

Address by

The Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic

Costas Simitis

Greece in The Emerging System of International Relations

1. Whither the 21st Century?

The world after the Second World War, was permeated and characterised by the fissure between East and West. Though we all recognise now that other dimensions of differentiation did persist, their role was definitely secondary in the sight of the main confrontation.

Defining and recognising conditions of stability in such a world was comparatively straightforward. Once the lines were drawn, the roles of the various actors in international relations were distinct and clear. Equally, the way in which the strategic, economic, trade and international relations, as well as other secondary arenas (such as energy or transport) interrelated and their degree of independence was also well understood.

Our world today, the emerging world of the 21st century, is far from these Manichaeian certainties of the Cold War. It is common, indeed commonplace, to refer to emerging opportunities, to the inherent hope that the collapse of artificial barriers has inspired. In this optimistic light, the world of the 21st century can be a world where international differences are resolved through reason and where economic prosperity can advance on the basis of unencumbered comparative advantage.

Yet it is with disturbing frequency that we are reminded by the forces of irrationality of the potential for a dark side of the emerging world scene. The very conditions that give us ground for hopeful opportunities appear able to generate conditions of insecurity and instability that allow some to speak of a slide to barbarism and of a new dark age.

In 1996 the world is balancing on a razor's edge, where it is still not certain whether the coming century will be something to hope for and not to dread. The final outcome will not depend on abstract and impersonal forces of history, but will

be the cumulative result of specific actions and decisions of individuals, or of groupings of individuals.

This last observation is reinforced by the complexity and fluidity of today's balance. In such a delicate equilibrium *all* actors contribute to the overall stability, while the way in which the various levels of foreign, financial and economic relations interplay is by no means given and certain. Maintaining stability is no longer the sole responsibility of a single country; the onerous task once shouldered by the U.S. is now, at least partly, the joint and common responsibility of all players.

The role that each country can play and the responsibility that it carries are functions of its internal priorities and its geopolitical and foreign relations position.

Stability will be furthered if a country's basic choices are given and enjoy consensus, while its foreign relations aspirations are consistent with the legitimate exercise of others' equivalent desires. Such a country, with its basic dilemmas resolved can and ought to play a part in ensuring peace, stability and mutual respect in an area wider than its borders. Such a country can show the way of integration in the international polity of states to other countries in the process of transition.

2. Greece's road to economic and social development

Greece since the Second World War has undergone a painful transformation of her economy and society. The agrarian prewar society where 60% of the population was occupied in agriculture was gradually transformed into a modern society with social and employment structures little different from those of her partners in the European Union. This social metamorphosis has left its legacy not only in productive structures, but also in political life, which was burdened by periods of crisis and constitutional deviations. One of these consequences is the

introverted and defensive way with which Greece has at times reacted to major challenges of international life. The weakness of social structures in the transitional phase has led her often not to play an active part in international processes. Moreover, on occasion it has led some people in Greece to misinterpret as threats developments of international affairs which a more sober analysis could have seen as opportunities for taking on an active role.

This situation has started to change in recent years. Greek society is showing greater readiness to participate dynamically in the international scene. Indeed, it appears to be leading politics and politicians, who occasionally in the past aligned themselves with the attitude of introversion, to increase their efforts towards a more active and substantial role of our country in international affairs.

The Greek people are resolved in pursuing an economic and social development path whose broad outlines meet with general consensus. This strategy is based on three key components:

First, full integration in the global economy . The Greek economy has for a long time been functioning in an open manner, linked to the international trade system. Greece is a full and active member of the most important international systems of economic integration, the European Union and the World Trade Organisation. Greeks understand that further economic advancement, improvements in the quality of life and the standard of living, the building of an effective and viable welfare system, but also progress in international and external relations depend on active participation in the world economic scene. Our country can gain through "playing the game" of the global economy and not through entrenchment in defensive protectionism.

Second, Sound Macroeconomic policies. Our targets for inflation and the public sector deficit for the years to 1999 are embodied in the Convergence Plan to full European monetary integration. The targets for the first years have been met, while the growth of GDP for 1994 and 1995 was stronger than envisaged.

For the first time after many years all macroeconomic indicators have exhibited marked improvements, after a period of stagnation or decline between 1990 and 1993. Our economic policy attempts to balance fiscal rectitude and stabilisation, with growth oriented supply-side policies in a climate of social consensus. The fruits of this policy is an anticipated GDP increase in 1996 in excess of 2.5% with further significant reductions of inflation levels by December. This success has led to a fall of interest rates by more than 7 percentage points, with all that means for the competitiveness and willingness to invest by entrepreneurs.

The fiscal policy followed has restored confidence in the Government's ability to succeed in a radical restructuring of public finances. However, our fiscal situation remains of critical importance, not least because of the pressures of debt service on the budget. The Government will persist with its efforts to fight tax evasion and to curtail the "unofficial economy"; a major weapon in this respect is the simplification of the tax system.

The **third** axis of economic policy is that of **Supply-side policies**, that of structural interventions in the economic process. We are focusing on the real problems facing production:

- Productivity and effectiveness of the public sector and the Government
- The quality, flexibility and adaptability of human capital
- Research and technological development
- Improvements in the quality of infrastructure.
- Information and cooperation networks between enterprises and the state

Growth proceeds on the basis of an implicit understanding between public and private economic agents, with the following characteristics:

- "Horizontal" and non-discriminatory interventions by the State to ensure a "level playing field" and to aid the mechanisms supporting competitiveness.
- The mobilisation , by the private sector, of entrepreneurial capital for investments, aided by the abolition of bureaucratic and other impediments in the implementation of their plans.
- Joint efforts to extend and improve the available infrastructure for transport, telecommunications and energy. Already the motorway network, the modernisation of ports and airports, tourist infrastructure projects, energy projects such as the introduction of natural gas on the one hand represent investment opportunities, while on the other hand offer the prospect of future reductions in the cost of production.

3. Greece in Europe

The cornerstone of our national strategy is Greece's membership of the European Union. Being a full member in that most important of regional integration organisations has materially and visibly contributed to the well-being of Greek people, to the strengthening of democratic values and to our international standing.

In the next few years Europe will be faced with a series of decisions of fundamental importance. These decisions, the first of which will be embodied in the Inter-Governmental conference of 1996 and the revision of the Treaty of Maastricht, will determine the future shape and role of Europe in the coming century. The negotiation will proceed in phases, each of which will be linked to its forerunner and will set the stage for its successor.

Greece's objective in these negotiations is clear: **We want a European Union that develops towards a deepening and more meaningful unity.**

- A Europe that has democratically constructed institutions safeguarding the institutional equality of member states.
- A Europe with common policies and sufficient means to foster conditions of sustainable growth.
- A Europe open to the world and with ability to protect the security and sovereignty of its member-states and citizens.

The European Union and all its constituent members face four paramount responsibilities towards their citizens:

The first responsibility is the Deepening of European Integration. The current state of European institutions is unlikely to be able to face the challenge of further increases in membership of the Union. The momentum of deepening is necessary to counteract the centrifugal forces. Failure to complete planned steps (such as European Monetary Union) may gradually downgrade the Union to nothing more than a regional free trade area.

Deepening as a general strategy implies specific positions on a series of matters:

1. Greater effectiveness and ability to implement policies at the Union level.
2. European Monetary Union. Convergence of nominal monetary magnitudes ought, though, to be supplemented by real convergence of economies and production structures.
3. Inclusion of new members. The Union has already committed itself for a date for starting negotiations with Cyprus and Malta.

The second responsibility is the strengthening of Common External and Security policies. At the moment there is no adequate common strategy, no sufficient agreed mechanisms, no effective supporting infrastructure for such a policy at the Union Level. What exists has proved ineffective, while Union reactions are often late and piecemeal. The absence of such a policy was sorely felt during the Yugoslav crisis. The crisis between Greece and Turkey over the islets is only the most recent example.

The third responsibility is to replenish the absence of social relevance. The European Union can often give the impression that it is concerned solely with financial and economic matters. Issues that touch people's ordinary day-to-day life, such as protection of the environment, consumer policy, employment, health should be matters of European concern. It is progress on these issues that will give content to the idea of the European citizenship.

The final responsibility is the rectification of the democratic deficit. Europe as an institution is in danger of being cut off from its citizens and peoples, for whose benefit it was originally constructed. Decision making in the European Union should not appear to be either the result of top-level deals, nor the sole province of faceless bureaucrats.

Europe, like the United States, is a polymorphous, multicultural society. Our task in the European Union is to attempt what the U.S. has so spectacularly succeeded, to make difference a source of enrichment and of strength. To succeed in that, we need to provide institutional structures through which the European citizen can feel that it is ultimately he or she who is shaping its historical progress. To do this, communication and cooperation must be unfettered, which can only happen in conditions of the rule of law and security.

4. Greece in the Balkans and the Mediterranean

For the last half-century geopolitics placed Greece in a disadvantageous position. The cold war cut it off from its traditional hinterland of the Balkans. All its immediate neighbours to the North were controlled by Communist regimes of varying severity. Areas of traditional trading significance to Greece further East in the Black Sea, such as the Ukraine, Southern Russia and the Caucasus had been closed to Greek interests since the Russian Revolution. To the South the Arab world was overcome by a wave of economic nationalism, while its preoccupation with the conflict with Israel led to strategic alliances taking precedence over economic rationality.

Today these areas are once again opening up. The countries of the area, new and old, are striving to define their role in the world; their economies are seeking their place in the international division of labour; their peoples are trying to shape their identity and future. Their relationship to the New Europe is a central element in their quest, be it at the economic, social, political or cultural levels. This relationship for some countries can mean eventual membership. For others it might mean finding the optimum way of organising trade, capital and know-how flows to accelerate their development.

Greece is a country with which these countries have a close economic, social and cultural affinity, engendered by centuries of close contacts and of parallel historical paths. At the same time it appears to have succeeded or to have already achieved many of the aspirations of the people of the Eastern Mediterranean and South eastern Europe. Greek people thus often and easily take on the role of acting as bridges between these countries and with Europe.

The central Greek objective remains the entrenching of peace in the Balkans, within today's established borders and constitutional realities.

Greece is prepared to contribute towards that goal with all diplomatic means. She will put to use her capacity as member of the European Union, NATO, the Council of Europe, Western European Union and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as her excellent relations with her Balkan neighbours (Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria, Serbia-Montenegro (New Yugoslavia) and Romania.

- The main objectives of our diplomatic activity in the Balkans are:
 - A Conference of the Balkan States aiming at the adoption of a regional Agreement that will safeguard the respect of borders, will encourage good neighbourliness and cooperation and will promote the protection of human rights in general and of minorities in particular; in so doing the dangers of conflagration in delicate areas will be lessened.
 - The steady improvement of bilateral relations of Greece with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) on the basis of the Interim Accord of New York, placing especial emphasis on the concrete definition and implementation of its provisions of economic and financial nature. It must be stressed that the Accord is of seven year duration; it may be replaced with a more comprehensive agreement once the problem of the name of that state is finally resolved.
 - The consideration of expanding NATO's Scheme for Initiative for Peace to include the Balkan States which have not already been incorporated and toward Russia;
 - The further improvement of our relations with Albania.

In the field of **economics**, the Balkan economic area is now opening up and is free to realise its potential. In the global economy it can only be an attractive opportunity for those planning to respond to new challenges. It is not a backwater

for those lagging behind and are either reluctant or incapable to adapt to the new international requirements.

Greece is pursuing *four* priorities for action to enhance the prospects of economic development in the area:

1. **Investment in value-adding activities** . The long term development of Balkan countries depends on the construction of modern infrastructure and the creation of a large number of new enterprises with substantial value added. In contrast with this need, only few of the investment projects concern the industrial sector.

In order to support the option of productive, high value-added investment in the area, a number of initiatives on the part of Greece are in progress:

- The new law on venture capital is expected to assist enterprises to participate in business initiatives in the Balkan countries.
- The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, based in Thessaloniki, will provide the critically important financing for trade and project development.
- The recent upgrading of the Hellenic Organisation of External Trade is insuring investors against political risks.

Direct investment in those countries, apart from the direct effects of the transfer of capital and expertise also serves as a sign of confidence in their future. Joint ventures are a form of business organisation that has many advantages, especially if resources of local, Greek and possibly U.S. investors are pooled.

2. **Human Resources.** The prospects of growth, employment and welfare of the Balkan countries require not only transfer of capital, but also of managerial skills, training and know-how of new technologies and promotion of scientific exchange programmes. Our country strongly supports such exchange programmes, aiming to foster scientific cooperation, management training and joint development of technology.
3. **A stable Macroeconomic environment.** Economic cooperation among Balkan countries requires the attainment of a relatively stable macro-economic environment in all countries, without extreme uncertainties. Increasing the degree of tax harmonisation, developing a compatible financial system and avoiding monetary surprises are steps towards this goal. Joint activity in the banking sector, information exchange by Central Banks and economic policy makers and a deeper knowledge of each other's economy will help to reach a level of mutual understanding and cooperation among economic authorities.
- 4 **Transeuropean networks.** The aim of the European Union is to integrate energy transport and telecommunication infrastructure into Transeuropean networks by the year 2010. Greece, being the only EU Balkan country, is doing its utmost to ensure extension and implementation of this grand project in the Balkan peninsula. Similarly, our area lies on the supply and transport routes for raw materials from areas of the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Our area thus has the capacity, as yet unrealised, of acting as a nodal point in all kinds of international networks.

Already, the major upgrading of infrastructure currently underway in Northern Greece (Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace) will convey substantial external benefits to bordering countries (Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria).

- Greece is taking a active role in efforts to integrate and develop the countries of the Southern Mediterranean rim. It is the responsibility of all countries in the region to ensure that the Oslo Accord between Israel and the P.L.O. is only the starting point of a lasting process for peace and prosperity. The peace and democratisation process which appears to be solidifying in the Middle East paves the way for hopeful prospects for Greece, Cyprus, and the South-eastern Mediterranean
- We are also building the foundations for a dense network of economic relations with the regions of the Black Sea area, ranging from the Caucasus, Ukraine and southern Russia. Greek entrepreneurs in the past played an important role in the economy of the region, a role which was interrupted by political developments. These traditional links, based on real complementarities, are once again taking shape and reasserting themselves. This improvement is matched by both bilateral and multilateral cooperation on the government level.
- Similarly, our relations with Russia and the other States of Central and Eastern Europe have been developing at all levels of possible cooperation.

5. Greek-Turkish relations

- Greece recognises and understands Turkey's need for a European orientation. It is imperative that such a perspective is matched by the safeguarding of European political values, of human rights and of democratic principles.
- The norms of customary international law, the provisions of international treaties, and the unequivocal will of Greece to stand up for her sovereign rights constitute the basis of Greek-Turkish relations.

- We express our deep disquiet for the recent events connected to the islets. In the course of these events Turkey contested the territorial sovereignty of Greece with both words and deeds - going as far as to land a military force on Greek soil. This contestation constitutes a qualitative change in the nature of Turkish claims in the Aegean. Until now, Turkey was casting doubt or demanding rights pertaining to the sea or to the air. The recent crisis shows that we have entered a new phase. In this phase the subjects of discussion and dispute are the land of Greece itself, as well as the titles of sovereignty over it.
- Turkey, careful *first* to dispute Greek territory, is now inviting us to a dialogue without preconditions in order to improve our mutual relations. Of course, we do not reject dialogue with any country. Equally, we are not prepared to negotiate unconditionally and with no prospect of a satisfactory conclusion. Our refusal to negotiate with Turkey is based on three considerations:
 1. on our knowledge that, negotiations, by nature a political and not a legal means of resolution of problems, cannot ensure a final and permanent solution which can be binding for both sides.
 2. on our negative experience of negotiations with Turkey in the seventies. Greece then attempted to negotiate with Turkey in order to jointly formulate an agreement to refer the matter of the Aegean continental shelf to the International Court of Justice. We soon realised that Turkey, on a range of matters, would first agree only to retract her agreement later. At the same time it was continuously placing more issues on the negotiating table, rendering thus an agreement increasingly distant. As could have been expected, these negotiations were fruitless and were discontinued after a few years.
 3. on our unwillingness and our inability to negotiate about national territory, whose possession by Greece is sanctioned by international treaties and on which she has exercised sovereignty unhindered for the last half century.

Yet in asking us to negotiate on the case of the islets, Turkey is doing exactly that.

In contrast, the International Court of Justice is the only secure means for a definitive and binding settlement. As far as the issue of the continental shelf is concerned, Greece is ready to proceed to a *compromis* that would refer the dispute to judicial settlement. In the case that Turkey chooses to have recourse to a judicial organ on the islets issue, Greece stands ready to participate.

Bilateral relations with Turkey will be very different if the basic legal issues are set on the way of resolution through the process of the International Court. In the resulting climate of reduced tension, Greece will have no objection to discuss with Turkey other outstanding issues as well as bilateral matters of mutual interest.

- As far as **Cyprus** is concerned, Greece has never wavered from the position that a solution to the problem should have the features of a bi-zonal, two-community federation which maintains intact the sovereignty of the independent and unitary state of Cyprus. The problem of Cyprus is not merely a constitutional, abstract problem, but has a very important humanitarian dimension, which excites emotional responses from the Greek people. Greece is thus not prepared to consent to a *fait accompli*, which has been imposed by violent means. I am referring, of course, to Turkey's military occupation of forty percent of Cyprus' territory and to the forced expulsion of that region's Greek-Cypriot residents from their homes.

6. Greece and the United States

Greek-American relations are so proven and well-established that I shall not dwell on what may be considered their "traditional" core of trade and investment. Suffice it to say that the investment boom that is currently under way in our

country and is connected with the implementation of the Second Community Support Framework Programme of the E.U. will have much to profit from the presence of American know-how, expertise, capital and generally entrepreneurship. The American investor is likely to find that what used to be a maze of bureaucratic red tape is now replaced with dealing with the Greek Investment Centre, known as the "One Stop Shop" for investment.

As far as the legal basis of trade and investment flows is concerned, Greece being a full member of the E.U. is subject to exactly the same legal, regulatory and customs regime as the other EU member-states. This applies in particular to all trade issues regulated or under discussion in the World Trade Organisation, the O.E.C.D. and other bodies.

To these traditional sources of contact, will be added in years to come contacts and common interests borne of a complementarity of the objectives of Greece and the United States. I have said enough to show that Greece's economic, financial and foreign priorities in the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean not only are not in conflict but complement those of the United States. The cooperation of Greece with the countries of the region, in the economic, but also in a variety of other fields, together with their desire to forge closer links with the European Union, can do much to foster those countries' development and to integrate them smoothly in the world economy.

The headway that Greek companies and Greek entrepreneurs have made in these areas will gain much by the cooperation of U.S. Companies, whether on the basis of subcontracts or joint ventures. The presence of U.S. capital and the multiplication of such joint cooperative activities will act as a signal for stability and security in the area and, quite apart from their immediate impact will do much to build confidence in those emerging markets' long term prospects.

Conclusion: Greece and the Emerging system of international relations

Humanity is becoming all the more universal. The development of communications, the international fusing of productive structures, the interdependence of policies of states have led to the spread of common values and principles. Many of the elements of this global culture, in the political, economic and cultural fields were unfamiliar to many peoples not so long ago.

Greece is on the interjection of many lines of fissure whose instability can prove problematic for world affairs: it is the only Balkan country in the European Union, it is the only Christian Orthodox country in the Union, it is washed by the Eastern Mediterranean, it has traditional cultural and economic links with the Black Sea and the Caucasus, with the Arab world and with Israel.

Countries in our neighbourhood are currently in an agonising search for their identity and to chart their course for the common decades. Will they choose their smooth transition and integration to the global economy? Will they reform their productive structures to be efficient market economies? Will their development path be in the direction of democratic institutions or will they slide to an arid theocracy? Will they strive to legitimise themselves by internal social development or external aggression?

Stability and prosperity on a global scale depend on the answers to these questions, Greece is one country of the area that has resolved her internal dilemmas with a very wide consensus and has no claims on its neighbours other than that they show good neighbourliness. From similar starting point she has succeeded in the road that many of her neighbours are only now embarking on. She is sure of what she is and where she wants to go.

Such a country *should* be uniquely placed to play a stabilising and integrating role on many levels. Yet, rather than playing this constructive role fully, Greece often has to expend her energies in repelling the kind of demands on her sovereignty and territorial integrity that the rule of the international legal order should rule out as unthinkable between established states. Thus, disputing the established international legal order is not only damaging for the immediate victim of the dispute, but also deprives the international scene of energies that can be put to use in constructive directions.

Maintaining international stability in our complex world is a burden that must be shared by all states and by all people. The prize of stability is peace, prosperity and the kind of respect to human rights that makes prosperity worthwhile.

SHORT VERSION B

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Yet it is with disturbing frequency that we are reminded by the forces of irrationality of the potential for a dark side of the emerging world scene.

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2. Greece's road to economic and social development

Greece since the Second World War has undergone a painful transformation of her economy and society. This social metamorphosis has left its legacy not only in productive structures, but also in political life. One of these consequences is the introverted and defensive way with which Greece has at times reacted to

major challenges of international life. The weakness of social structures has led her often not to play an active part in international processes.

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 2. on our negative experience of negotiations with Turkey in the seventies. Greece then attempted to negotiate with Turkey in order to jointly formulate an agreement to refer the matter of the Aegean continental shelf to the

International Court of Justice. We soon realised that Turkey, on a range of matters, would first agree only to retract her agreement later. At the same time it was continuously placing more issues on the negotiating table, rendering thus an agreement increasingly distant. As could have been expected, these negotiations were fruitless and were discontinued after a few years.

3. on our unwillingness and our inability to negotiate about national territory, whose possession by Greece is sanctioned by international treaties and on which she has exercised sovereignty unhindered for the last half century. Yet in asking us to negotiate on the case of the islets, Turkey is doing exactly that.

In contrast, the International Court of Justice is the only secure means for a definitive and binding settlement. As far as the issue of the continental shelf is concerned, Greece is ready to proceed to a *compromis* that would refer the dispute to judicial settlement. In the case that Turkey chooses to have recourse to a judicial organ on the islets issue, Greece stands ready to participate.

Bilateral relations with Turkey will be very different if the basic legal issues are set on the way of resolution through the process of the International Court. In the resulting climate of reduced tension, Greece will have no objection to discuss with Turkey other outstanding issues as well as bilateral matters of mutual interest.

- As far as **Cyprus** is concerned, Greece has never wavered from the position that a solution to the problem should have the features of a bi-zonal, two-community federation which maintains intact the sovereignty of the independent and unitary state of Cyprus. Greece is not prepared to consent to a *fait accompli*, which has been imposed by violent means. I am referring, of course, to Turkey's military occupation of forty percent of Cyprus' territory and

to the forced expulsion of that region's Greek-Cypriot residents from their homes.

6. Greece and the United States

Greek-American relations are so proven and well-established that I shall not dwell on what may be considered their "traditional" core of trade and investment. The American Investor, however, is likely to find that what used to be a maze of bureaucratic red tape is now replaced with dealing with the Greek Investment Centre, known as the "One Stop Shop" for investment.

To these traditional sources of contact, will be added in years to come contacts and common interests borne of a complementarity of the objectives of Greece and the United States. The cooperation of Greece with the countries of the region, in the economic, but also in variety of other fields, together with their desire to forge closer links with the European Union, can do much to foster those countries' development and to integrate them smoothly in the world economy.

7. Conclusion: Greece and the Emerging system of international relations

Humanity is becoming all the more universal. The development of communications, the international fusing of productive structures, the interdependence of states have led to the spread of common values and principles.

Greece is on the interjection of many lines of fissure whose instability can prove problematic for world affairs.

Countries in our neighbourhood are currently in an agonising search for their identity and to chart their course for the common decades. Will they choose their smooth integration to the global economy? Will they reform their productive structures? Will their development path be in the direction of democratic institutions or will they slide to an arid theocracy? Will they strive to legitimise themselves by social development or external aggression?

Stability and prosperity on a global scale depend on the answers to these questions, Greece is one country of the area that has resolved her internal dilemmas with a very wide consensus and has no claims on its neighbours other than that they show good neighbourliness. From similar starting point she has succeeded in the road that many of her neighbours are only now embarking on. She is sure of what she is and where she wants to go.

Such a country *should* be uniquely placed to play a stabilising and integrating role on many levels. Yet, rather than playing this constructive role fully, Greece often has to expend her energies in repelling demands on her that the rule of the international legal order should rule out as unthinkable between established states. Thus, disputing the established international legal order is not only damaging for the immediate victim of the dispute, but also deprives the international scene of energies that can be put to use in constructive directions.

Maintaining international stability in our complex world is a burden that must be shared by all states and by all people. The prize of stability is peace, prosperity and the kind of respect to human rights that makes prosperity worthwhile.