by the *'esprit d'affaires'*.

MR. BELLOS: Well, I'd like it from you because you were there. Why don't you tell me about it? You were the prime instigator of the affair; I mean, you were the main action of the affair. Why don't you tell me about it?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Was I the main action?

MR. BELLOS: That's what the people say at home.

MR. PAPANDREOU: What people?

MR. BELLOS: That's what the reports say.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Which reports?

MR. BELLOS: Before the coup.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Which reports?

MR. BELLOS: Before the coup.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Yeah, but which reports, not when?

MR. BUCKLEY: I'll tell you who said it.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Okay, let's get down to the facts.

(laughter)

MR. BUCKLEY: I don't actually —

MR. BELLOS: Wasn't it the army that sent the report? Wasn't it some part of the —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, I can make it easier for you. I was charged on the 10th of May. The coup was April 21. And on the 10th of May, I was taken over to a criminal prison and put in solitary confinement for eight months, while waiting trial for what they called high treason.

They called it high treason because I was supposed to have been in cahoots with and, in some sense, the political inspirator and leader of a group of what were called "leftist officers." I think about 27 in number, junior officers, who wanted to take over the country, oust the king, establish a dictatorship in Greece. This is the way the charge read. And I'm perfectly willing to tell you what the charge said. And I waited quite eagerly for the day that this trial would take place. We all did.

The basis of this accusation was beyond the kind of hearsay that is quite standard under dictatorial regimes. The whole case rested on the personal depositions of two people who had said that they had heard me say something.

Well, at some point, these two people arrived in Washington, D. C., here, and called a press conference and told your people and the world that they had been intimidated and threatened to make these declarations, following which there was no case. And that is why no trial was held.

This is apart from the very funny thing, you know, for a military gang that takes over a country and destroys its freedom to say they will try you because you "thought." Maybe you did, eh? You thought of doing something like this —

MR. BUCKLEY: Which they succeeded in doing.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Pardon me?

MR. BUCKLEY: Which they succeeded in

doing.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Which they succeeded in doing and which I didn't have any reason to do, for a very simple reason, Mr. Buckley —

MR. BUCKLEY: That you were going to come —

MR. PAPANDREOU: We had 53 percent of the people. Why should you really, even if you are a very ambitious man and a very arrogant man, go by the force of arms when you have the popular vote? I mean minorities do that, not majorities.

MR. BELLOS: Yeah, but let me ask you a question.

MR. PAPANDREOU: What did I need the army for?

MR. BELLOS: Well, let's talk about the king again, which was my first question. Why is it your father never mentioned anything about monarchy? And why did you have that misunderstanding between you and your father about the monarchy thing?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Well, my father mentioned many things about the monarchy. In fact, he was not an especially close friend of Constantine, as you do know.

MR. BELLOS: Hm mmm.

MR. PAPANDREOU: He raised the famous slogan in Greece, which is part of our life now, "The King rules and the people govern." And that was a charge. My disagreement with my father was entirely tactical, as to whether we should vote for a caretaker government or not. And that was not an issue of principle; it was a tactical question.

MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Stevenson?

MR. STEVENSON: I want to get back to the question of what should be the proper basis for U.S. relations with Greece. You obviously want us to turn off the military tap, and presumably disestablish whatever CIA organization we have there. How much further would you go? What about American private industry, the other aspects of American involvement?

MR. PAPANDREOU: I think the one key

recommendation I have is to respect the will of the Greek people. That is to say, to make it possible, by withdrawing support for this regime, for the Greek people to hold elections, free and uninterfered with — not the kind of elections Thieu held some time ago in South Vietnam, but honest elections. And let them, the Greek people, through their elected representatives, whoever they may be — and I may not be one of them, who knows? The Greek people may not wish me to be their representative. Let those representatives negotiate with you on what kind of relations they wish to have, military and economic.

MR. STEVENSON: But the sequence of events is simply to turn off the military tap that will bring about elections that will somehow reflect the will of the people.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Not necessarily. I cannot give you the scenario. I wish I knew enough to be able to give you the scenario. As my father used to say, "Entrance to this arena of a dictatorship is very easy. The ticket is easy to buy. Exit is very difficult." I do not think it is easy to get out of the mess. All I can say that the U.S. can do now is disengage itself and let the Greeks take care of their problems.

I don't ask that you supervise any transition period. I don't even want that kind of patronizing. I wish that you would cut off relations with this regime, that is a shame to European traditions and life as the Council of Europe has established, by ousting the Greek junta from its ranks, and that you leave us alone to find our way. Then you deal on equal terms, moral equal terms with the elected representatives of that people. That's what I'm recommending. Is it difficult to buy that?

MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Hackett?

MR. HACKETT: Mr. Papandreou, last year in a statement that you sent to one of your political groups, at the Vienna meeting in November, I believe —

MR. PAPANDREOU: Right, sir.

MR. HACKETT: — you wrote, in describing the political situation as you saw it after the junta, "Greece will be a neutral country with respect to cold war blocs — Socialist, not simply Socialist-Democratic — a democracy in the context of a Socialist community which surpasses the petrified parliamentary

type." If that's a point of —

MR. PAPANDREOU: It's not the best translation.

MR. HACKETT: If that's a point of agreement between you and Mr. Buckley, that you both seem to look back with some doubts about Greek's parliamentary past, what do you see in a post-junta —

MR. PAPANDREOU: A very good question. You see, that phrase does not imply that I am against parliamentary government. It does imply that I consider it inadequate, by itself, specifically. That was a very short letter and the time now is short. I also believe in very substantial regionalization of Greece, eleven regions. And I believe there should be substantial autonomy and social and economic policy and direct participation of the people of the region in the decisions that concern them.

I want to decentralize decision-making in Greece. I want Athens to be played down and I want the village to be played up. And this is really the thing — not that deputies won't be elected to a national parliament, but many decisions won't be for the central government. It will be for the regional government.

As for the first, it is true, Mr. Hackett, that so many years after the confirmation that NATO really intends to keep the colonels in power, we have no choice as honestmen but to say, "We want out of that." But, so do we also want out of any military alliance that suppresses our freedom. So our condemnation is at least as strong with respect to the Warsaw Pact, which has the Hungarys and the Czechoslovakias in its history. We want to live in peace and in freedom, and NATO, far from guaranteeing that, has deprived us of both.

MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Bellos?

MR. BELLOS: Well, you said, "The province in the islands." Don't you think that out of Athens there are more conservative people than in Athens?

MR. PAPANDREOU: No, sir, quite to the contrary, I think the Greek villager is the most progressive force in Greece.

MR. BELLOS: Coming back to my question, don't you think that the Greek villager wants a king and a church?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Why did they vote 53 percent for us? Don't think it was Athens that gave us the vote. Athens voted either for the right or for the Communists. We got our votes in the Greek village. And this is our strength and this is our base.

I quite disagree with the reports about the conservative Greek of the village. He's a magnificently wise and committed man. And if he has not moved into action, it's because, organizationally, the framework has not been provided for that.

MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Stevenson?

MR. STEVENSON: How is the United States supposed to know that the will of the Greek people has been exercised? In a lot of countries, the way elections are held, they can be controlled. Perhaps, even in the past, because of the involvement of outside powers, elections have been rigged somewhat.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Quite true —

MR. STEVENSON: How do we know?

MR. PAPANDREOU: Quite true, and I would not even wish to put the burden on the United States to supervise these elections, because that would give it too much influence on what happens in Greece.

MR. STEVENSON: Should it be any other non-Greek agency?

MR. PAPANDREOU: I would prefer a United Nations commission.

MR. STEVENSON: You would?

MR. PAPANDREOU: A United Nations commission to supervise elections in Greece. And I would like them to be supervised. (To Buckley) I suppose that if a United Nations commission were to do that, you would be willing to accept its findings, or not?

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, would you get members of the United Nations that were practiced in democracy?

MR. PAPANDREOU: I'm afraid that the United Nations, on the whole, is not too practiced.

MR. BUCKLEY: You can find a few.

MR. PAPANDREOU: But you know, one has to reach for something and I think the only thing that has remained somewhat respectable as an instrumentality is the United Nations. I say only somewhat respectable because it doesn't have teeth, because it includes everything pretty much, or almost everything under the sun.

But there is one advantage in the United Nations — all the forces are represented. And if you have a unanimous report by some commission that the elections were honest, I'm willing to buy it.

MR. BUCKLEY: Even if it returned the colonels to power?

MR. PAPANDREOU: I'm willing to accept anything the Greek people wish.

MR. BUCKLEY: Really? I thought you said you were, above all, in favor of freedom.

MR. PAPANDREOU: Yes, but that is freedom.

MR. BUCKLEY: You surely wouldn't go against freedom simply because the majority wanted to be without it, would you?

MR. PAPANDREOU: All right. You ask a very fundamental, of course, philosophical question —

MR. BUCKLEY: We have only 15 seconds, though.

(laughter)

MR. PAPANDREOU: Okay, my answer — all right, that was very smart of you. Yes, I think there's a contradiction of democratic process which is that you have the freedom to kill freedom. I don't think anybody has resolved that, and I'm surely not going to.

MR. BUCKLEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Papandreou, and gentlemen of the panel, ladies and gentlemen.

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