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# **A DECADE OF DECEPTION AND DEFIANCE**

**SADDAM HUSSEIN'S DEFIANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS**

**SEPTEMBER 12, 2002**



## PREFACE

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*A Decade of Deception and Defiance* serves as a background paper for President George W. Bush's September 12<sup>th</sup> speech to the United Nations General Assembly. This document provides specific examples of how Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has systematically and continually violated 16 United Nations Security Council resolutions over the past decade. This document is not designed to catalogue all of the violations of UN resolutions or other abuses of Saddam Hussein's regime over the years.

For more than a decade, Saddam Hussein has deceived and defied the will and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council by, among other things: continuing to seek and develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and prohibited long-range missiles; brutalizing the Iraqi people, including committing gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity; supporting international terrorism; refusing to release or account for prisoners of war and other missing individuals from the Gulf War era; refusing to return stolen Kuwaiti property; and working to circumvent the UN's economic sanctions.

The Administration will periodically provide information on these and other aspects of the threat posed to the international community by Saddam Hussein.



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## **SADDAM HUSSEIN'S DEFIANCE OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS**

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Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated sixteen United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) designed to ensure that Iraq does not pose a threat to international peace and security. In addition to these repeated violations, he has tried, over the past decade, to circumvent UN economic sanctions against Iraq, which are reflected in a number of other resolutions. As noted in the resolutions, Saddam Hussein was required to fulfill many obligations beyond the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Specifically, Saddam Hussein was required to, among other things: allow international weapons inspectors to oversee the destruction of his weapons of mass destruction; not develop new weapons of mass destruction; destroy all of his ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers; stop support for terrorism and prevent terrorist organizations from operating within Iraq; help account for missing Kuwaitis and other individuals; return stolen Kuwaiti property and bear financial liability for damage from the Gulf War; and he was required to end his repression of the Iraqi people. Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated each of the following resolutions:

### **UNSCR 678 – NOVEMBER 29, 1990**

- Iraq must comply fully with UNSCR 660 (regarding Iraq's illegal invasion of Kuwait) "and all subsequent relevant resolutions."
- Authorizes UN Member States "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."

### **UNSCR 686 – MARCH 2, 1991**

- Iraq must release prisoners detained during the Gulf War.
- Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.
- Iraq must accept liability under international law for damages from its illegal invasion of Kuwait.

### **UNSCR 687 – APRIL 3, 1991**

- Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities."
- Iraq must "unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material" or any research, development or manufacturing facilities.
- Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the destruction, removal or rendering harmless "under international supervision" of all "ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 KM and related major parts and repair and production facilities."
- Iraq must not "use, develop, construct or acquire" any weapons of mass destruction.
- Iraq must reaffirm its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- Creates the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify the elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs and mandated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verify elimination of Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
- Iraq must declare fully its weapons of mass destruction programs.
- Iraq must not commit or support terrorism, or allow terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq.
- Iraq must cooperate in accounting for the missing and dead Kuwaitis and others.
- Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.



#### UNSCR 688 – APRIL 5, 1991

- "Condemns" repression of Iraqi civilian population, "the consequences of which threaten international peace and security."
- Iraq must immediately end repression of its civilian population.
- Iraq must allow immediate access to international humanitarian organizations to those in need of assistance.

#### UNSCR 707 – AUGUST 15, 1991

- "Condemns" Iraq's "serious violation" of UNSCR 687.
- "Further condemns" Iraq's noncompliance with IAEA and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- Iraq must halt nuclear activities of all kinds until the Security Council deems Iraq in full compliance.
- Iraq must make a full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction and missile programs.
- Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
- Iraq must cease attempts to conceal or move weapons of mass destruction, and related materials and facilities.
- Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors to conduct inspection flights throughout Iraq.
- Iraq must provide transportation, medical and logistical support for UN and IAEA inspectors.

#### UNSCR 715 – OCTOBER 11, 1991

- Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors.

#### UNSCR 949 – OCTOBER 15, 1994

- "Condemns" Iraq's recent military deployments toward Kuwait.
- Iraq must not utilize its military or other forces in a hostile manner to threaten its neighbors or UN operations in Iraq.
- Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors.
- Iraq must not enhance its military capability in southern Iraq.

#### UNSCR 1051 – MARCH 27, 1996

- Iraq must report shipments of dual-use items related to weapons of mass destruction to the UN and IAEA.
- Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

#### UNSCR 1060 – JUNE 12, 1996

- "Deplores" Iraq's refusal to allow access to UN inspectors and Iraq's "clear violations" of previous UN resolutions.
- Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.



#### UNSCR 1115 – JUNE 21, 1997

- "Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a "clear and flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
- Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
- Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors want to interview.

#### UNSCR 1134 – OCTOBER 23, 1997

- "Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access" to UN inspectors, which constitutes a "flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.
- Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.
- Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom UN inspectors want to interview.

#### UNSCR 1137 – NOVEMBER 12, 1997

- "Condemns the continued violations by Iraq" of previous UN resolutions, including its "implicit threat to the safety of" aircraft operated by UN inspectors and its tampering with UN inspector monitoring equipment.
- Reaffirms Iraq's responsibility to ensure the safety of UN inspectors.
- Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

#### UNSCR 1154 – MARCH 2, 1998

- Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, and notes that any violation would have the "severest consequences for Iraq."

#### UNSCR 1194 – SEPTEMBER 9, 1998

- "Condemns the decision by Iraq of 5 August 1998 to suspend cooperation with" UN and IAEA inspectors, which constitutes "a totally unacceptable contravention" of its obligations under UNSCR 687, 707, 715, 1060, 1115, and 1154.
- Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors, and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

#### UNSCR 1205 – NOVEMBER 5, 1998

- "Condemns the decision by Iraq of 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation" with UN inspectors as "a flagrant violation" of UNSCR 687 and other resolutions.
- Iraq must provide "immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation" with UN and IAEA inspectors.



#### UNSCR 1284 – DECEMBER 17, 1999

- Created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace previous weapon inspection team (UNSCOM).
- Iraq must allow UNMOVIC "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" to Iraqi officials and facilities.
- Iraq must fulfill its commitment to return Gulf War prisoners.
- Calls on Iraq to distribute humanitarian goods and medical supplies to its people and address the needs of vulnerable Iraqis without discrimination.

#### ADDITIONAL UN SECURITY COUNCIL STATEMENTS

In addition to the legally binding UNSCRs, the UN Security Council has also issued at least 30 statements from the President of the UN Security Council regarding Saddam Hussein's continued violations of UNSCRs. The list of statements includes:

- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 28, 1991
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, February 5, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, February 19, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, February 28, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 6, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 11, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 12, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, April 10, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 17, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, July 6, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, September 2, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 23, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 24, 1992
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, January 8, 1993
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, January 11, 1993
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 18, 1993
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 28, 1993
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 23, 1993
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, October 8, 1994
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, March 19, 1996
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 14, 1996
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, August 23, 1996
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, December 30, 1996
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, June 13, 1997
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, October 29, 1997
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, November 13, 1997
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, December 3, 1997
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, December 22, 1997
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, January 14, 1998
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement, May 14, 1998



## SADDAM HUSSEIN'S DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Saddam Hussein has continued to defy UN weapons inspectors for more than a decade, and he continues his efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction – including biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, and prohibited long-range missiles – and other means to deliver them.

### BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

- In 2001, an Iraqi defector, Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haidari, said he had visited twenty secret facilities for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Mr. Saeed, a civil engineer, supported his claims with stacks of Iraqi government contracts, complete with technical specifications. Mr. Saeed said Iraq used companies to purchase equipment with the blessing of the United Nations – and then secretly used the equipment for their weapons programs.<sup>1</sup>
- Iraq admitted to producing biological agents, and after the 1995 defection of a senior Iraqi official, Iraq admitted to the weaponization of thousands of liters of anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin for use with Scud warheads, aerial bombs and aircraft.<sup>2</sup>
- United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) experts concluded that Iraq's declarations on biological agents vastly understated the extent of its program, and that Iraq actually produced two to four times the amount of most agents, including anthrax and botulinum toxin, than it had declared.<sup>3</sup>
- UNSCOM reported to the UN Security Council in April 1995 that Iraq had concealed its biological weapons program and had failed to account for 3 tons of growth material for biological agents.<sup>4</sup>
- The Department of Defense reported in January 2001 that Iraq has continued to work on its weapons programs, including converting L-29 jet trainer aircraft for potential vehicles for the delivery of chemical or biological weapons.<sup>5</sup>
- The al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility is one of two known biocontainment level-three facilities in Iraq that have an extensive air handling and filtering system. Iraq has admitted that this was a biological weapons facility. In 2001, Iraq announced that it would begin renovating the plant without UN approval, ostensibly to produce vaccines that it could more easily and more quickly import through the UN.
- Saddam Hussein continues its attempts to procure mobile biological weapons laboratories that could be used for further research and development.

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<sup>1</sup> "Secret Sites: Iraqi tells of Renovations at Sites for Chemical and Nuclear Arms," *The New York Times*, December 20, 2001

<sup>2</sup> UNSCOM Report, January 25, 1999

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> *Proliferation: Threat and Response*; Department of Defense; January 2001



### CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Saddam Hussein launched a large-scale chemical weapons attack against Iraq's Kurdish population in the late 1980s, killing thousands. On at least 10 occasions, Saddam Hussein's military forces have attacked Iranian and Kurdish targets with combinations of mustard gas and nerve agents through the use of aerial bombs, 122-millimeter rockets, and conventional artillery shells. Saddam Hussein continues his efforts to develop chemical weapons:

- Gaps identified by UNSCOM in Iraqi accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq maintains stockpiles of chemical agents, probably VX, sarin, cyclosarin and mustard.
- Iraq has not accounted for hundreds of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled munitions, including Scud variant missile warheads.<sup>6</sup>
- Iraq has not accounted for at least 15,000 artillery rockets that in the past were its preferred vehicle for delivering nerve agents, nor has it accounted for about 550 artillery shells filled with mustard agent.<sup>7</sup>
- Iraq continues to rebuild and expand dual-use infrastructure that it could quickly divert to chemical weapons production, such as chlorine and phenol plants.
- Iraq is seeking to purchase chemical weapons agent precursors and applicable production equipment, and is making an effort to hide activities at the Fallujah plant, which was one of Iraq's chemical weapons production facilities before the Gulf War.
- At Fallujah and three other plants, Iraq now has chlorine production capacity far higher than any civilian need for water treatment, and the evidence indicates that some of its chlorine imports are being diverted for military purposes.

### NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf War and continues his work to develop a nuclear weapon:

- A new report released on September 9, 2002 from the International Institute for Strategic Studies – an independent research organization – concludes that Saddam Hussein could build a nuclear bomb within months if he were able to obtain fissile material.<sup>8</sup>
- Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb. In the last 14 months, Iraq has sought to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes which officials believe were intended as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium.

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<sup>6</sup> UNSCOM Report, January 25, 1999

<sup>7</sup> Ibid

<sup>8</sup> *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment*, September 9, 2002; The International Institute for Strategic Studies



- Iraq has withheld documentation relevant to its past nuclear program, including data about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design, experimental data, and technical documents.
- Iraq still has the technical expertise and some of the infrastructure needed to pursue its goal of building a nuclear weapon.
- Saddam Hussein has repeatedly met with his nuclear scientists over the past two years, signaling his continued interest in developing his nuclear program.

#### BALLISTIC MISSILES

- Iraq is believed to be developing ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers – as prohibited by the UN Security Council Resolution 687.
- Discrepancies identified by UNSCOM in Saddam Hussein's declarations suggest that Iraq retains a small force of Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of launchers and warheads.<sup>9</sup>
- Iraq continues work on the al-Samoud liquid propellant short-range missile (which can fly beyond the allowed 150 kilometers). The al-Samoud and the solid propellant Ababil-100 appeared in a military parade in Baghdad on December 31, 2000, suggesting that both systems are nearing operational deployment.
- The al-Rafah-North facility is Iraq's principal site for testing liquid propellant missile engines. Iraq has been building a new, larger test stand there that is clearly intended for testing prohibited longer-range missile engines.
- At their al-Mamoun facility, the Iraqis have rebuilt structures that had been dismantled by UNSCOM that were originally designed to manufacture solid propellant motors for the Badr-2000 missile program.

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<sup>9</sup> UNSCOM Report



## SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REPRESSION OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE

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UNSCR 688 (April 5, 1991) "condemns" Saddam Hussein's repression of the Iraqi civilian population -- "the consequences of which threaten international peace and security." UNSCR 688 also requires Saddam Hussein to end his repression of the Iraqi people and to allow immediate access to international humanitarian organizations to help those in need of assistance. Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated these provisions and has: expanded his violence against women and children; continued his horrific torture and execution of innocent Iraqis; continued to violate the basic human rights of the Iraqi people and has continued to control all sources of information (including killing more than 500 journalists and other opinion leaders in the past decade). Saddam Hussein has also harassed humanitarian aid workers; expanded his crimes against Muslims; he has withheld food from families that fail to offer their children to his regime; and he has continued to subject Iraqis to unfair imprisonment.<sup>10</sup>

### REFUSAL TO ADMIT HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS

- The UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN General Assembly issued a report that noted "with dismay" the lack of improvement in the situation of human rights in Iraq. The report strongly criticized the "systematic, widespread, and extremely grave violations of human rights" and of international humanitarian law by the Iraqi Government, which it stated resulted in "all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror." The report called on the Iraqi Government to fulfill its obligations under international human rights treaties.
- Saddam Hussein has repeatedly refused visits by human rights monitors and the establishment of independent human rights organizations. From 1992 until 2002, Saddam prevented the UN Special Rapporteur from visiting Iraq.<sup>11</sup>
- In September 2001 the Government expelled six UN humanitarian relief workers without providing any explanation.<sup>12</sup>

### VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

- Human rights organizations and opposition groups continued to receive reports of women who suffered from severe psychological trauma after being raped by Iraqi personnel while in custody.<sup>13</sup>
- Former Mukhabarat member Khalid Al-Janabi reported that a Mukhabarat unit, the Technical Operations Directorate, used rape and sexual assault in a systematic and institutionalized manner for political purposes. The unit reportedly also videotaped the rape of female relatives of suspected oppositionists and used the videotapes for blackmail purposes and to ensure their future cooperation.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq*, March 4, 2002; US Department of State; [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

<sup>11</sup> Page 2-3, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq*, March 4, 2002; US Department of State; [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 6

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 5

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 5



- In June 2000, a former Iraqi general reportedly received a videotape of security forces raping a female family member. He subsequently received a telephone call from an intelligence agent who stated that another female relative was being held and warned him to stop speaking out against the Iraqi Government.<sup>15</sup>
- Iraqi security forces allegedly raped women who were captured during the Anfal Campaign and during the occupation of Kuwait.<sup>16</sup>
- Amnesty International reported that, in October 2000, the Iraqi Government executed dozens of women accused of prostitution.<sup>17</sup>
- In May, the Iraqi Government reportedly tortured to death the mother of three Iraqi defectors for her children's opposition activities.<sup>18</sup>
- Iraqi security agents reportedly decapitated numerous women and men in front of their family members. According to Amnesty International, the victims' heads were displayed in front of their homes for several days.<sup>19</sup>

#### TORTURE

- Iraqi security services routinely and systematically torture detainees. According to former prisoners, torture techniques included branding, electric shocks administered to the genitals and other areas, beating, pulling out of fingernails, burning with hot irons and blowtorches, suspension from rotating ceiling fans, dripping acid on the skin, rape, breaking of limbs, denial of food and water, extended solitary confinement in dark and extremely small compartments, and threats to rape or otherwise harm family members and relatives. Evidence of such torture often was apparent when security forces returned the mutilated bodies of torture victims to their families.<sup>20</sup>
- According to a report received by the UN Special Rapporteur in 1998, hundreds of Kurds and other detainees have been held without charge for close to two decades in extremely harsh conditions, and many of them have been used as subjects in Iraq's illegal experimental chemical and biological weapons programs.<sup>21</sup>
- In 2000, the authorities reportedly introduced tongue amputation as a punishment for persons who criticize Saddam Hussein or his family, and on July 17, government authorities reportedly amputated the tongue of a person who allegedly criticized Saddam Hussein. Authorities reportedly performed the amputation in front of a large crowd. Similar tongue amputations also reportedly occurred.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Page 7, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq*, March 4, 2002; US Department of State: [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 5

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 2

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 3

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 3

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 4

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 6

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 4-5



- Refugees fleeing to Europe often reported instances of torture to receiving governments, and displayed scars and mutilations to substantiate their claims.<sup>23</sup>
- In August 2001 Amnesty International released a report entitled *Iraq -- Systematic Torture of Political Prisoners*, which detailed the systematic and routine use of torture against suspected political opponents and, occasionally, other prisoners. Amnesty International also reports "Detainees have also been threatened with bringing in a female relative, especially the wife or the mother, and raping her in front of the detainee. Some of these threats have been carried out."<sup>24</sup>
- Saad Keis Naoman, an Iraqi soccer player who defected to Europe, reported that he and his teammates were beaten and humiliated at the order of Uday Saddam Hussein for poor performances. He was flogged until his back was bloody, forcing him to sleep on his stomach in the tiny cell in Al-Radwaniya prison.<sup>25</sup>

#### EXECUTIONS AND REPRESSION OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION

- Former UN Human Rights Special Rapporteur Max Van der Stoep's report in April 1998 stated that Iraq had executed at least 1,500 people during the previous year for political reasons.
- The government continues to execute summarily alleged political opponents and leaders in the Shi'a religious community. Reports suggest that persons were executed merely because of their association with an opposition group or as part of a continuing effort to reduce prison populations.<sup>26</sup>
- In February 2001, the Government reportedly executed 37 political detainees for opposition activity.<sup>27</sup>
- In June 2001, security forces killed a Shi'a cleric, Hussein Bahar al-Uloom, for refusing to appear on television to congratulate Qusay Saddam Hussein for his election to a Ba'th Party position. Such killings continue an apparent government policy of eliminating prominent Shi'a clerics who are suspected of disloyalty to the government. In 1998 and 1999, the Government killed a number of leading Shi'a clerics, prompting the former Special Rapporteur in 1999 to express his concern to the government that the killings might be part of a systematic attack by government officials on the independent leadership of the Shi'a Muslim community. The government did not respond to the Special Rapporteur's letter.<sup>28</sup>
- There are persistent reports that families are made to pay for the cost of executions.<sup>29</sup>
- Saddam Hussein destroyed the southern Iraqi town of Albu 'Aysh sometime between September 1998 and December 1999.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Page 4, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq*, March 4, 2002; US Department of State; [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

<sup>24</sup> *Iraq – Systematic Torture of Political Prisoners*; Amnesty International; [web.amnesty.org](http://web.amnesty.org)

<sup>25</sup> Page 4, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq*, March 4, 2002; US Department of State; [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 1

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 2

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 2

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 4

<sup>30</sup> *Iraq – Systematic Torture of Political Prisoners*; Amnesty International; [web.amnesty.org](http://web.amnesty.org)



- Iraq has conducted a systematic "Arabization" campaign of ethnic cleansing designed to harass and expel ethnic Kurds and Turkmen from government-controlled areas. Non-Arab citizens are forced to change their ethnicity or their identity documents and adopt Arab names, or they are deprived of their homes, property and food-ration cards, and expelled.

#### SADDAM HUSSEIN'S ABUSE OF CHILDREN

- Saddam Hussein has held 3-week training courses in weapons use, hand-to-hand fighting, rappelling from helicopters, and infantry tactics for children between 10 and 15 years of age. Camps for these "Saddam Cubs" operated throughout the country. Senior military officers who supervised the courses noted that the children held up under the "physical and psychological strain" of training that lasted for as long as 14 hours each day. Sources in the opposition report that the army found it difficult to recruit enough children to fill all of the vacancies in the program. Families reportedly were threatened with the loss of their food ration cards if they refused to enroll their children in the course. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq reported in October 1999 that authorities were denying food ration cards to families that failed to send their young sons to Saddam Cubs compulsory weapons-training camps. Similarly, authorities reportedly withheld school examination results to students unless they registered in the Fedayeen Saddam organization.<sup>31</sup>
- Iraq often announces food ration cuts for the general population, blaming US or UK actions. Among the most controversial have been cuts in baby milk rations. Iraq has blamed the shortages on US and UK contract rejections, although the UN has approved all baby milk contracts submitted.
- Child labor persists and there are instances of forced labor.
- There are widespread reports that food and medicine that could have been made available to the general public, including children, have been stockpiled in warehouses or diverted for the personal use of some government officials.<sup>32</sup>

#### DISAPPEARANCES

- Amnesty International reported that Iraq has the world's worst record for numbers of persons who have disappeared or remain unaccounted for.<sup>33</sup>
- In 1999, the UN Special Rapporteur stated that Iraq remains the country with the highest number of disappearances known to the UN: over 16,000.

#### BASIC FREEDOMS: FREEDOM OF SPEECH, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

- In practice, Saddam Hussein does not permit freedom of speech or of the press, and does not tolerate political dissent in areas under its control. In November 2000, the UN General Assembly criticized Saddam Hussein's "suppression of freedom of thought, expression, information, association, and assembly." The Special Rapporteur stated in October 1999 that citizens lived "in a climate of fear," in

<sup>31</sup> Page 1, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq*, March 4, 2002; US Department of State; [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* Page 16

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.* Page 3



which whatever they said or did, particularly in the area of politics, involved "the risk of arrest and interrogation by the police or military intelligence." He noted that "the mere suggestion that someone is not a supporter of the President carries the prospect of the death penalty."<sup>34</sup>

- In June 2001, the Human Rights Alliance reported that Saddam Hussein had killed more than 500 journalists and other intellectuals in the past decade.<sup>35</sup>
- Saddam Hussein frequently infringes on citizens' constitutional right to privacy. Saddam routinely ignores constitutional provisions designed to protect the confidentiality of mail, telegraphic correspondence, and telephone conversations. Iraq periodically jams news broadcasts from outside the country, including those of opposition groups. The security services and the Ba'th Party maintain pervasive networks of informers to deter dissident activity and instill fear in the public.<sup>36</sup>
- Foreign journalists must work from offices located within the Iraqi ministry building and are accompanied everywhere they go by ministry officers, who reportedly restrict their movements and make it impossible for them to interact freely with citizens.<sup>37</sup>
- The Iraqi Government, the Ba'th Party, or persons close to Saddam Hussein own all print and broadcast media, and operate them as propaganda outlets. They generally do not report opposing points of view that are expressed either domestically or abroad.<sup>38</sup>
- In September 1999, Hashem Hasan, a journalist and Baghdad University professor, was arrested after declining an appointment as editor of one of Uday Hussein's publications. The Paris-based Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF) sent a letter of appeal to Uday Hussein; however, Hassan's fate and whereabouts remained unknown at year's end.<sup>39</sup>
- Saddam Hussein regularly jams foreign news broadcasts. Satellite dishes, modems, and fax machines are banned, although some restrictions reportedly were lifted in 1999.<sup>40</sup>
- In government-operated Internet cafes, users only are permitted to view web sites provided by the Ministry of Culture and Information.<sup>41</sup>
- In 1999, Uday Hussein reportedly dismissed hundreds of members of the Iraqi Union of Journalists for not praising Saddam Hussein and the Government sufficiently.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Page 9, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq*, March 4, 2002; US Department of State; [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 9

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 7

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 9

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 9

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 10

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 10

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 10

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 10



### WITHHOLDING OF FOOD

- Relatives who do not report deserters may lose their ration cards for purchasing government-controlled food supplies, be evicted from their residences, or face the arrest of other family members. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq reported in October and December 1999 that authorities denied food ration cards to families that failed to send their young sons to the "Saddam's Cubs" compulsory weapons training camps.<sup>43</sup>

### CRIMES AGAINST MUSLIMS

- The Government consistently politicizes and interferes with religious pilgrimages, both of Iraqi Muslims who wish to make the Hajj to Mecca and Medina and of Iraqi and non-Iraqi Muslim pilgrims who travel to holy sites within the country. For example, in 1998 the UN Sanctions Committee offered to disburse vouchers for travel and expenses to pilgrims making the Hajj; however, the Government rejected this offer. In 1999 the Sanctions Committee offered to disburse funds to cover Hajj-related expenses via a neutral third party; the Government again rejected the offer. Following the December 1999 passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1284, the Sanctions Committee again sought to devise a protocol to facilitate the payment for individuals making the journey. The Sanctions Committee proposed to issue \$250 in cash and \$1,750 in travelers checks to each individual pilgrim to be distributed at the U.N. office in Baghdad in the presence of both U.N. and Iraqi officials. The Government again declined and, consequently, no Iraqi pilgrims were able to take advantage of the available funds or, in 2000, of the permitted flights. The Government continued to insist that these funds would be accepted only if they were paid in cash to the government-controlled central bank, not to the Hajj pilgrims.<sup>44</sup>

More than 95 percent of the population of Iraq are Muslim. The (predominantly Arab) Shi'a Muslims constitute a 60 to 65 percent majority:

- The Iraqi government has for decades conducted a brutal campaign of murder, summary execution, and protracted arbitrary arrest against the religious leaders and followers of the majority Shi'a Muslim population. Despite nominal legal protection of religious equality, the Government has repressed severely the Shi'a clergy and those who follow the Shi'a faith.<sup>45</sup>
- Forces from the Mukhabarat, General Security (Amn Al-Amm), the Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos (Fedayeen Saddam), and the Ba'th Party have killed senior Shi'a clerics, desecrated Shi'a mosques and holy sites, and interfered with Shi'a religious education. Security agents reportedly are stationed at all the major Shi'a mosques and shrines, where they search, harass, and arbitrarily arrest worshipers.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Page 8, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq*, March 4, 2002; US Department of State, [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 11-12

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 11

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, Page 11



- The following government restrictions on religious rights remained in effect during 2001: restrictions and outright bans on communal Friday prayer by Shi'a Muslims; restrictions on the loaning of books by Shi'a mosque libraries; a ban on the broadcast of Shi'a programs on government-controlled radio or television; a ban on the publication of Shi'a books, including prayer books and guides; a ban on funeral processions other than those organized by the Government; a ban on other Shi'a funeral observances such as gatherings for Koran reading; and the prohibition of certain processions and public meetings that commemorate Shi'a holy days. Shi'a groups report that they captured documents from the security services during the 1991 uprising that listed thousands of forbidden Shi'a religious writings.<sup>47</sup>
- In June 1999, several Shi'a opposition groups reported that the Government instituted a program in the predominantly Shi'a districts of Baghdad that used food ration cards to restrict where individuals could pray. The ration cards, part of the UN oil-for-food program, reportedly are checked when the bearer enters a mosque and are printed with a notice of severe penalties for those who attempt to pray at an unauthorized location.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Page 11, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq*, March 4, 2002; US Department of State; [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. Page 11



## SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

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Iraq is one of seven countries that have been designated by the Secretary of State as state sponsors of international terrorism. UNSCR 687 prohibits Saddam Hussein from committing or supporting terrorism, or allowing terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq. Saddam continues to violate these UNSCR provisions.<sup>49</sup>

- In 1993, the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) directed and pursued an attempt to assassinate, through the use of a powerful car bomb, former U.S. President George Bush and the Emir of Kuwait. Kuwaiti authorities thwarted the terrorist plot and arrested 16 suspects, led by two Iraqi nationals.
- Iraq shelters terrorist groups including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO), which has used terrorist violence against Iran and in the 1970s was responsible for killing several U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians.<sup>50</sup>
- Iraq shelters several prominent Palestinian terrorist organizations in Baghdad, including the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), which is known for aerial attacks against Israel and is headed by Abu Abbas, who carried out the 1985 hijacking of the cruise ship *Achille Lauro* and murdered U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer.<sup>51</sup>
- Iraq shelters the Abu Nidal Organization, an international terrorist organization that has carried out terrorist attacks in twenty countries, killing or injuring almost 900 people. Targets have included the United States and several other Western nations. Each of these groups have offices in Baghdad and receive training, logistical assistance, and financial aid from the government of Iraq.<sup>52</sup>
- In April 2002, Saddam Hussein increased from \$10,000 to \$25,000 the money offered to families of Palestinian suicide/homicide bombers. The rules for rewarding suicide/homicide bombers are strict and insist that only someone who blows himself up with a belt of explosives gets the full payment. Payments are made on a strict scale, with different amounts for wounds, disablement, death as a "martyr" and \$25,000 for a suicide bomber. Mahmoud Besharat, a representative on the West Bank who is handing out to families the money from Saddam, said, "You would have to ask President Saddam why he is being so generous. But he is a revolutionary and he wants this distinguished struggle, the *intifada*, to continue."<sup>53</sup>
- Former Iraqi military officers have described a highly secret terrorist training facility in Iraq known as Salman Pak, where both Iraqis and non-Iraqi Arabs receive training on hijacking planes and trains, planting explosives in cities, sabotage, and assassinations.

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<sup>49</sup> *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001: Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism*; US Department of State; May 21, 2002.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> "Jenin Families Pocket Iraqi Cash"; *The Washington Times: London Daily Telegraph*; May 31, 2002.



## SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REFUSAL TO ACCOUNT FOR GULF WAR PRISONERS

UNSCRs 686, 687 and others require Saddam Hussein to release immediately any Gulf War prisoners and to cooperate in accounting for missing and dead Kuwaitis and others from the Gulf War. Saddam has continued to violate these resolutions.

- Saddam Hussein has failed to return, or account for, a large number of Kuwaiti citizens and citizens of other countries who were detained during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and continues to refuse to cooperate with the Tripartite Commission to resolve the cases.
- Of 609 cases of missing Gulf War POWs/MIAs representing 14 nationalities – including one American pilot – under review by the Tripartite Commission on Gulf War Missing, only 4 have been resolved. Because of continued Iraqi obfuscation and concealment, very few cases have been resolved since the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein denies having any knowledge of the others and claims that any relevant records were lost in the aftermath of the Gulf War.
- In a December 2001 report to the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary-General criticized the Iraqi Government's refusal to cooperate with the U.N. on the issue of the missing POWs/MIAs citizens. Iran reports that the Iraqi Government still has not accounted for 5,000 Iranian POW's missing since the Iran-Iraq War.
- "Secretary General reiterates little progress on the issue of repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains, as Iraq refused to cooperate with the Tripartite Commission."<sup>54</sup>
- In August 2001, Amnesty International reported that Saddam Hussein has the world's worst record for numbers of persons who have disappeared and remain unaccounted for.<sup>55</sup>
- The Iraqi Government continued to ignore the more than 16,000 cases conveyed to it in 1994 and 1995 by the UN, as well as requests from the Governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to account for the whereabouts of those who had disappeared during Iraq's 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait, and from Iran regarding the whereabouts of prisoners of war that Iraq captured in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.<sup>56</sup>
- "Security Council regrets that no progress made on return of Kuwaiti national archives, reiterate need for Iraq to immediately fulfill all requirements under the relevant resolutions, including repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains."<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Vorontsov Report; UN SG/2002/931 on Iraqi Non-Compliance With UNSCR 1284

<sup>55</sup> Page 3, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq*, March 4, 2002; US Department of State; [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov)

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, Page 3

<sup>57</sup> Vorontsov Report; UN SG/2002/931 on Iraqi Non-Compliance With UNSCR 1284



## **SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REFUSAL TO RETURN STOLEN PROPERTY**

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Iraq destroyed much stolen property before it could be returned, and Kuwait claims that large quantities of equipment remain unaccounted for:

- The UN and Kuwait say Iraq has not returned extensive Kuwaiti state archives and museum pieces, as well as military equipment, including eight Mirage F-1 aircraft, 245 Russian-made fighting vehicles, 90 M113 armored personnel carriers, one Hawk battery, 3,750 Tow and anti-tank missiles, and 675 Russian-made surface-to-air missile batteries.



## SADDAM HUSSEIN'S EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND IMPEDE THE OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM

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- Saddam Hussein has illegally imported hundreds of millions of dollars in goods in violation of economic sanctions and outside of the UN's Oil-for-Food program. For example, Iraq has imported fiber optic communications systems that support the Iraqi military.
- Iraq has diverted dual-use items obtained under the Oil for Food program for military purposes. For example, Iraq diverted UN approved trucks from humanitarian relief purposes to military purposes, and has used construction equipment to help rebuild WMD-affiliated facilities.
- The Iraqi regime illicitly exports hundreds of thousands of barrels of oil each day in flagrant violation of UNSCRs and blatant disregard for the humanitarian well-being of the Iraqi people. In so doing, it has deprived the Iraqi people of billions of dollars in food, medicine, and other humanitarian assistance that would have been provided if the regime had exported the oil under the UN Oil-for-Food program. Instead, Saddam Hussein has used these billions to fund his WMD programs, pay off his security apparatus, and supply himself and his supporters with luxury items and other goods.
- In January 2002, President Bush reported to Congress that "as most recently stated in a November 19 UN report, the government of Iraq is not committed to using funds available through the Oil for Food program to improve the health and welfare of the Iraqi people...Iraq's contracting delays, cuts in food, medicine, educational and other humanitarian sector allocations, government attempts to impede or shut down humanitarian NGO operations in northern Iraq, and Baghdad's delays in the issuance of visas for UN personnel demonstrate that the Iraqi regime is trying to undermine the effectiveness of the program."<sup>58</sup>
- Saddam Hussein spends smuggled oil wealth on his lavish palaces and inner circle, rather than on the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.
- Saddam Hussein has used water pumps, piping, and other supplies that could have been used to repair urban sewer and water systems in order to construct moats and canals at his palaces.

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<sup>58</sup> President's Report to Congress; January 2002; under P.L. 102-1





## Washington File

19 September 2002

### **Bush Asks Congress for Use of Force Resolution on Iraq**

(President says Iraq continues to violate U.N. resolutions) (5050)

President Bush asked the U.S. Congress for authority to use all means necessary, including the use of the U.S. armed forces, to depose the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and to disarm the country of any weapons of mass destruction.

Bush told news reporters September 19 after sending the proposed resolution to the Congress that "If you want to keep the peace, you've got to have the authorization to use force." The resolution was sent to Congress after meetings September 18 with the Congressional leadership at the White House. Bush is seeking action on the resolution before a Congressional recess for the general elections November 5.

The resolution reads, in part: "The President is authorized to use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the United Nations Security Council resolutions referenced above, defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region."

Two senior administration officials, during a background briefing, said that the president will consult closely with Congress as it moves forward on the resolution's language. "It is important that this nation be united in confronting the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime," they said.

And the resolution specifically calls for a regime change in Iraq, consistent with U.S. policy since 1998, they said.

In addition to sending the resolution to the Congress, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld concluded two days of testimony September 19 before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and Secretary of State Colin Powell testified before the House International Relations Committee. Both cabinet officers were testifying about the reasons why Bush is seeking support for the resolution.

Bush said in the resolution that Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated UN resolutions and international law by obtaining chemical and biological weapons, and seeking nuclear weapons. It also cites his support for terrorism and for oppressing the Iraqi people.

Following is the text of the Bush resolution and a transcript of the White House background briefing:



(begin text)

White House Discussion Draft  
September 19, 2002

Joint Resolution

To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq.

Whereas Congress in 1998 concluded that Iraq was then in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations and thereby threatened the vital interests of the United States and international peace and security, stated the reasons for that conclusion, and urged the President to take appropriate action to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations (Public Law 105-235);

Whereas Iraq remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations, thereby continuing to threaten the national security interests of the United States and international peace and security;

Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population, including the Kurdish peoples, thereby threatening international peace and security in the region, by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait;

Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people;

Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the United States, including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;

Whereas members of al-Qaeda, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;

Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of American citizens;

Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 underscored the gravity of the threat that Iraq will transfer weapons of mass destruction to international terrorist organizations;

Whereas the United States has the inherent right, as acknowledged in the United Nations Charter, to use force in order to defend itself;

Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons



of mass destruction, the high risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify the use of force by the United States in order to defend itself;

Whereas Iraq is in material breach of its disarmament and other obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, to cease repression of its civilian population that threatens international peace and security under United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, and to cease threatening its neighbors of United Nations operations in Iraq under United Nations Security Council Resolution 949, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 authorizes use of all necessary means to compel Iraq to comply with these "subsequent relevant resolutions";

Whereas Congress in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) has authorized the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve full implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 678;

Whereas Congress in section 1095 of Public Law 102-190 has stated that it "supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq (Public Law 102-1)," that Iraq's repression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and "constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region," and that Congress "supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Resolution 688";

Whereas Congress in the Iraq Liberation Act (Public Law 105-338) has expressed its sense that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime;

Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States, as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and

Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to use force in order to defend the national security interests of the United States;

Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

#### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Further Resolution on Iraq".



SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

The President is authorized to use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the United Nations Security Council resolutions referenced above, defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region.

(end text)

(begin transcript)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary  
September 19, 2002

BACKGROUND PRESS BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ON THE  
CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION

James S. Brady Press Briefing Room

3:01 P.M. EDT

MR. MCCORMACK: We have two senior administration officials here to talk about the proposed language for a joint resolution which the President sent up to the Hill today. So without further ado, I'll turn it over to our senior administration officials.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good afternoon. Let me have a brief opening statement, and then we will be prepared to take questions.

This morning, the President sent to Congress proposed language for a joint resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. The President is asking Congress to support him in using all means he determines to be appropriate, including force, to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions, to defend the national security of our country against the threat posed by the Iraqi regime. The President is reviewing all of his options to ensure that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime is addressed in an effective manner.

For more than a decade, Saddam Hussein has defied U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding that, among other things, he give up his stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, stop his aggressive efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, stop his violent oppression of the Iraqi people, and end his support for terrorism. Iraq also agreed to do all of these things after its defeat in the Gulf War as part of a cessation of hostilities.

The President has urged the United Nations Security Council to act now to enforce its own resolutions, and he expects that the UN will live up to its responsibilities. But the world should not doubt the resolve of the United States to do what is necessary to defend its national security interests. Secretary Powell is working closely with UN Security Council members and other parties to draft language for a new, effective resolution that makes clear what is required of Saddam Hussein's regime, as well as the potential consequences if the regime fails to act.



Long experience has shown us the character of Saddam Hussein's regime. We know what he is capable of. For more than a decade, he has been in violation of UN resolutions. The burden of proof does not rest with the Security Council to prove that Saddam continues to defy the United Nations. The burden is on Saddam Hussein to prove that he is complying with Security Council resolutions, and complying with the agreements he made at the end of the Gulf War. The burden is on him to prove that he has destroyed all chemical and biological weapons, and ended his nuclear weapons program.

The President and members of his administration will consult closely with Congress as it moves toward a vote on a joint resolution. It is important that this nation be united in confronting the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime. The President is confident that the Congress will act in the best traditions of our democracy in debating and voting on a resolution.

Thank you. Do you have any comments you want to add?

All right, we'll take questions. Ron.

QUESTION: A couple of questions on the technical merits of this. Does -- there's no explicit mention of regime change in Section 2. Because of the reference to the earlier "whereas"-es, are you saying that there is -- that he is asking --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's there --

Q: -- clearly for a regime change, and to use military force to do so?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's there in the "whereas"-es. And I'd just remind everybody that the policy of the United States since 1998 has been regime change. So, yes, it concerns regime change.

Q: And secondly, the language, it says "the threat posed by Iraq" and "restore international peace and security in the region." Could that be interpreted to include threats outside of Iraq, either now or in the future?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's very clear that the President is asking for support on Iraq at this point.

Q: Could it be interpreted, though, to react to threats, either now or in the future, outside of Iraq?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the President has -- I'll let my colleague speak to this, but the President constitutionally has authority to react to any threat to the United States and the people. But this resolution is specific to Iraq.

Do you want to add anything?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, my colleague is right. The President would have the constitutional authority to take any actions to restore peace and security to the region. But the focus here is on Iraq and the threat that is posed by Iraq to the United States and to the region.

Q: Can I follow up on that issue?



SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure, follow up.

Q: The question is, could this language, as written, be used somewhere down the road to make the argument that Congress has, in fact, authorized military force in the region elsewhere besides Iraq?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could the language be -- first of all, let me make one point perfectly clear. This is an initial draft by the White House. We're going to be meeting with Congress to debate these kinds of points with the Congress. The objective here is to provide to the President the maximum flexibility to deal with the threat posed by Iraq, and to provide, as the resolution says, peace and security to the region.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Note that this -- it really refers to peace and security in the region in the context of Iraq.

Q: There are some members on the Hill who would have some kind of language in here that would refer to what's going on at the United Nations -- maybe a direct link, maybe not a direct link, but in some way acknowledge what's happening in the international community. Is that something the White House would oppose, any kind of reference or connection to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the important thing here is to provide maximum flexibility to the President to react to this threat. But again, let me just underscore what my colleague said. This is a draft. We are going to talk with members of the Congress about what needs to go into this resolution.

What would not make sense, of course, is for the United States to -- as the President as Commander-in-Chief, to be wholly obligated to only act on behalf of the United States if the U.N. did something. I mean, that would not give the President maximum flexibility. But we'll talk about how the language might be, and it's obvious that we're working in the UN.

Q: Can I ask about the legal doctrine in here and the precedence? It talks about because 9-11 showed the gravity of terrorist attacks, and there's a threat that Iraq could transfer weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, and the United States has the right of self-defense, therefore the President should be authorized to use force. What's the precedent for that kind of anticipatory defense doctrine in international law?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there is the inherent right of self-defense for all member-nations under the UN charter.

Q: Against a threat?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And the question is, what do you mean by responding in self-defense to a threat? The theory of anticipatory threat, or anticipatory self-defense, is one that is long recognized. It is something that has been utilized by the United States in the past. If you look at the Cuban missile crisis, the embargo, for example, one could characterize that as anticipatory self-defense, the use of force -- a blockade is a use of force. So there is some history for this.

Q: If I could ask you to respond to the Iraqi Foreign Minister's



contention, among many, that the U.S. is not consistent in enforcing UN resolutions about weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and that Israel's weapons of mass destruction, if, in fact -- Israel's weapons of mass destruction are off the table, as far as the U.S. is concerned.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As far as the United States is concerned, Saddam Hussein, who fought a war of aggression, a war that he began in 1991, during that war and the war previously -- I'm sorry, war that he began in 1990 -- but, and a war that he previously launched against another neighbor, has used chemical weapons against those people and against his own people; a bloody tyrant that represses his people at the level that he does, including minorities, to the point that the U.N. human rights reports continue to cite him as one of the worst offenders, is -- and given the way that he has defied the United Nations time and time and time again is in a class by himself. And it probably should not be the Iraqi Foreign Minister's job to start trying to hold the United States to consistency. I mean, this is a ludicrous argument.

Q: So there are regimes that are okay to have those weapons in that region, and regimes which aren't?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, we -- obviously, weapons of mass destruction have to be put into context. And the context here is a bloody dictator who has used a weapon of mass destruction against his own people and against his neighbors, who has tremendous animus against the United States, has tried to assassinate an American President, has paid suicide bombers. I think the equation of Iraq with almost anybody else in this context really doesn't make any sense.

Q: Would you point to any significant differences, or any important differences, between the language you're now asking for and the language from 1998?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me have my colleague do that, because he did most of the drafting of this.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The 1998 language, of course, the resolution in 1998 had a series of "whereas"-es that basically makes the case for the breaches that occurred. So that's one difference. The other difference is the specific grant; it urges the President, I believe, to take "appropriate" or maybe "necessary" means to bring Iraq into compliance with U.N. resolutions. So that was the language of the '98.

Q: And this one is saying that -- while we're pursuing a different resolution at the UN, this one says that should he not do that, then the U.S. would act on its own?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely not. It's not tied to any actions by the U.N. What we're asking -- again, what the President is asking for is maximum flexibility to deal with the threat posed by Iraq to the interests of the United States. It's not in any way tied or conditioned on what happens at the UN.

Q: Which you believe the '98 language was?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The '98 language was not tied to any future action, or further action by the UN. And what I'm saying is the



language used in the grant of authorization used the word "urges" the President to exercise his powers under the Constitution and under applicable laws to bring Iraq into compliance. And that -- we've used different language. Here, the grant of authority is a lot more explicit.

Q: Senator Daschle said today that he would want to approve this with an understanding that before a trigger was pulled, there would be additional consultations with Congress. This -- the wording here reads like this is the last stop for Congress. Is that the correct way to read it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, consultations go on with Congress all the time. But, obviously, this is a grant of support and of authority. And that would stand. But consultations would, of course, continue with Congress as we go forward, and as we think about what options the President needs to pursue. But it must be understood that when there's a resolution, there's been a grant of authority.

Q: In the part that talks about the right of self-defense in the UN Charter, under Chapter 7, that speaks specifically to a response to a direct attack. I wonder if you're now saying that the President's doctrine of preemption is the administration's interpretation of Article 51 of Chapter 7.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm going to go back to my colleague again, but let's remember that -- first of all, it is not a new idea that you do not have to wait to be physically attacked before you try to take out the means that might attack you. That is not a new idea.

As the other official said, we blockaded Cuba in expectation that missiles that were being put there -- missiles that nobody was even clear on how operational they might be -- might be used against the United States. And so, in a sense, that's anticipatory self-defense. It is also the case that the United States maintained throughout the Cold War a policy that refused to say that there would be no first use of nuclear weapons, because there was an expectation that you might have to use weapons to prevent a worse attack against the United States.

So this is not a new idea. Nobody has ever said that you have to wait to physically be attacked in order to take out the means that might attack you.

Q: I'm not asking if it's been U.S. policy before, but is it the specific administration interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter that it explicitly authorizes a preemptive attack that is not in response to an attack?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no precise definition of imminence in international law. And I think it is a word, a definition, that evolves over time. As you find weapons that can be delivered with more speed, with more destruction, I think it's appropriate to redefine or look at imminence, and consider a wide variety of factors -- such as the probability that a threat will materialize; the degree of harm that will result if that threat materialized; the probability that the risk of that threat materializing increasing over time; and perhaps the amount of time that one can anticipate before that threat will materialize. So I



think that there are a variety of things that one ought to look at in defining whether or not a threat is imminent.

Q: I'm sorry, I don't mean to belabor the point, but you speak specifically of the United Nations Charter, which as I understand it, doesn't use the word imminent at all, let alone try to interpret it. So I'm asking if your interpretation of the Charter is that it specifically authorizes a preeminent -- preemptive -- sorry -- attack.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think if you look at the history of actions by member states, I don't think there's any kind of requirement that you have to wait until you're physically being attacked or about to be attacked. And I think also, again, that the doctrine of self-defense and the incorporation of the term of imminence, I think that is something that has evolved, and will continue to evolve as the threat changes.

Q: Sir, if there's a possibility that the President might go to war against Iraq, why under the Constitution is he not obligated to get a declaration of war from Congress?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He is coming to the Congress to get whatever authority he believes is appropriate in this case. I think as a matter of constitutional theory, the President has the authority, under the Constitution, as the Commander-in-Chief, to use force to defend this country. It is true that the Constitution grants Congress only the power to declare war. That does not mean that the President is precluded from defending this country as Commander-in-Chief.

Q: There's talk at the UN that it could take months to get weapons inspectors up and running. How long are you willing to wait for the UN to act?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that we don't believe that the time line needs to be months. But one of the things that we have to assess with others on the Security Council is what the time line really should look like here. Let me just say that weapons inspectors may well be a part of the story of how you get Saddam Hussein disarmed. But the United States is withholding at this point, pending discussions and pending consultations on what means you use to disarm him. The question -- weapons inspectors are simply a means, not an end in and of themselves. So the key here is to get an effective resolution that deals with the threat, not just to get one that might deal with weapons inspections.

So we'll see how long some of this would take. But I've heard varying estimates of how long such a thing could take. I think we have to just talk with people and see.

Q: What's the state of play --

Q: Doesn't this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's got a follow-up, just a second.

Q: What's the state of play with discussions with the Russia and France?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, Secretary Powell has had a couple of conversations with various foreign ministers of the Perm



Five. It was important for people to go back to capitals and to talk, obviously, to the heads of state and to get instructions. You might note that the Russian Foreign Minister is here today, so they'll have another opportunity to talk. Although, let me be clear, the visits of the Russian Foreign and Defense Ministers have long been planned in accordance with the Moscow Treaty, which has a consultative group with the four ministers. So this is not Iraq specific.

But, obviously, while the Foreign Minister is here, he will, and he'll continue phone conversations with him. I think that we're impressing upon people that strong Security Council action through a new resolution is required, that we -- to the degree that Iraq was concerned about such -- it made this ploy the other night, but it does mean that you've got Iraq's attention -- this isn't the time to let up if you want a road to, this time, a successful outcome.

Q: Doesn't this new doctrine, the preemptive strike idea, introduce a certain element of arbitrariness in your decisions? That is, what is to prevent you, or what is to prevent a government from deciding they didn't -- somebody they don't like, that they will use this a pretext for attacking them and eliminating a bad -- what they consider to be a bad guy, in spite of the fact there might not be a threat? Really, it's an arbitrary decision on your part, or on the part of government, to decide, okay, this is a guy who represents a threat in the future, therefore, we should eliminate him.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd be the first to say there have never been any hard and fast rules about when to use force. Never. And it is, in fact, not a new matter to think that you don't have to wait to be attacked until you attack. That's simply not a new concept.

Now, we believe that the particular notion of anticipatory self-defense or preemption is a pretty limited concept. This isn't something that you go around the world preempting and changing regimes around the world. Nobody is making that claim. There are circumstances in which you have no other option to protect yourself but to try and deal with a growing threat before it becomes a devastating attack on you.

There are many other cases in which diplomacy might work, in which other counter-means might work. All of those have actually been tried with Iraq. You might note the President made a long list of all of the things that have been tried with Iraq. But nobody would say that this is something that you go out and do every day. And as to whether others might do this, I think we have to be a little careful in assuming that others will be deterred from doing aggressive acts, that we would consider aggressive acts, just because the United States doesn't say that it's going to protect itself against an emerging threat. And I think that norm -- people are going to do what they need to do.

In the cases that have been most often cited, like India-Pakistan, we continually talk to the Indians and the Pakistanis about the available means that they have to deal with the conflict between them. And indeed, we have been very intimately involved -- we, and particularly the British -- in trying to find a means for them to resolve that conflict. And we're very clear with them that the use of military force is not going to resolve that conflict and it's going to make the situation worse.



So when there are other means, you by all means ought to try them. You ought to try to deal with threats in any way that you can. But there will come times when, in order to prevent an attack against you, you have to preempt that threat.

Last question.

Q: Did you all speed up work on this resolution in a way to kind of influence skeptical U.S. allies in the UN to act with a new resolution?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Kelly, if you remember, all the way back on -- when the President first came back from Crawford, he made clear that he thought that this resolution needed to be before the members went out for the recess. We do believe that the effect of a united front by the United States will be to show the seriousness of purpose of the United States and to underscore that the United Nations Security Council should act because the United States is prepared to act in the absence of action by the Security Council.

Q: Isn't it likely the Security Council will act before Congress gets around to its resolution?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't -- I don't know, Jim. That would also be great. But I think just the fact that the United States is debating this, that there's a seriousness of purpose within the United States is having an effect. It is also the case that other parliaments are debating this, as well. The British Parliament will come in on Tuesday to debate it.

Thank you.

END 3:24 P.M. EDT

(end text)

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## Washington File

19 September 2002

### **Powell Says Iraq Is Responding to "Pressure" of Bush Speech**

(Secretary of State's prepared testimony to House panel) (2960)

Iraq's recent offer to allow the return of U.N. weapons inspectors "without conditions" is a ploy that the United States "will not fall for," Secretary of State Colin Powell told the House International Relations Committee September 19.

Powell testified before the committee as part of an administration effort to make its case on the need for a new U.N. Security Council resolution on Iraq and for a congressional resolution authorizing President Bush to use all necessary means to enforce existing U.N. resolutions Iraq has violated. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testified on the same subject before the House Armed Services Committee September 18 and the Senate Armed Services Committee September 19. Also on the 19th, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz appeared before a joint House-Senate Select Intelligence Committee. The president also sent proposed language for the congressional resolution to Capitol Hill the same day.

"The Iraqi regime," Powell said in a prepared statement, "is infamous for its ploys, its stalling tactics, its demands on inspectors -- sometimes at the point of a gun... There is absolutely no reason at all to expect that Iraq has changed..."

"The Iraqis did not suddenly see the error of their ways," Powell said. "They were responding to the heat and pressure generated by the international community after President Bush's speech" September 12 to the UN General Assembly.

The secretary said the United States believes a new Security Council resolution must demand that Iraq:

- "immediately and unconditionally" disclose and eliminate all of its weapons of mass destruction;
- end its support for terrorism and act to suppress it;
- cease persecuting its civilian population;
- account for missing Persian Gulf War personnel, return the remains of those deceased, return stolen Kuwaiti property, cooperate fully with the international community in the process; and
- end its contraband economic trading outside the parameters of the UN Oil-for-Food Program.



In seeking to secure a new Security Council resolution, Powell said, "This is the time to apply more pressure, not to relent."

On the administration's desire for a congressional resolution, Powell said, "The President should be authorized to use all means he determines appropriate, including military force, to enforce the UN Security Council resolutions Iraq is defying, and to defend the United States and its interests against the threat Iraq poses...."

Such a congressional resolution, he said, would help U.S. diplomatic efforts at the United Nations.

Following is the text of Powell's remarks as prepared for delivery:

(begin text)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Office of the Spokesman  
September 19, 2002  
As Prepared for Delivery

OPENING REMARKS BY SECRETARY OF STATE COLIN L. POWELL  
BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

September 19, 2002  
Washington, DC

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you to testify on the administration's position with regard to Iraq.

Congressman Hyde, Congressman Lantos, you and I have been discussing Iraq for a long time. In fact, many of the committee members go back with me to the days of the Gulf War.

In 1990, Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait, brutalized the population, and rejected the international community's ultimatum to withdraw.

The U.S. built a worldwide coalition with the clear political purpose of liberating Kuwait. The military instrument of that coalition, led by America, had an equally clear military objective that flowed directly from the political purpose: eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait.

The United Nations Security Council endorsed this purpose and objective, and the international community responded with unprecedented political backing, financial support, and military forces. As a result, we not only accomplished our mission in the Gulf War, the way we did it was a model of American leadership and international cooperation.

When the war ended, the UN Security Council agreed to take measures to ensure Iraq did not threaten any of its neighbors again. Saddam Hussein was a man after all who had sent his armies against Iran in 1980 and then against Kuwait in 1990, who had fired ballistic missiles at neighboring countries, and who had used chemical weapons in the war with Iran and even against his own people. The United States and the international community were strongly determined to prevent any future aggression.



UN Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 fixed the terms of the ceasefire in the Gulf. The fundamental purpose of this resolution and many more that followed was restoration of regional peace and security by way of a series of stringent demands on Iraq, particularly its disarmament with respect to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 kilometers. Desert Storm had dramatically reduced Iraq's more conventional military capability while at the same time not leaving Iraq so prostrate it could not defend itself against Iran.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, you know the rest of the story. You heard the President relate it at the United Nations seven days ago today. Iraq has defied the United Nations and refused to comply completely with any of the UN Security Council Resolutions. Moreover, since December 1998 when the UN's inspection teams left Iraq because of the regime's flagrant defiance of the UN, the Iraqi regime has been free to pursue weapons of mass destruction.

Meanwhile, the world has changed dramatically.

Since September 11, 2001, the world is a different place. As a consequence of the terrorist attacks on that day and of the war on terrorism that those attacks made necessary, a new reality was born: the world had to recognize that the potential connection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction moved terrorism to a new level of threat. In fact, that nexus became the overriding security concern of our nation. It still is. It will continue to be for some years to come.

We now see that a proven menace like Saddam Hussein, in possession of weapons of mass destruction, could empower a few terrorists to threaten millions of innocent people.

President Bush is fully determined to deal with this threat. His administration is determined to defeat it. I believe the American people would have us do no less.

President Bush is also aware of the need to engage the international community. He understands how powerful a strong and unified international community can be, as we have seen so well-demonstrated in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

The need to engage the international community is why the President took his message on the grave and gathering danger of Iraq to the United Nations last week. Moreover, it is the United Nations that is the offended party, not Iraq, as some might claim.

It was United Nations resolutions that were systematically and brutally ignored and violated for these past 12 years. It was United Nations inspectors who found it impossible to do their job and had to leave the work unfinished.

The President's challenge to the United Nations General Assembly was a direct and simple one: If you would remain relevant, you must act.

The President's speech was powerful and energized the UN General Assembly debate. It changed the political landscape on which this issue was being discussed. Iraq is the problem. Iraq is in material breach of the demands placed upon it by the United Nations.



President Bush made clear in his speech what Iraq must do to repair this breach:

- Iraq must immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material.
- Iraq must end all support for terrorism and act to suppress it, as all states are required to do by U.N. Security Council resolutions.
- Iraq must cease persecution of its civilian population, including Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkomans, and others, again as required by UN Security Council resolutions,
- Iraq must release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still unknown. It must return the remains of any who are deceased, return stolen property, accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, and it must cooperate fully with international efforts to resolve these issues, once again as required by Security Council resolutions.
- And Iraq must immediately end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program. It must accept UN administration of funds from that program, to ensure that the money is used fairly and promptly for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

Over the past weekend I watched the pressure build on Iraq as the Arab League, the Secretary General and others pressed Iraq on the need to take action.

Four days ago, on Monday, Iraq responded with a familiar, tactical ploy. The Iraqi Foreign Minister said Iraq would let the inspectors in without conditions. But he is not deceiving anyone. It is a ploy we have seen before, on many occasions. And on each occasion, once inspectors began to operate Iraq continued to do everything to frustrate their work.

In May 1991, for example, just after suspension of hostilities in the Gulf War, Iraq accepted the unrestricted freedom of entry and exit without delay or hindrance for UN inspectors and their property, supplies, and equipment.

In June 1991 -- a short month later -- Iraqis fired warning shots at the inspectors to keep them away from suspicious vehicles.

Three months later, in September, the Iraqis confiscated a set of documents from the inspectors. When the inspectors refused to comply with an Iraqi demand to give up a second set of documents, the Iraqis surrounded them and for four days refused to let them leave the inspection site. Finally, when the UN threatened enforcement action, the inspectors were allowed to leave.

In February 1992 Iraq refused to comply with a UN inspection team's decision to destroy certain facilities used in proscribed programs and in April of that year Iraq demanded a halt to the inspectors' aerial flights.

Later, in July of that year, Iraq refused the inspectors access to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture. The inspectors had reliable information that the site contained archives related to proscribed activities.



They finally gained access only after members of the Council threatened enforcement action.

In January 1993, Iraq refused to allow the UN inspection teams to use their own aircraft to fly into Iraq.

In June and July of 1993, Iraq refused to allow the UN inspectors to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two missile engine test stands.

In March 1996, Iraqi security forces refused UN inspection teams access to five sites designated for inspection. The teams entered the sites after delays of up to 17 hours -- which of course permitted the Iraqis to remove any incriminating evidence.

In November 1996, Iraq blocked UN inspectors from removing remnants of missile engines for in-depth analysis outside Iraq.

In June 1997, Iraqi escorts on board a UN inspector team helicopter attempted physically to prevent the UN pilot from flying the helicopter in the direction of its intended destination.

In that month also, Iraq again blocked UN inspection teams from entering designated sites for inspection.

In September 1997, an Iraqi officer attacked a UN inspector on board a UN helicopter while the inspector was attempting to take photographs of unauthorized movement of Iraqi vehicles inside a site designated for inspection.

Also in September, while seeking access to a site declared by Iraq to be "sensitive," UN inspectors witnessed and videotaped Iraqi guards moving files, burning documents, and dumping ash-filled waste cans into a nearby river.

Mr. Chairman, I have left out much and could go on -- all the way to the departure of the UN inspection teams from Iraq in December 1998 because they could no longer do their job. And I could talk about Operation Desert Fox, the military action that resulted.

But I believe you get the point.

The Iraqi regime is infamous for its ploys, its stalling tactics, its demands on inspectors -- sometimes at the point of a gun, and its general and consistent defiance of the mandate of the UN Security Council.

There is absolutely no reason at all to expect that Iraq has changed, that this latest effort to welcome inspectors without conditions is not another ploy.

Let's be clear about the reason for their announcement. The Iraqis did not suddenly see the error of their past ways. They were responding to the heat and pressure generated by the international community after President Bush's speech.

The United States has made it clear to our Security Council colleagues that we will not fall for this ploy. This is the time to apply more pressure, not to relent. We must not believe that inspectors going in on the same conditions that caused their withdrawal four years ago is



in any way acceptable. These four years have been more than enough time for Iraq to procure, develop, and hide proscribed items well beyond the reach of the kinds of inspectors that were subject to Saddam's cheat and retreat approach from 1991 to 1998.

The United States has determined that Iraq's obstruction of U.N. Security Council resolutions and its gross violation of its obligations cannot continue. In his speech to the General Assembly, the President challenged the Security Council to live up to its responsibilities. The U.N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan, said the same thing. We, our closest allies, and our friends around the world are prepared to do our part to enforce Security Council resolutions and render harmless the Iraqi threat. We are discussing now the best way to proceed with the other members of the Security Council and with close friends. We are trying to find a solution.

If part of the solution involves an inspection regime, it must be a regime that goes in with the authority of a new resolution that removes the weaknesses of the present regime and which will not tolerate any Iraqi disobedience. It cannot be a resolution that will be negotiated with Iraq. The resolution must be strong enough and comprehensive enough that it produces disarmament, not just inspections.

Many UN members, including some on the Security Council, want to take Iraq at its word and send inspectors back in without any new resolution or new authority. This is a recipe for failure.

The debate we have begun to have within the Council is on the need for and the wording of a resolution. Our position is clear. We must face the facts and find Iraq in material breach. Then, we must specify the actions we demand of Iraq -- which President Bush has already shown us. And we must determine what consequences will flow from Iraq's failure to take action.

That is what makes this time different. This time, unlike any time over the previous 12 years of Iraqi defiance, there must be hard consequences. This time, Iraq must comply with the UN mandate or there will be decisive action to compel compliance.

We will listen to other points of view and try to reach agreement within the Council. It will be a difficult debate. We will also preserve the President's ability to defend our nation and our interests.

Some have suggested that there is a conflict in this approach, that U.S. interests should be our total concern.

But Mr. Chairman, both of these issues are important. We are a member of the U.N. Security Council. We are a member of the UN. It is a multilateral institution whose resolutions have been violated. But the United States, as a separate matter, believes that its interest is threatened. We are trying to solve this problem through the United Nations and in a multilateral way. The President took the case to the UN because it is the body that should deal with such matters as Iraq. It was created to deal with such matters. And President Bush is hoping that the U.N. will act and act in a decisive way.

But at the same time, if the UN is not able to act and act decisively -- and I think that would be a terrible indictment of the UN -- then



the United States will have to make its own decision as to whether the danger posed by Iraq is such that we have to act in order to defend our country and our interests.

And Mr. Chairman, our diplomatic efforts at the United Nations would be helped by a strong Congressional resolution authorizing President Bush to take action.

The President should be authorized to use all means he determines appropriate, including military force, to enforce the UN Security Council resolutions Iraq is defying, and to defend the United States and its interests against the threat Iraq poses, and to restore international peace and security to the region.

I ask for your immediate action on such a resolution to show the world that we are united in this effort.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues in the intelligence community and in the Department of Defense are giving the Congress what it will need with respect to intelligence on Iraq and on military contingency planning. So I won't speak to those areas.

But let me say this about the Iraqi threat before I stop and allow the greater part of this time for your important questions.

We can have debates about the size and nature of the Iraqi stockpile of WMD and of mid- and long-range missiles. But no one can doubt the record of Iraqi violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions, one after another, and for 12 long years.

And no one can doubt that the Iraqi dictator's intentions have not changed. He wants weapons of mass destruction as clearly as he wants to remain in power.

These two realities stare us in the face and cannot -- must not -- be avoided.

Thank you and I'll stop there and take your questions.

(end text)

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19 September 2002

## Rumsfeld Says "Time Is Not On Our Side" With Iraq

### Says Iraqi regime will be "more of a threat" in the future

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says he questions Iraq's commitment to disarmament because the Iraqi military has fired artillery and rockets at U.S. and British aircraft enforcing the No-Fly Zones six times since Iraq sent a letter to the UN announcing its readiness to permit unfettered weapons inspections.

"If that isn't a signal as to what they [the Iraqis] have in mind, I don't know what ... is," he told interviewer Jim Lehrer on the PBS "News Hour" on September 18. Even the Iraqi letter, itself, contained "contradictions," he said.

Rumsfeld said that years ago, after the conclusion of the Persian Gulf war, the hope was that "Iraq would become a country that would disarm as they signed and agreed to do" at the end of the war. The world community, he said, "wants Iraq to be disarmed."

The secretary also said that going to war should be "a last resort," not a first one. "That is to say that no one with any sense would want to go to war," Rumsfeld said.

But, he said, the deterrence argument, which worked with the former Soviet Union for a variety of reasons, does not apply to Iraq because "the nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction makes it perfectly possible for Saddam Hussein to work with a terrorist network, arrange for them to have biological weapons ... and to use them without a return address." Suicide bombers "are not deterred, they are proud, they think they're going to heaven," he said, "So the deterrent argument ... is ... obviously fallacious."

The secretary also pointed out that the balance of mutual assured destruction that existed during the Cold War with the Soviet Union "didn't stop the Korean War; it didn't stop the Vietnam War. It didn't stop a whole host of other things in the world."

In the case of the Soviet Union, Rumsfeld said, "time was on our side" because its economy became weaker and weaker until it eventually imploded. With Iraq, "time is not on our side," he said, because Saddam Hussein has oil revenues and is using them to buy additional weapons and to move his weapons of mass destruction programs forward. At the same time, the secretary said the Iraqi leader "is dealing with terrorists, and every week, month, and year that go on he is going to be more of a threat, not less of a threat."

Rumsfeld also said the Iraqi leader "has been about four times as clever as the United States, the UN, and the Western world in managing public opinion." The Iraqis "are just masters at manipulating the press and putting out disinformation. They are already moving military units and elements next to mosques and next to hospitals and next to schools," he added, in anticipation of coalition military action so that there will be civilian casualties and they can then claim that the coalition "has done all these terrible things."



A link to the audio version of this interview is available on the Internet at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/textonly/focus1.html>.

*Following is the transcript of Rumsfeld's remarks:*

**DOD News Briefing  
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Wednesday, September 18, 2002 - 7:00 p.m. EDT**

**(Rumsfeld Interview with Jim Lehrer, News Hour, PBS WETA)**

JIM LEHRER: And to the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Mr. Secretary, welcome.

SECRETARY DONALD RUMSFELD (Defense Department): Thank you.

LEHRER: Forty-eight hours later, how does Iraq's offer to let inspectors back in look to you?

RUMSFELD: Well, it looks a lot like earlier ploys and plays and moves that Iraq has taken. It's very clear that even within the letter it has contradictions. It in one place talks about without any constraints or conditions, and then later in the letter it talks about beginning negotiations and discussions about how it would be done.

Second, it's interesting that here's a letter that purports to say that, fair enough, we're willing to work with the UN and allow inspectors in, and within the last 48 hours they've fired on American aircraft six times in Northern and Southern Iraq.

LEHRER: I assume that's the No-FlyZone?

RUMSFELD: In the No-Fly Zones that the coalition forces, the United States and Great Britain and men and women in uniform from our two countries have been flying over those zones, implementing the U.N. resolutions, and they fired from the ground artillery and rockets at these aircraft six times since that letter was delivered. If that isn't a signal as to what they have in mind, I don't know what it is.

LEHRER: So, this letter should be ignored by the United States and the U.N.?

RUMSFELD: Oh, it's a letter not to the United States, it's a letter to the United Nations. And that's for the president and Secretary Powell to work with. I'm just really repeating what Secretary Powell has said with respect to the letter. It's pretty clear that it is not what it seems to be.

LEHRER: But in terms of inspections, you said — you told the Congress today that this isn't about inspections this is about disarmament. Is inspections not a step toward disarmament?

RUMSFELD: That is what was hoped years ago, after the Gulf War. The hope was that Iraq would become a country that would disarm as they signed and agreed to do at the end of the war. The UN resolutions said that the way to implement that disarmament was to



have inspectors in. And clearly that's one way to do it. Inspectors have the benefit of working pretty well, if they're working with a country that wants to disarm, and has agreed to disarm. And then they invite inspectors in so that the world can know that they, in fact, did do it. It only works if you have a cooperative partner. You can't go in and inspect a country that's resisting those inspections and expect to find very much, because so much of it is mobile, so much of it is underground. So, there clearly is a role in our world for inspections, but it tends to be with a cooperative partner, and we've seen the situation with Iraq where they've violated some 16 UN resolutions, and finally threw the inspectors out.

LEHRER: Do you see, based on everything that you know, do you see any scenario that could disarm Iraq the way the United States wants it to be disarmed short of military action?

RUMSFELD: I don't think it's the United States that wants Iraq to be disarmed, it was the world community, the international.

LEHRER: The world community.

RUMSFELD: The United Nations voted repeatedly, over and over, and over, that that is what Iraq agreed to do that.

LEHRER: But I mean now, that was years ago now, and we're in this situation now, and the president of the United States says, no more, action has to be taken, this has to end. Do you see a scenario short of military action that's going to get what the president and the world community wants to get, which is a disarmed Iraq?

RUMSFELD: Well, one would certainly hope so. That is to say that, no one with any sense would want to go to war, war is a last resort, not a first resort. We've gone through 11 years of violating these U.N. resolutions. We've gone through 11 years where — recent years, four years, where they threw the inspectors out, and there's been no one there. And their progress on weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological and nuclear have gone forward. Now, if Saddam Hussein and his family decided that the game was up, and we'll go live in some foreign country, like other leaders have done, clearly the Shah of Iran left, Idi Amin left, Baby Doc Duvalier left, any number of leaders who have departed their countries recognizing that the game was up, that it was over, that they'd run their term. So that could happen. It's entirely possible that the people in that country, a lot of wonderful people who are hostages, they're hostages to a very vicious regime, they could decide that it was time, the time was up, and change the regime from inside. It's a very repressive regime. It would be a very difficult thing to do. But, clearly, the overwhelming majority of people, even in the army don't want Saddam Hussein there. Look what he's done to the country. He's a pariah. He's threatening his neighbors. He's listed on the terrorist state. Their economy should be a booming economy with those oil revenues. And those people would want to be liberated.

LEHRER: As Secretary of Defense, let's say that all those possibilities do not pan out, and let's say some kind of military action is required down the road, whenever. As Secretary of Defense, what would you say to the young men and women of America and their families as to why this is in the vital interest of this country to a point where they have to risk their lives for it?

RUMSFELD: Well, you know, it's interesting in your opening remarks you were talking



about the congressional hearings on September 11th, and the fact that they've spent months pouring over all kinds of documentation and trying to connect the dots. What happened, what did people know, and how might they have figured it out sooner so that we could have prevented 3,000 innocent men, women and children from being killed on September 11th of last year. What we're trying to do — that's difficult, and they are having a dickens of a time trying to figure out that. We're trying to connect the dots before there is another September 11th. We're trying to connect the dots not only before there's another September 11th on our country, but before there's a September 11th that involves weapons of mass destruction, biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon. That is a serious responsibility that the government has. It's not an easy thing to do. It is a difficult thing to do. Indeed, it's more difficult than trying to connect the dots after it's happened. But if we wait until after it's happened, we're not talking about 3,000 people being killed when this happened on September 11th, we're talking about potentially tens of thousands of people being killed.

LEHRER: But what do you say —

RUMSFELD: And you say to them, you say to the American people, the first responsibility of government is to provide for the common defense. That is what the central government is there for, very essentially. That's its principal task. And as one looks at the world and sees this new security environment and sees the nexus between weapons of mass destruction, terrorist states, and terrorist networks, and reflects on last September 11th, reflects on our vulnerability as free people, and how many people can come into our country and do things in our country, and how available today biological weapons and chemical weapons, and, indeed, elements of nuclear weapons are today, what one would say is, if we want to live in a more peaceful world, if we want to avoid that kind of a catastrophe, our country has to recognize that new security environment, and recognize that absorbing that blow, waiting for it and absorbing it, and then having an investigation afterward is not a preferred option.

LEHRER: What would you say to an American people, or to a member of a family of somebody in the military who says, fine, I hear you, Mr. Secretary, how do you know that Saddam Hussein and the people of Iraq would use these weapons against the United States in a way that jeopardizes my life, or my families lives?

RUMSFELD: First of all, the truth has a wonderful virtue, one can't know what can happen in the future. What you can do is try to connect the dots. You have a vicious dictator, who has already weaponized chemical and biological weapons, and already used them on their neighbors, and on their own people. They have killed thousands of their own people with chemical weapons, and they have used them against the Iranians. So, we know we have a leader who is a dictator, he's got the programs, who has a perfect willingness to use them. And then one looks at their rhetoric, what are they saying about their neighbors, what are they saying about the United States, why are they offering \$20,000 bonuses to the families of suicide bombers who blow up people in other countries in shopping malls and discotheque, and pizza parlors. Why do they do those things? Well, what kind of a threat does that pose?

If you were talking about a conventional capability, your standard of evidence would be one thing, you say, well, we can absorb that. If you're talking about an unconventional capability, one has to be very careful about saying you're going to absorb it.

LEHRER: But then somebody can come back to you and say, wait a minute, we had a



deterrence thing with the Soviet Union for many, many years, and we had the capability of blowing them to smithereens, and they were doing the same to us, a lot more so than Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and it worked. We never took a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union.

RUMSFELD: Right. And that balance of terror, or mutual assured destruction did, in fact, work with the Soviet Union for a variety of different reasons. It did not work for everything. It did not stop the Soviet Union from invading other countries, like Afghanistan. If we had a balance of terror, if you will, with Saddam Hussein, which is not our first choice. Our first choice is to prevent that, but if you had one, it wouldn't stop them from invading Kuwait again, or invading Saudi Arabia, which they were ready to do, or getting in another war with Iran, or attacking their other neighbors, or destroying Israel as they talk about every day in their rhetoric. It wouldn't stop them from that.

Furthermore, a balance of mutual assured destruction with the Soviet Union didn't stop the Korean War, it didn't stop the Vietnam War, it didn't stop a whole host of other things in the world. It was a limited deterrent effect. It was a limited constraint or containment policy, but it was never perfect.

Furthermore, the nexus between terrorist networks and a terrorist state with weapons of mass destruction, it's perfectly possible for Saddam Hussein to work with a terrorist network, arrange for them to have the biological weapons. They have sleeper cells around the world, and to use them without a return address. Suicide bombers are not deterred, they're proud. They think they're going to heaven. So the deterrent argument would be wonderful if there were something like that that worked. But it's so obviously fallacious.

LEHRER: No way to deter Saddam Hussein from using what he may or may not have?

RUMSFELD: Well, you know, one of the concerns about a conflict with Saddam Hussein is that he would use those weapons. The problem is, he can't do it himself. He needs others to do it, and I would think that the Iraqi military and the linkages he has to those weapons ought to be very, very careful about thinking about using them. The concern of the United States is those weapons. The concern of the United States is the regime at the top. And clearly people who would use those weapons are not going to have a happy future if, in fact, they do them.

LEHRER: A man asked me today while I was on an airplane coming back from Colorado, and a man said to me, wait a minute, we know about the al-Qaeda terrorists, they've already killed Americans. Why don't we get rid of them first and then worry about the guy who might do something to us, Saddam Hussein. What would you say to him?

RUMSFELD: Well, the global war on terrorism is important, and this is a part of it. It is the nexus between an al-Qaeda type network and other terrorist network and a terrorist state like Saddam Hussein who has those weapons of mass destruction. As we sit here, there are senior al-Qaeda in Iraq. They are there. They are also in Iran. They are also in other countries. They're in Pakistan.

LEHRER: That can't separate them out is what you're saying, right?

RUMSFELD: Not from the air.



LEHRER: But, what I mean is going after Saddam Hussein is also going after al-Qaeda, in a way?

RUMSFELD: It is clearly, if one deals with that problem in whatever way the president may decide, and he has not made a decision, except he said the choice we don't have is to do nothing, because time is on their side. With the Soviet Union time was on our side, going back to that deterrent analogy, we could wait, their economy was getting weaker and weaker, and weaker, and they were isolated, and finally it imploded. Time is not on our side here. He's got the oil revenues, he's buying additional weapons, he's moving his weapons of mass destruction programs forward, he's dealing with terrorists. And every week, month and year that go on he's going to be more of a threat not less of a threat.

LEHRER: Speaking of time, there have been several stories in the last few days in the newspapers that you and your colleagues in the military are concerned about a military action against Iraq, because of the weather. It has to be before January or February, because things start to get too hot after that. Is that legit? Is that a problem?

RUMSFELD: I don't know that I want to get into that. Obviously there's lots of things that are more favorable at one moment than at another moment. There are so many considerations that go into it, certainly weather is one. But, I don't know that I'd want to differentiate among them particularly.

LEHRER: But, in terms of what's going on with the U.N. now, would you concede that at least what that letter did, we'll go back to where we started, the letter from Iraq, has slowed a process, or the process down. Does the inspector thing now have to be played out some way?

RUMSFELD: I don't know that it will prove to have slowed things down. I was with the president and Secretary Powell this morning when Colin briefed the National Security Council on what's taking place in the United Nations. And I didn't get the sense that either one of them were in a relaxed mode. They clearly are going to be moving forward with short timetables in the United Nations.

LEHRER: What about the diplomatic thing here? Do we, meaning the big we, the Western world or the world that's upset about all of this, not just the United States, have to call Iraq's bluff? If you think this is not real, and other people think this isn't real, does this bluff have to be called, and does that take time, does it slow things down, is that a legitimate course to take?

RUMSFELD: It depends on what credence one gives the moves that Iraq makes. I mean, here is a country that's violated every U.N. resolution that relates to it. It has lied, it has thrown the inspectors out. The idea that they're likely to be credible with respect to one more opportunity is, I think, debatable. And I think the problem the U.N. has is they have issued very tough resolutions year after year, after year, and they have never been implemented. Now, at some point an institution has to ask how does it feel about that, does it want to be irrelevant as an institution? Does it want to have relevance, or is it willing to simply keep making resolutions and having a dictator like Iraq tell the world community not to worry, you're irrelevant. I think the UN is facing an issue here, and I think the president put it very, very well before that institution. It is not a U.S. issue for the UN, it's a UN resolution, it's a UN issue.



LEHRER: You don't think the offer of Iraq to readmit the inspectors kind of takes a little steam out of all of that? The French, several Arab nations, the Russians have already said, we don't think we need to do anything right now, no new resolutions, let's play this thing out with the inspectors. That's not a problem?

RUMSFELD: I don't doubt for a minute that Iraq and maybe some other countries would like to rope a dope it along, and just keep delaying things and putting it off. That's always the case. There's never unanimity on anything that I've seen, at least rarely. But, I think most countries are pretty wise and perceptive. The truth is that Saddam Hussein has been about four times as clever as the United States, the U.N., and the Western world in managing public opinion. They're just masters at manipulating the press, and putting out disinformation. They're already moving military units and elements next to mosques, and next to hospitals, and next to schools. So that —

RUMSFELD: Exactly, so they can claim that the coalition has done all these terrible things. It's an old pattern. I don't know what credence it will be given up in the UN. Only time will tell. I know that Colin is working with the other countries, and a lot of them have been very forthright, and understand what's taking place.

LEHRER: Meanwhile, and finally, to your responsibilities as Secretary of Defense. Whenever a decision is made, whatever the decision is made by the president to do something, is the United States military ready to do anything on that scale of everything that's been discussed?

RUMSFELD: Absolutely.

LEHRER: Without question?

RUMSFELD: Without question.

LEHRER: We can do that and still keep going after al-Qaeda, and do all of our other responsibilities?

RUMSFELD: Absolutely. The military leaders and the combatant commanders, and the services and I have all met repeatedly. We have a force sizing construct and a strategy that enables the United States of America to engage in two major conflicts, near simultaneously, to win decisively in one and occupy the country, to swiftly defeat in the other case and hold, and to simultaneously provide for homeland defense, and a series of lesser contingencies, such as Bosnia or Kosovo. And we have the capability to pursue the global war on terrorism, and certainly the problems of Iraq are part of the global war on terrorism as we've been doing.

LEHRER: So whatever the president decides, if it's a military decision on Iraq, you're prepared to do it, and do it whatever it is?

RUMSFELD: There is just no question about it. The United States military will be prepared to do whatever the president orders, and do it well.

LEHRER: Mr. Secretary, thank you.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

September 17, 2002

## Timeline: Saddam Hussein's Deception and Defiance

*We've heard "unconditional" before*

*Last week, the President of the United States focused the world's attention on Iraq's continued defiance of UN resolutions. Saddam Hussein's regime claimed yesterday that Iraq would comply unconditionally. While this new statement is evidence that world pressure can force the Iraqi regime to respond, it is also a return to form. Time after time, "without conditions" has meant deception, delay, and disregard for the United Nations.*

"I am pleased to inform you of the decision of the Government of the Republic of Iraq to allow the return of United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq **without conditions**." - Naji Sabri, Iraq's minister of foreign affairs, September 16, 2002  
(emphasis added)

The following timeline details the Iraqi regime's repeated pattern of accepting inspections "without conditions" and then demanding conditions, often at gunpoint. This information is derived from an October 1998 UNSCOM report and excerpted from [http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/uns\\_chro.htm](http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/uns_chro.htm).

<u>Date</u>	<u>Action</u>
April 3, 1991	U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), Section C, declares that Iraq shall accept <b><u>unconditionally</u></b> , under international supervision, the "destruction, removal or rendering harmless" of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range over 150 kilometers (emphasis added). One week later, Iraq accepts Resolution 687. Its provisions were reiterated and reinforced in subsequent action by the United Nations in June and August of 1991.
May 1991	Iraq accepts the privileges and immunities of the Special Commission (UNSCOM) and its personnel. These guarantees include the right of " <b><u>unrestricted</u></b> freedom of entry and exit without delay or hindrance of its personnel, property, supplies, equipment ... (emphasis added)."
June 1991	Iraqi personnel fire warning shots to prevent the inspectors from approaching the vehicles.
September 1991	Iraqi officials confiscate documents from the inspectors. The inspectors refuse to yield a second set of documents. In response, Iraq refuses to allow the team to leave the site with these documents. A four-day standoff ensues, but Iraq permits the team to leave with the



documents after a statement from the Security Council threatens enforcement actions.

**October 11, 1991**

The Security Council adopts Resolution 715, which approves joint UNSCOM and IAEA plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. UNSCOM's plan establishes that Iraq shall "accept unconditionally the inspectors and all other personnel designated by the Special Commission" (*emphasis added*).

**October 1991**

Iraq states that it considers the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Plans adopted by Resolution 715 to be unlawful and states that it is not ready to comply with Resolution 715.

**February 1992**

Iraq refuses to comply with an UNSCOM/IAEA decision to destroy certain facilities used in proscribed programs and related items.

**April 1992**

Iraq calls for a halt to UNSCOM's aerial surveillance flights, stating that the aircraft and its pilot might be endangered. The President of the Security Council issues a statement reaffirming UNSCOM's right to conduct such flights. Iraq says that it does not intend to carry out any military action aimed at UNSCOM's aerial flights.

**July 6-29, 1992**

Iraq refuses an inspection team access to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture. UNSCOM said it had reliable information that the site contained archives related to proscribed activities. Inspectors gained access only after members of the Council threatened enforcement action.

**January 1993**

Iraq refuses to allow UNSCOM to use its own aircraft to fly into Iraq.

**June-July 1993**

Iraq refuses to allow UNSCOM inspectors to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two missile engine test stands.

**November 26, 1993**

Iraq accepts Resolution 715 and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification.

**October 15, 1994**

The Security Council adopts Resolution 949, which demands that Iraq "cooperate fully" with UNSCOM and that it withdraw all military units deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions (*emphasis added*). Iraq withdraws its forces and resumes working with UNSCOM.

**March 1996**

Iraqi security forces refuse UNSCOM teams access to five sites designated for inspection. The teams enter the sites after delays of up to 17 hours.



<b>March 19, 1996</b>	The Security Council issues a presidential statement expressing its concern over Iraq's behavior, which it terms "a clear violation of Iraq's obligations under relevant resolutions." The council also demands that Iraq allow UNSCOM teams immediate, <u>unconditional</u> and unrestricted access to all sites designated for inspection ( <i>emphasis added</i> ).
<b>March 27, 1996</b>	Security Council Resolution 1051 approves the export/import monitoring mechanism for Iraq and demands that Iraq meet <u>unconditionally</u> all its obligations under the mechanism and cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the director-general of the IAEA ( <i>emphasis added</i> ).
<b>June 1996</b>	Iraq denies UNSCOM teams access to sites under investigation for their involvement in the "concealment mechanism" for proscribed items.
<b>June 12, 1997</b>	The Security Council adopts Resolution 1060, which terms Iraq's actions a clear violation of the provisions of the council's earlier resolutions. It also demands that Iraq grant " <u>immediate and unrestricted access</u> " to all sites designated for inspection by UNSCOM ( <i>emphasis added</i> ).
<b>June 13, 1996</b>	Despite the adoption of Resolution 1060, Iraq again denies access to another inspection team.
<b>November 1996</b>	Iraq blocks UNSCOM from removing remnants of missile engines for in-depth analysis outside Iraq.
<b>June 1997</b>	Iraqi escorts on board an UNSCOM helicopter try to physically prevent the UNSCOM pilot from flying the helicopter in the direction of its intended destination.
<b>June 21, 1997</b>	Iraq again blocks UNSCOM teams from entering certain sites for inspection.
<b>June 21, 1997</b>	The Security Council adopts Resolution 1115, which condemns Iraq's actions and demands that Iraq allow UNSCOM's team immediate, <u>unconditional</u> and unrestricted access to any sites for inspection and officials for interviews ( <i>emphasis added</i> ).
<b>September 13, 1997</b>	An Iraqi officer attacks an UNSCOM inspector on board an UNSCOM helicopter while the inspector was attempting to take photographs of unauthorized movement of Iraqi vehicles inside a site designated for inspection.



<b>September 17, 1997</b>	While seeking access to a site declared by Iraq to be "sensitive," UNSCOM inspectors witness and videotape Iraqi guards moving files, burning documents, and dumping ash-filled waste cans into a nearby river.
<b>November 12, 1997</b>	The Security Council adopts Resolution 1137, condemning Iraq for continually violating its obligations, including its decision to seek to <b><u>impose conditions</u></b> on cooperation with UNSCOM ( <i>emphasis added</i> ). The resolution also imposes a travel restriction on Iraqi officials who are responsible for or participated in instances of non-compliance.
<b>November 3, 1997</b>	Iraq demands that US citizens working for UNSCOM leave Iraq immediately.
<b>December 22, 1997</b>	The Security Council issues a statement calling upon the government of Iraq to cooperate fully with the commission and stresses that failure by Iraq to provide immediate, <b><u>unconditional</u></b> and unrestricted access to any site is an unacceptable and clear violation of Security Council resolutions ( <i>emphasis added</i> ).
<b>February 20-23, 1998</b>	Iraq signs a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations on February 23, 1998. Iraq pledges to accept all relevant Security Council resolutions, to cooperate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA, and to grant to UNSCOM and the IAEA "immediate, <b><u>unconditional</u></b> and unrestricted access" for their inspections ( <i>emphasis added</i> ).
<b>August 5, 1998</b>	The Revolutionary Command Council and the Ba'ath Party Command decide to stop cooperating with UNSCOM and the IAEA until the Security Council agrees to lift the oil embargo as a first step towards ending sanctions.

###



Iraq and the UN

## Saddam under pressure

Keep him that way



THE past week has been good for President George Bush and bad for President Saddam Hussein. Mr Bush's stirring and well-crafted speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 12th convinced many other countries, most notably

other permanent members of the Security Council, to support the idea of new resolutions laying down the world's demands on Iraq. Arab countries that had been widely assumed to oppose a war on Iraq in almost any circumstances suddenly changed their minds, saying that, well, if the UN were to be behind a war then yes, of course American and other forces could use bases on their territory. Given all that, it is hardly surprising that Mr Hussein then performed a somersault, dropping his previous absolute rejection of any idea that UN weapons inspectors should return to his country after their four-year exclusion, and sending a short letter saying that inspectors could return after all. Even dangerous dictators have survival instincts.

What has been surprising—or, rather, dispiriting—has been the reaction to Mr Hussein's somersault by many western commentators and some western governments. Plainly, the reason why Mr Hussein has changed his mind is that at last, for the first time since the end of the Gulf war in 1991, he faces a credible threat of military attack, supported by the important members of the UN and even by his Arab neighbours. So what, for example, does the foreign minister of Russia say? In effect, that the pressure can now be relaxed, that no new Security Council resolutions are needed, and that all will now be well. The only charitable way to interpret such a position is that it could be a clever feint to tempt Mr Hussein to show his true nature by modifying his offer again in the belief that the world's great powers are disunited once more. More likely, however, Igor Ivanov and others who echo such views are simply being recklessly irresponsible.

### Resolute about resolutions

Might Saddam Hussein's offer be sincere? Might he really be willing to readmit the weapons inspectors unconditionally, allow them unimpeded access throughout Iraq, and accept complete disarmament of his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons or facilities? The possibility can be dismissed immediately. For even Mr Hussein will not know whether he is being sincere, at this point. On every single occasion in the past he has not been, for he has always done as little to reveal and disarm as he could get away with. That is natural, for evasion is in his interest. The same will be true now: he will do as little as he can get away with. It is just that he does not yet know how little or how much that will be.

The task for the outside world is to make sure that he has to be sincere, in every single respect. And the only way to do that is to keep up the military and diplomatic pressure. Indeed now would be a fine time to intensify it, given that Mr Hussein has shown in the past few days that he will blink under such

pressure. America's military build-up, through exercises and forward deployments of troops, ships and aircraft should continue, in a steady but remorseless fashion. Iraq's Arab neighbours, especially Saudi Arabia, should keep up their diplomatic arm-twisting, both privately and publicly, to try to persuade Mr Hussein to make further concessions (see page 39). Above all, the Security Council needs to draft and then pass new resolutions about Iraq as soon as possible, setting terms that are as tough as possible.

Some will argue that such resolutions are unnecessary, for all that is needed is for Iraq to fulfil the terms of the previous 16 resolutions laid down for it during the past 11 years. If only they meant it, for most who take this view think that only resolutions about weapons inspectors and disarmament need to be enforced, and not ones about Kuwaiti prisoners-of-war, Kuwaiti property or respect for Iraqis' human rights, among others. Yet two points argue for new resolutions. One is that this was the path the Security Council was heading down after Mr Bush's speech, and so to abandon it now would be to hand an unnecessary victory to Mr Hussein. A display of unchanged determination would put him back on the defensive. The second is that Mr Hussein's successfully evasive record during the 1990s makes it vital to set tougher conditions, using tougher wording and tougher methods, if there is to be any chance of success. In particular, inspectors will need the help of UN troops if they are to be able to do a proper job. At the same time, the demands in a new resolution can and should be set as broadly as is necessary to encompass the subject-matter of all the 16 resolutions he has flouted.

### Call his bluff

For the United States and Britain to press for such a new resolution, or if necessary two new resolutions, will be risky. There will be a chance that France, Russia and China will withdraw the support or (in China's case) acquiescence they were previously showing. But, having gone so far to rally the UN, that is a risk worth taking. If France and Russia pull back merely because of one offer from a serial liar and murderer, then their support can never have been genuine in the first place. It is more probable, though, that with careful diplomacy and bargaining, they will be persuaded to fall in line.

Their bluff, in other words, will have been called. But the most important bluff to call is that of Saddam Hussein himself. He has long ago forfeited any right to be trusted. He has also forfeited the normal rights of sovereignty by his slaughter of his own people and his violations of international treaties, giving the outside world every right to be thoroughly intrusive in his internal affairs. The hope has to be that the more intrusive outsiders become, the more Mr Hussein's power will be eroded. The dream must be that one day soon he will join Slobodan Milosevic, another brutal dictator, in the dock for crimes against humanity. The worst fear, though, should be that he would succeed again in emulating a much more humorous man with a moustache, Groucho Marx, who said that sincerity was the most important asset in life: if you can fake that, you've got it made. Don't let him. ■



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## Prepared Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees regarding Iraq

*Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Washington, D.C., September 18-19, 2002.*

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today.

Last week, we commemorated the one-year anniversary of the most devastating attack our nation has ever experienced—more than 3,000 innocent people killed in a single day.

Today, I want to discuss the task of preventing even more devastating attacks—attacks that could kill not thousands, but potentially tens of thousands of our fellow citizens.

As we meet, state sponsors of terror across the world are working to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction. As we speak, chemists, biologists, and nuclear scientists are toiling in weapons labs and underground bunkers, working to give the world's most dangerous dictators weapons of unprecedented power and lethality.

The threat posed by those regimes is real. It is dangerous. And it is growing with each passing day. We cannot wish it away.

We have entered a new security environment, one that is dramatically different than the one we grew accustomed to over the past half-century. We have entered a world in which terrorist movements and terrorists states are developing the capacity to cause unprecedented destruction.

Today, our margin of error is notably different. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, we were dealing, for the most part, with conventional weapons—weapons that could kill hundreds or thousands of people, generally combatants. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we



are dealing with weapons of mass destruction that can kill potentially tens of thousands of people—innocent men, women and children.

Further, because of the nature of these new threats, we are in an age of little or no warning, when threats can emerge suddenly—at any place or time—to surprise us. Terrorist states have enormous appetite for these powerful weapons—and active programs to develop them. They are finding ways to gain access to these capabilities. This is not a possibility—it is a certainty. In word and deed, they have demonstrated a willingness to use those capabilities.

Moreover, after September 11<sup>th</sup>, they have discovered a new means of delivering these weapons—terrorist networks. To the extent that they might transfer WMD to terrorist groups, they could conceal their responsibility for attacks. And if they believe they can conceal their responsibility for an attack, then they would likely not be deterred.

We are on notice. Let there be no doubt: an attack will be attempted. The only question is when and by what technique. It could be months, a year, or several years. But it will happen. It is in our future. Each of us needs to pause, and think about that for a moment—about what it would mean for our country, for our families—and indeed for the world.

If the worst were to happen, not one of us here today will be able to honestly say it was a surprise. Because it will not be a surprise. We have connected the dots as much as it is humanly possible -- before the fact. Only by waiting until after the event could we have proof positive. The dots are there for all to see. The dots are there for all to connect. If they aren't good enough, rest assured they will only be good enough after another disaster—a disaster of still greater proportions. And by then it will be too late.

The question facing us is this: what is the responsible course of action for our country? Do you believe it is our responsibility to wait for a nuclear, chemical or biological 9/11? Or is it the responsibility of free people to do something now—to take steps to deal with the threat before we are attacked?

The President has made his position clear: the one thing that is not an option is doing nothing.

There are a number of terrorist states pursuing weapons of mass destruction—Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, to name but a few. But no terrorist state poses a greater and more immediate threat to the security of our people, and the stability of the world, than the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

No living dictator has shown the murderous combination of intent and capability - of aggression against his neighbors; oppression of his own people; genocide; support of terrorism; pursuit of weapons of mass destruction; the use of weapons of mass destruction; and the most threatening hostility to its neighbors and to the United States, than Saddam Hussein and his regime.



Mr. Chairman, these facts about Saddam Hussein's regime should be part of this record and of our country's considerations:

- Saddam Hussein has openly praised the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>.
  - Last week, on the anniversary of 9/11, his state run press called the attacks "God's punishment."
  - He has repeatedly threatened the U.S. and its allies with terror—once declaring that "every Iraqi [can] become a missile."
- He has ordered the use of chemical weapons—Sarin, Tabun, VX, and mustard agents—against his own people, in one case killing 5,000 innocent civilians in a single day.
- His regime has invaded two of its neighbors, and threatened others.
  - In 1980, they invaded Iran, and used chemical weapons against Iranian forces.
  - In 1990, they invaded Kuwait and are responsible for thousands of documented cases of torture, rape and murder of Kuwaiti civilians during their occupation.
  - In 1991, they were poised to march on and occupy other nations—and would have done so, had they not been stopped by the U.S. led coalition forces.
- His regime has launched ballistic missiles at four of their neighbors—Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
- His regime plays host to terrorist networks, and has directly ordered acts of terror on foreign soil.
- His regime assassinates its opponents, both in Iraq and abroad, and has attempted to assassinate the former Israeli Ambassador to Great Britain, and a former U.S. President.
- He has executed members of their cabinet, including the Minister of Health, whom he personally shot and killed.
- His regime has committed genocide and ethnic cleansing in Northern Iraq, ordering the extermination of between 50,000 and 100,000 people and the destruction of over 4,000 villages.
- His attacks on the Kurds drove 2 million refugees into Turkey, Syria and Iran.
- His regime has brought the Marsh Arabs in Southern Iraq to the point of extinction, drying up the Iraqi marsh lands in order to move against their villages—one of the worst environmental crimes ever committed.
- His regime is responsible for catastrophic environmental damage, setting fire to over 1,100 Kuwaiti oil wells.
- His regime beat and tortured American POWs during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and used them as "human shields."
- His regime has still failed to account for hundreds of POWs, including Kuwaiti, Saudi, Indian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iranian, Egyptian, Bahraini and Omani nationals—and an American pilot shot down over Iraq during the Gulf War.



- His regime on almost a daily basis continues to fire missiles and artillery at U.S. and coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones in Northern and Southern Iraq, and has made clear its objective of shooting down coalition pilots enforcing UN resolutions -- it is the only place in the world where U.S. forces are shot at with impunity.
- His regime has subjected tens of thousands of political prisoners and ordinary Iraqis to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, summary execution, torture, beatings, burnings, electric shocks, starvation and mutilation.
- He has ordered doctors to surgically remove the ears of military deserters, and the gang rape of Iraqi women, including political prisoners, the wives and daughters of their opposition and members of the regime suspected of disloyalty.
- His regime is actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and willing to pay a high price to get them—giving up tens of billions in oil revenue under economic sanctions by refusing inspections to preserve his WMD programs.
- His regime has amassed large, clandestine stockpiles of biological weapons—including anthrax and botulism toxin, and possibly smallpox.
- His regime has amassed large, clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons—including VX, sarin, cyclosarin and mustard gas.
- His regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons.
  - They have the knowledge of how to produce nuclear weapons, and designs for at least two different nuclear devices.
  - They have a team of scientists, technicians and engineers in place, as well as the infrastructure needed to build a weapon.
  - Very likely all they need to complete a weapon is fissile material—and they are, at this moment, seeking that material—both from foreign sources and the capability to produce it indigenously.
- His regime has dozens of ballistic missiles, and is working to extend their range in violation of UN restrictions.
- His regime is pursuing pilotless aircraft as a means of delivering chemical and biological weapons.
- His regime agreed after the Gulf War to give up weapons of mass destruction and submit to international inspections—then lied, cheated and hid their WMD programs for more than a decade.
- His regime has in place an elaborate, organized system of denial and deception to frustrate both inspectors and outside intelligence efforts.
- His regime has violated UN economic sanctions, using illicit oil revenues to fuel their WMD aspirations.
- His regime has diverted funds from the UN's "oil for food" program—funds intended to help feed starving Iraqi civilians—to fund WMD programs.
- His regime violated 16 UN resolutions, repeatedly defying the will of the international community without cost or consequence.
- And his regime is determined to acquire the means to strike the U.S., its friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction, acquire the territory of their neighbors, and impose their control over the Persian Gulf region.



As the President warned the United Nations last week, "Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger." It is a danger to its neighbors, to the United States, to the Middle East, and to international peace and stability. It is a danger we do not have the option to ignore.

The world has acquiesced in Saddam Hussein's aggression, abuses and defiance for more than a decade.

In his UN address, the President explained why we should not allow the Iraqi regime to acquire weapons of mass destruction—and issued a challenge to the international community: to enforce the numerous resolutions the UN has passed and Saddam Hussein has defied; to show that Security Council's decisions will not to be cast aside without cost or consequence; to show that the UN is up to the challenge of dealing with a dictator like Saddam Hussein; to show that the UN is determined not to become irrelevant.

President Bush has made clear that the United States wants to work with the UN Security Council to deal with the threat posed by the Iraqi regime. But he made clear the consequences of Iraq's continued defiance: "The purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced... or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power."

The President has asked the Members of the House and the Senate to support the actions that may be necessary to deliver on that pledge. He urged that the Congress act before the Congressional recess. He asked that you send a clear signal—to the world community and the Iraqi regime—that our country is united in purpose and ready to act. Only certainty of U.S. and UN purposefulness can have even the prospect of affecting the Iraqi regime.

It is important that Congress send that message as soon as possible—before the UN Security Council votes. The Security Council must act soon, and it is important that the U.S. Congress signal the world where the U.S. stands before the UN vote takes place. Delaying a vote in the Congress would send a message that the U.S. may be unprepared to take a stand, just as we are asking the international community to take a stand, and as Iraq will be considering its options.

Delay would signal the Iraqi regime that they can continue their violations of the UN resolutions. It serves no U.S. or UN purpose to give Saddam Hussein excuses for further delay. His regime should recognize that the U.S. and the UN are purposeful.

It was Congress that changed the objective of U.S. policy from containment to regime change, by the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. The President is now asking Congress to support that policy.

A decision to use military force is never easy. No one with any sense considers war a first choice—it is the last thing that any rational person wants to do. And it



is important that the issues surrounding this decision be discussed and debated.

In recent weeks, a number of questions have been surfaced by Senators, Members of Congress and former government officials. Some of the arguments raised are important. Just as there are risks in acting, so too there are risks in not acting.

Those risks need to be balanced, and to do so it is critical to address a number of the issues that have been raised:

Some have asked whether an attack on Iraq would disrupt and distract the U.S. from the Global War on Terror.

The answer to that is: Iraq is a part of the Global War on Terror—stopping terrorist regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key objective of that war. We can fight all elements of this war simultaneously.

Our principal goal in the war on terror is to stop another 9/11—or a WMD attack that could make 9/11 seem modest by comparison—before it happens. Whether that threat comes from a terrorist regime or a terrorist network is beside the point. Our objective is to stop them, regardless of the source.

In his State of the Union address last January, President Bush made our objectives clear. He said: "by seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases the price of indifference would be catastrophic." Ultimately, history will judge us all by what we do now to deal with this danger.

Another question that has been asked is this: The Administration argues Saddam Hussein poses a grave and growing danger. Where is the "smoking gun?"

Mr. Chairman, the last thing we want is a smoking gun. A gun smokes after it has been fired. The goal must be to stop Saddam Hussein before he fires a weapon of mass destruction against our people. As the President told the United Nations last week, "The first time we may be completely certain he has nuclear weapons is when, God forbid, he uses one. We owe it to... our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from coming." If the Congress or the world wait for a so-called "smoking gun," it is certain that we will have waited too long.

But the question raises an issue that it is useful to discuss—about the kind of evidence we consider to be appropriate to act in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

In our country, it has been customary to seek evidence that would prove guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" in a court of law. That approach is appropriate when the objective is to protect the rights of the accused. But in the age of WMD, the objective is not to protect the "rights" of dictators like Saddam Hussein—it is to protect the lives of our citizens. And when there is that risk, and we are trying to defend against the closed societies and shadowy networks that threaten us in the



21st century, expecting to find that standard of evidence, from thousands of miles away, and to do so before such a weapon has been used, is not realistic. And, after such weapons have been used it is too late.

I suggest that any who insist on perfect evidence are back in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and still thinking in pre-9/11 terms. On September 11<sup>th</sup>, we were awakened to the fact that America is now vulnerable to unprecedented destruction. That awareness ought to be sufficient to change the way we think about our security, how we defend our country—and the type of certainty and evidence we consider appropriate.

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when we were dealing largely with conventional weapons, we could wait for perfect evidence. If we miscalculated, we could absorb an attack, recover, take a breath, mobilize, and go out and defeat our attackers. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, that is no longer the case, unless we are willing and comfortable accepting the loss not of thousands of lives, but potentially tens of thousands of lives – a high price indeed.

We have not, will not, and cannot know everything that is going on in the world. Over the years, even our best efforts, intelligence has repeatedly underestimated the weapons capabilities of a variety of countries of major concern to us. We have had numerous gaps of two, four, six or eight years between the time a country of concern first developed a WMD capability and the time we finally learned about it.

We do know that the Iraqi regime has chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction and is pursuing nuclear weapons; that they have a proven willingness to use the weapons at their disposal; that they have proven aspirations to seize the territory of, and threaten, their neighbors; proven support for and cooperation with terrorist networks; and proven record of declared hostility and venomous rhetoric against the United States. Those threats should be clear to all.

In his UN address, the President said "we know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left?" To the contrary, knowing what we know about Iraq's history, no conclusion is possible except that they have and are accelerating their WMD programs.

Now, do we have perfect evidence that can tell us precisely the date Iraq will have a deliverable nuclear device, or when and where he might try to use it? That is not knowable. But it is strange that some seem to want to put the burden of proof on us—the burden of proof ought to be on him—to prove he has disarmed; to prove he no longer poses a threat to peace and security. And that he cannot do.

Committees of Congress currently are asking hundreds of questions about what happened on September 11<sup>th</sup>—pouring over thousands of pages of documents, and asking who knew what, when and why they didn't prevent that tragedy. I suspect, that in retrospect, most of those investigating 9/11 would have supported



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preventive action to pre-empt that threat, if it had been possible to see it coming.

Well, if one were to compare the scraps of information the government had before September 11<sup>th</sup> to the volumes of information the government has today about Iraq's pursuit of WMD, his use of those weapons, his record of aggression and his consistent hostility toward the United States—and then factor in our country's demonstrated vulnerability after September 11<sup>th</sup>—the case the President made should be clear.

As the President said, time is not on our side. If more time passes, and the attacks we are concerned about come to pass, I would not want to have ignored all the warning signs and then be required to explain why our country failed to protect our fellow citizens.

We cannot go back in time to stop the September 11<sup>th</sup> attack. But we can take actions now to prevent some future threats.

Some have argued that the nuclear threat from Iraq is not imminent—that Saddam is at least 5-7 years away from having nuclear weapons.

I would not be so certain. Before Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the best intelligence estimates were that Iraq was at least 5-7 years away from having nuclear weapons. The experts were flat wrong. When the U.S. got on the ground, it found the Iraqi's were probably six months to a year away from having a nuclear weapon – not 5 to 7 years.

We do not know today precisely how close he is to having a deliverable nuclear weapon. What we do know is that he has a sizable appetite for them, that he has been actively and persistently pursuing them for more than 20 years, and that we allow him to get them at our peril. Moreover, let's say he is 5-7 years from a deliverable nuclear weapon. That raises the question: 5-7 years from when? From today? From 1998, when he kicked out the inspectors? Or from earlier, when inspectors were still in country? There is no way of knowing except from the ground, unless one believes what Saddam Hussein says.

But those who raise questions about the nuclear threat need to focus on the immediate threat from biological weapons. From 1991 to 1995, Iraq repeatedly insisted it did not have biological weapons. Then, in 1995, Saddam's son-in-law defected and told the inspectors some of the details of Iraq's biological weapons program. Only then did Iraq admit it had produced tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and other biological weapons. But even then, they did not come clean. UN inspectors believe Iraq had in fact produced two to four-times the amount of biological agents it had declared. Those biological agents were never found. Iraq also refused to account for some three tons of materials that could be used to produce biological weapons.

Iraq has these weapons. They are much simpler to deliver than nuclear weapons, and even more readily transferred to terrorist networks, who could allow Iraq to deliver them without fingerprints.



If you want an idea of the devastation Iraq could wreak on our country with a biological attack, consider the recent "Dark Winter" exercise conducted by Johns Hopkins University. It simulated a biological WMD attack in which terrorists released smallpox in three separate locations in the U.S. Within 22 days, it is estimated it would have spread to 26 states, with an estimated 6000 new infections occurring daily. Within two months, the worst-case estimate indicated one million people could be dead and another 2 million infected. Not a nice picture.

The point is this: we know Iraq possesses biological weapons, and chemical weapons, and is expanding and improving their capabilities to produce them. That should be of every bit as much concern as Iraq's potential nuclear capability.

Some have argued that even if Iraq has these weapons, Saddam Hussein does not intend to use WMD against the U.S. because he is a survivor, not a suicide bomber—that he would be unlikely to take actions that could lead to his own destruction.

Then why is Iraq pursuing WMD so aggressively? Why are they willing to pay such a high price for them—to suffer a decade of economic sanctions that have cost them tens of billions in oil revenues—sanctions they could get lifted simply by an agreement to disarm?

One answer is that, as some critics have conceded, "he seeks weapons of mass destruction... to deter us from intervening to block his aggressive designs." This is no doubt a motivation. But consider the consequences if they were allowed to succeed.

Imagine for a moment that Iraq demonstrated the capacity to attack U.S. or European populations centers with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Then imagine you are the President of the United States, trying to put together an international coalition to stop their aggression, after Iraq had demonstrated that capability. It would be a daunting task. His regime believes that simply by possessing the capacity to deliver WMD to Western capitals, he will be able to prevent—terrorize—the free world from projecting force to stop his aggression—driving the West into a policy of forced isolationism.

That said, it is far from clear that he would not necessarily restrain from taking actions that could result in his destruction. For example, that logic did not stop the Taliban from supporting and harboring al-Qaeda as they planned and executed repeated attacks on the U.S. And their miscalculation resulted in the destruction of their regime. Regimes without checks and balances are prone to grave miscalculations. Saddam Hussein has no checks whatsoever on his decision-making authority. Who among us really believes it would be wise or prudent for us to base our security on the hope that Saddam Hussein, or his sons who might succeed him, could not make the same fatal miscalculations as Mullah Omar and the Taliban?

It is my view that we would be ill advised to stake our people's lives on Saddam



Hussein's supposed "survival instinct."

Some have argued Iraq is unlikely to use WMD against us because, unlike terrorist networks, Saddam has a "return address."

Mr. Chairman, there is no reason for confidence that if Iraq launched a WMD attack on the U.S. it would necessarily have an obvious "return address." There are ways Iraq could easily conceal responsibility for a WMD attack. They could deploy "sleeper cells" armed with biological weapons to attack us from within—and then deny any knowledge or connection to the attacks. Or they could put a WMD-tipped missile on a "commercial" shipping vessel, sail it within range of our coast, fire it, and then melt back into the commercial shipping traffic before we knew what hit us. Finding that ship would be like searching for a needle in a haystack—a bit like locating a single terrorist. Or they could recruit and utilize a terrorist network with similar views and objectives, and pass on weapons of mass destruction to them. It is this nexus between a terrorist state like Iraq with WMD and terrorist networks that has so significantly changed the U.S. security environment.

We still do not know with certainty who was behind the 1996 bombing the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia—an attack that killed 19 American service members. We still do not know who is responsible for last year's anthrax attacks. The nature of terrorist attacks is that it is often very difficult to identify who is ultimately responsible. Indeed, our consistent failure over the past two decades to trace terrorist attacks to their ultimate source gives terrorist states the lesson that using terrorist networks as proxies is an effective way of attacking the U.S. with impunity.

Some have opined there is scant evidence of Iraq's ties to terrorists, and he has little incentive to make common cause with them.

That is not correct. Iraq's ties to terrorist networks are long-standing. It is no coincidence that Abu Nidal was in Baghdad, when he died under mysterious circumstances. Iraq has also reportedly provided safe haven to Abdul Rahman Yasin, one of the FBI's most wanted terrorists, who was a key participant in the first World Trade Center bombing. We know that al-Qaeda is operating in Iraq today, and that little happens in Iraq without the knowledge of the Saddam Hussein regime. We also know that there have been a number of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda over the years. We know Saddam has ordered acts of terror himself, including the attempted assassination of a former U.S. President.

He has incentives to make common cause with terrorists. He shares many common objectives with groups like al-Qaeda, including an antipathy for the Saudi royal family and a desire to drive the U.S. out of the Persian Gulf region. Moreover, if he decided it was in his interest to conceal his responsibility for an attack on the U.S., providing WMD to terrorists would be an effective way of doing so.

Some have said that they would support action to remove Saddam if the U.S.



could prove a connection to the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>—but there is no such proof.

The question implies that the U.S. should have to prove that Iraq has already attacked us in order to deal with that threat. The objective is to stop him before he attacks us and kills thousands of our citizens.

The case against Iraq does not depend on an Iraqi link to 9/11. The issue for the U.S. is not vengeance, retribution or retaliation—it is whether the Iraqi regime poses a growing danger to the safety and security of our people, and of the world. There is no question but that it does.

Some argue that North Korea and Iran are more immediate threats than Iraq. North Korea almost certainly has nuclear weapons, and is developing missiles that will be able to reach most of the continental United States. Iran has stockpiles of chemical weapons, is developing ballistic missiles of increasing range, and is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. The question is asked: why not deal with them first?

Iran and North Korea are indeed threats—problems we take seriously. That is why President Bush named them specifically, when he spoke about an "Axis of Evil." And we have policies to address both.

But Iraq is unique. No other living dictator matches Saddam Hussein's record of waging aggressive war against his neighbors; pursuing weapons of mass destruction; using WMD against his own people and other nations; launching ballistic missiles at his neighbors; brutalizing and torturing his own citizens; harboring terrorist networks; engaging in terrorist acts, including the attempted assassination of foreign officials; violating his international commitments; lying, cheating and hiding his WMD programs; deceiving and defying the express will of the United Nations over and over again.

As the President told the UN, "in one place—in one regime—we find all these dangers in their most lethal and aggressive forms."

Some respond by saying, OK, Iraq poses a threat we will eventually have to deal with—but now is not the time to do so.

To that, I would ask: when? Will it be a better time when his regime is stronger? When its WMD programs are still further advanced? After he further builds his forces, which are stronger and deadlier with each passing day? Yes, there are risks in acting. The President understands those risks. But there are also risks in further delay. As the President has said: "I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."

Others say that overthrowing the regime should be the last step, not the first.



I would respond that for more than a decade now, the international community has tried every other step. They have tried diplomacy; they have tried sanctions and embargoes; they have tried positive inducements, such as the "oil for food" program; they have tried inspections; they have tried limited military strikes. Together, all these approaches have failed to accomplish the UN goals.

If the President were to decide to take military action to overthrow the regime, it would be not the first step, it would be the last step, after a decade of failed diplomatic and economic steps to stop his drive for WMD.

Some have asked: why not just contain him? The West lived for 40 years with the Soviet threat, and never felt the need to take pre-emptive action. If containment worked on the Soviet Union, why not Iraq?

First, it's clear from the Iraqi regimes 11 years of defiance that containment has not led to their compliance. To the contrary, containment is breaking down—the regime continues to receive funds from illegal oil sales and procure military hardware necessary to develop weapons of mass murder. So not only has containment failed to reduce the threat, it has allowed the threat to grow.

Second, with the Soviet Union we faced an adversary that already possessed nuclear weapons—thousands of them. Our goal with Iraq is to prevent them from getting nuclear weapons. We are not interested in establishing a balance of terror with the likes of Iraq, like the one that existed with the Soviet Union. We are interested in stopping a balance of terror from forming.

Third, with the Soviet Union, we believed that time was on our side – and we were correct. With Iraq, the opposite is true—time is not our side. Every month that goes by, his WMD programs are progressing and he moves closer to his goal of possessing the capability to strike our population, and our allies, and hold them hostage to blackmail.

Finally, while containment worked in the long run, the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal prevented the West from responding when they invaded their neighbor, Afghanistan. Does anyone really want Saddam to have that same deterrent, so he can invade his neighbors with impunity?

Some ask: Why does he have to be overthrown? Can't we just take out the capabilities he has that threaten us?

While the President has not made that decision, the problem with doing it piecemeal is this: First, we do not know where all of Iraq's WMD facilities are. We do know where a fraction of them are. Second, of the facilities we do know, not all are vulnerable to attack from the air. Some are underground. Some are mobile. Others are purposely located near population centers – schools, mosques, hospitals, etc. -- where an air strike could kill large numbers of innocent people. The Iraq problem cannot be solved with air strikes alone.

Some have argued that, if we do have to go to war, the U.S. should first layout



details of a truly comprehensive inspections regime, which, if Iraq failed to comply, would provide a casus belli.

I would respond this way: if failure to comply with WMD inspections is a casus belli, the UN already has it—Iraq's non-compliance with UN inspection regimes has been going on for more than a decade. What else can one ask for?

The U.S. is not close to inspections as an element of an effective response. But the goal is not inspections—it is disarmament. Any inspections would have to be notably different from the past. Given the history of this regime, the world community has every right to be skeptical that it would be. And that is why, in 1998, the U.S. began to speak of regime change.

Our goal is disarmament. The only purpose of any inspections would be to prove that Iraq has disarmed, which would require Iraq to reverse its decades-long policy of pursuing these weapons. Something they are unlikely to do.

There are serious concerns about whether an inspections regime could be effective. Even the most intrusive inspection regime would have difficulty getting at all his weapons of mass destruction. Many of his WMD capabilities are mobile and can be hidden to evade inspectors. He has vast underground networks and facilities to hide WMD, and sophisticated denial and deception techniques. It is simply impossible to "spot check" a country the size of Iraq. Unless we have people inside the Iraqi program who are willing to tell us what they have and where they have it—as we did in 1995 with the defection of Saddam's son in law, Hussein Kamel—it is easy for the Iraqi regime to hide its capabilities from us.

Indeed, Hans Blix, the chief UN Weapons inspector, said as much in an interview with the New York Times last week. According to the Times, (quote) " [Mr. Blix] acknowledged that there were some limitations to what his team could accomplish even if it was allowed to return. Mr. Blix said his inspectors might not be able to detect mobile laboratories for producing biological weapons materials, or underground storehouses for weapons substances, if the inspectors did not have information about such sites from the last time they were in Iraq or have not seen traces of them in satellite surveillance photography." (Unquote).

When UNSCOM inspectors were on the ground, they did an admirable job of uncovering many of Iraq's violations—which is undoubtedly why Iraq had them expelled. But despite the UN's best efforts, from 1991-1995 Saddam was able to conceal some of his nuclear program and his biological weapons program. Some aspects were uncovered after his son-in-law defected and provided information that allowed inspectors to find them. And even then, Iraq was able to hide many of those activities from inspectors—capabilities he most likely still has today, in addition to what he has developed in recent years.

There is a place in this world for inspections. They tend to be effective if the target nation is cooperating—if they are actually willing to disarm and want to prove to the world that they are doing so. They tend not to be as effective in uncovering deceptions and violations when the target is determined not to disarm.



Iraq's record of the past decade shows the regime is not interested in disarming or cooperating. Their behavior demonstrates they want weapons of mass destruction and are determined to continue developing them.

Some ask: now that Iraq has agreed to "unconditional inspections," why does Congress need to act?

Iraq has demonstrated great skill at playing the international community. When it's the right moment to lean forward, they lean forward. When it's a time to lean back, they lean back. It's a dance. They can go on for months or years jerking the U.N. around. When they find that things are not going their way, they throw out a proposal like this. And hopeful people say: "There's our opportunity. They are finally being reasonable. Seize the moment. Let's give them another chance." And then we repeatedly find, at the last moment, that Iraq withdraws that carrot and goes back into their mode of rejecting the international community. And the dance starts all over again.

The issue is not inspections. The issue is disarmament. The issue is compliance. As the President made clear in his UN address, we require Iraq's compliance with all 16 UN resolutions that they have defied over the past decade. And, as the President said, the UN Security Council—not the Iraqi regime—needs to decide how to enforce its own resolutions. Congress's support for the President is what is needed to further generate international support.

Some have asked whether military intervention in Iraq means the U.S. would have to go to war with every terrorist state that is pursuing WMD?

The answer is: no. Taking military action in Iraq does not mean that it would be necessary or appropriate to take military action against other states that possess or are pursuing WMD. For one thing, preventive action in one situation may very well produce a deterrent effect on other states. After driving the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, we have already seen a change in behavior in certain regimes.

Moreover, dealing with some states may not require military action. In some cases, such as Iran, change could conceivably come from within. The young people and the women in Iran are increasingly fed up with the tight clique of Mullahs—they want change, and may well rise up to change their leadership at some point.

Some say that there is no international consensus behind ousting Saddam—and most of our key allies are opposed.

First, the fact is that there are a number of countries that want Saddam Hussein gone. Some are reluctant to say publicly just yet. But, if the U.S. waited for a consensus before acting, we would never do anything. Obviously, one's first choice in life is to have everyone agree with you at the outset. In reality, that is



seldom the case. It takes time, leadership and persuasion. Leadership is about deciding what is right, and then going out and persuading others.

The coalition we have fashioned in the global war on terror today includes some 90 nations—literally half the world. It is the greatest coalition ever assembled in the annals of human history. It was not there on September 11<sup>th</sup>. It was built, one country at a time, over a long period of time. If we had waited for consensus, the Taliban would still be in power in Afghanistan today. The worldwide coalition was formed by leadership.

During the Persian Gulf War, the coalition eventually included 36 nations. But they were not there on August 2, 1990 when Saddam invaded Kuwait. They were not there on August 5<sup>th</sup>, when the President George H. W. Bush announced to the world that Saddam's aggression "will not stand." That coalition was built over a period of many months.

With his UN speech, President George W. Bush began the process of building international support for dealing with Iraq. The reaction has been positive. We will continue to state our case, as the President is doing, and I suspect that as he does so, you will find that other countries in increasing numbers will cooperate and participate. Will it be unanimous? No. Does anyone expect it to be unanimous? No. Does it matter that it will not be unanimous? No. But does the U.S. want all the support possible – you bet. Just as we have in the coalition supporting the Global War on Terrorism.

The point is: if our nation's leaders do the right thing, others will follow and support the just cause—just they have in the global war against terror.

Some say that our European allies may reluctantly go along in the end, but that U.S. intervention in Iraq would spark concern in the Arab world—that not one country in that regions supports us, and many are vocally opposed.

That is not so. Saddam's neighbors are deathly afraid of him—and understandably so. He has invaded his neighbors, used weapons of mass destruction against them, and launched ballistic missiles at them. He aspires to dominate the region. The nations of the region would be greatly relieved to have him gone, and that if Saddam Hussein is removed from power, the reaction in the region will be not outrage, but great relief. And the reaction of the Iraqi people will most certainly be jubilation.

Some ask, but will they help us? Will they give us access to bases and territory and airspace we need to conduct a military operation?

The answer is that the President has not decided to take military action, but, if he does, we will have all the support we need to get the job done. You can be certain of it.

Another argument is that military action in Iraq will be expensive, and will have



high costs for the global economy.

That may be true. But there are also dollar costs to not acting—and those costs could well be far greater. Consider: the New York City Comptroller estimates that the economic costs of the Sept. 11 attacks to New York alone were between \$83 and \$95 billion. He further estimated that New York lost 83,000 existing jobs and some 63,000 jobs the city estimates would have been created had the attacks not happened. One institute puts the cost to the national economy at \$191 billion—including 1.64 million jobs lost as a direct result of the 9/11 attacks. Other estimates are higher—as much as \$250 billion in lost productivity, sales, jobs, advertising, airline revenue and the like. And that is not to mention the cost in human lives, and the suffering of those who lost fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, sisters and brothers that day.

And we must not forget that the costs of a nuclear, chemical or biological weapons attack would be far worse. The price in lives would be not thousands, but tens of thousands. And the economic costs could make September 11<sup>th</sup> pale by comparison. Those are the costs that also must be weighed carefully. And this is not mention the cost to one's conscience of being wrong.

Some have suggested that if the U.S. were to act it might provoke Saddam Hussein's use of WMD. Last time, the argument goes, he didn't use chemical weapons on U.S. troops and allies because he saw our goal was not to oust him, but to push back his aggression. This time, the argument goes, the opposite would be true, and he would have nothing to lose by using WMD.

That is an important point. And the President made clear on March 13, 2002 the consequences of such an attack. He said: "we've got all options on the table because we want to make it very clear to nations that you will not threaten the United States or use weapons of mass destruction against us, our allies, or our friends."

There are ways to mitigate the risk of a chem-bio attack, but it cannot be entirely eliminated—it is true that could be a risk of military action. But consider the consequences if the world were to allow that risk to deter us from acting. We would then have sent a message to the world about the value of weapons of mass destruction that we would deeply regret having sent. A country thinking about acquiring WMD would conclude that the U.S. had been deterred by Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capabilities, and they could then resolve to pursue those weapons to assure their impunity. The message the world should want to send is the exact opposite. The message should be that Iraq's pursuit of WMD has not only not made it more secure, it has made it less secure—that by pursuing those weapons, they have attracted undesired attention to themselves.

But if he is that dangerous, then that only makes the case for action stronger—because the longer we wait, the more deadly his regime becomes. If the world community were to be deterred from acting today by the threat that Iraq might use chemical or biological weapons, how will the UN feel when one day, when Iraq demonstrates it has a deliverable nuclear weapon? The risks will only grow



worse. If we are deterred today, we could be deterred forever—and Iraq will have achieved its objective. Or will the world community be deterred until Iraq uses a weapon of mass destruction, and only then decide it is time to act.

But I would suggest that even if Saddam Hussein were to issue an order for the use chemical or biological weapons, that does not mean his orders would necessarily be carried out. Saddam Hussein might not have anything to lose, but those beneath him in the chain of command most certainly would have a great deal to lose – let there be no doubt. He has maintained power by instilling fear in his subordinates. If he is on the verge of losing power, he may also lose his ability to impose that fear—and, thus, the blind obedience of those around him. Wise Iraqis will not obey orders to use WMD.

If President Bush were to decide to take military action, the U.S. will execute his order and finish the job professionally—Saddam Hussein and his regime would be removed from power. Therefore, with that certain knowledge, those in the Iraqi military will need to think hard about whether it would be in their interest to follow his instructions to commit war crimes by using WMD—and then pay a severe price for that action. The United States will make clear at the outset that those who are not guilty of atrocities can play a role in the new Iraq. But if WMD is used all bets are off.

I believe many in the Iraqi Armed Forces despise Saddam Hussein, and want to see him go as much as the rest of the world does. Those who may not despise him, but decide they would prefer to survive, may desert and try to blend into the civilian population or escape the country. This is what happened in Panama, when it became clear that Noriega was certain to be on his way out.

Some say that Saddam might succeed in provoking an Israeli response this time—possibly a nuclear response—and that this would set the Middle East aflame.

We are concerned about the Iraqi regime attacking a number of its neighbors, and with good reason: Saddam Hussein has a history of doing so. Iraq has attacked Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Iraq is a threat to its neighbors. We will consult with all of our allies and friends in the region on how to deal with this threat.

But the fact that they have blackmailed their neighbors makes the case for action stronger. If we do nothing, that blackmail will eventually become blackmail with weapons of mass destruction—with significantly new consequences for the world.

Some have said the U.S. could get bogged down in a long-term military occupation, and want to know what the plan is for a post-Saddam Iraq?

That is a fair question. It is likely that international forces would have to be in Iraq for a period of time, to help a new transitional Iraqi government get on its feet and create conditions where the Iraqi people would be able to choose a new government and achieve self-determination. But that burden is a small one, when



balanced against the risks of not acting.

In Afghanistan, our approach was that Afghanistan belongs to the Afghans—we did not and do not aspire to own it or run it. The same would be true of Iraq.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. and coalition countries helped create conditions so that the Afghan people could exercise their right of self-government. Throughout the Bonn process and the Loya Jirga process, a new president was chosen, a new cabinet sworn-in, and a transitional government, representative of the Afghan people, was established to lead the nation.

If the President were to make the decision to liberate Iraq, with coalition partners, it would help the Iraqi people establish a government that would be a single country, that did not threaten its neighbors, the United States, or the world with aggression and weapons of mass destruction, and that would respect the rights of its diverse population.

Iraq has an educated population that has been brutally and viciously repressed by Saddam Hussein's regime. He has kept power not by building loyalty, but by instilling fear—in his people, his military and the government bureaucracy. I suspect that there would be substantial defections once it became clear that Saddam Hussein was finished. Moreover, there are numerous free Iraqi leaders—both inside Iraq and abroad—who would play a role in establishing that new free Iraqi government. So there is no shortage of talent available to lead and rehabilitate a free Iraq.

In terms of economic rehabilitation, Iraq has an advantage over Afghanistan. A free Iraq would be less dependent on international assistance, and could conceivably get back on its feet faster, because Iraq has a marketable commodity—oil.

Some have raised concerns that other countries elsewhere in the world might take advantage of the fact that the U.S. is tied up in Iraq, and use that as an opportunity to invade neighbors or cause other mischief.

There is certainly a risk that some countries might underestimate our capability to handle Iraq and stop their aggression at the same time. But let there be no doubt: we have that capability.

Last year, we fashioned a new defense strategy, which established that we will and do have the capability to near simultaneously:

- Defend the U.S. homeland;
- Undertake a major regional conflict and win decisively—including occupying a country and changing their regime;
- If necessary, swiftly defeat another aggressor in another theater; and
- Simultaneously conduct a number of lesser contingencies—such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.



The United States can do the above, if called upon to do so.

Another argument is that acting without provocation by Iraq would violate international law.

That is untrue. The right to self-defense is a part of the UN Charter. Customary international law has long provided for the right of anticipatory self-defense—to stop an attack before it happens. In addition, he is in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. Those concerned about the integrity of international law should focus on their attention his brazen defiance of the UN.

Some ask: What has changed to warrant action now?

What has changed is our experience on September 11<sup>th</sup>. What has changed is our appreciation of our vulnerability—and the risks the U.S. faces from terrorist networks and terrorist states armed with weapons of mass destruction.

What has not changed is Saddam Hussein's drive to acquire these weapons. Every approach the UN has taken to stop Iraq's drive for WMD has failed. In 1998, after Iraq had again kicked out UN inspectors, President Clinton came to the Pentagon and said (quote):

"If [Saddam] fails to comply, and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route which gives him yet more opportunities to develop his weapons of mass destruction... and continue to ignore the solemn commitment he made... he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction.... The stakes could not be higher. Some day, some way, I guarantee you, he'll use that arsenal." (unquote)

At the time, the U.S. massed forces in the Persian Gulf, ready to strike. At the last minute, Iraq relented and allowed UN inspectors to return. But predictably, they kicked them out again ten months later. They have not been allowed to return since. He has not only paid a price for that defiance, he has been rewarded for his defiance of the UN by increased trade from a large group of UN member nations.

If, in 1998, Saddam Hussein posed the grave threat that President Clinton correctly described, then he most certainly poses a vastly greater danger today, after four years without inspectors on the ground to challenge his WMD procurement and development efforts. To those who still ask—that is what has changed!

Some have asked what are the incentives for Iraq to comply—is there is anything the Iraqi regime could do to forestall military action? Or is he finished either way?

Our objective is gaining Iraq's compliance. Our objective is an Iraq that does not menace its neighbors, does not pursue WMD, does not oppress its people or



threaten the United States. The President set forth in his speech what an Iraqi regime that wanted peace would do. Everything we know about the character and record of the current Iraqi regime indicates that it is highly unlikely to do the things the President has said it must do. So long as Saddam Hussein is leading that country, to expect otherwise is, as the President put it, to "hope against the evidence." If Saddam Hussein is in a corner, it is because he has put himself there. One choice he has is to take his family and key leaders and seek asylum elsewhere. Surely one of the one hundred and eighty plus countries would take his regime – possibly Belarus.

Some ask does the U.S. needs UN support?

The President has asked the UN Security Council to act because it is the UN Security Council that is being defied, disobeyed and made less relevant by the Iraqi regime's defiance. There have already been 16 UN resolutions, every one of which Saddam Hussein has ignored. There is no shortage of UN resolutions. What there is is a shortage of consequences for Saddam's ongoing defiance of those 16 UN resolutions. The President has made the case that it is dangerous for the United Nations to be made irrelevant by the Iraqi regime.

As the President put it in his address last week, "All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?"

But the President has also been clear that all options are on the table. The only option President Bush has ruled out is to do nothing.

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Mr. Chairman, as the President has made clear, this is a critical moment—for our country and for the world. Our resolve is being put to the test. It is a test that, unfortunately, the world's free nations have failed before in recent history—with terrible consequences.

Long before the Second World War, Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf indicating what he intended to do. But the hope was that maybe he would not do what he said. Between 35 and 60 million people died because of a series of fatal miscalculations. He might have been stopped early—at a minimal cost of lives—had the vast majority of the world's leaders not decided at the time that the risks of acting were greater than the risks of not acting.

Today, we must decide whether the risks of acting are greater than the risks of not acting. Saddam Hussein has made his intentions clear. He has used weapons of mass destruction against his own people and his neighbors. He has demonstrated an intention to take the territory of his neighbors. He has launched ballistic missiles against U.S. allies and others in the region. He plays host to terrorist networks. He pays rewards to the families of suicide bombers in Israel—like those who killed five Americans at the Hebrew University earlier this year. He is



hostile to the United States, because we have denied him the ability he has sought to impose his will on his neighbors. He has said, in no uncertain terms, that he would use weapons of mass destruction against the United States. He has, at this moment, stockpiles chemical and biological weapons, and is pursuing nuclear weapons. If he demonstrates the capability to deliver them to our shores, the world would be changed. Our people would be at great risk. Our willingness to be engaged in the world, our willingness to project power to stop aggression, our ability to forge coalitions for multilateral action, could all be under question. And many lives could be lost.

We need to decide as a people how we feel about that. Do the risks of taking action to stop that threat outweigh these risks of living in the world we see? Or is the risk of doing nothing greater than the risk of acting? That is the question President Bush has posed to the Congress, to the American people and to the world community.

The question comes down to this: how will the history of this era be recorded? When we look back on previous periods of our history, we see there have been many books written about threats and attacks that were not anticipated:

- "At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor"
- "December 7, 1941: The Day the Admirals Slept Late"
- "Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment"
- "From Munich to Pearl Harbor"
- "While England Slept"
- "The Cost of Failure"

The list of such books is endless. And, unfortunately, in the past year, historians have added to that body of literature—there are already books out on the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks and why they were not prevented. As we meet today, Congressional committees are trying to determine why that tragic event was not prevented.

Each is an attempt by the authors to "connect the dots"—to determine what happened, and why it was not possible to figure out that it was going to happen.

Our job today – the President's, the Congress' and the UN's is to connect the dots before the fact—to anticipate vastly more lethal attacks before they happens—and to make the right decision as to whether we should take preventive action— before it is too late.

We are on notice—each of us. Each has a solemn responsibility to do everything in our power to ensure that, when the history of this period is written, the books won't ask why we slept—to ensure that history will instead record that on September 11<sup>th</sup> the American people were awakened to the impending dangers—and that those entrusted with the safety of the American people made the right decisions and saved our nation, and the world, from 21<sup>st</sup> century threats.

President Bush is determined to do just that.



For Immediate Release  
Office of the Press Secretary  
September 12, 2002

## President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly

Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly  
New York, New York



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10:39 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President, distinguished delegates, and ladies and gentlemen: We meet one year and one day after a terrorist attack brought grief to my country, and brought grief to many citizens of our world. Yesterday, we remembered the innocent lives taken that terrible morning. Today, we turn to the urgent duty of protecting other lives, without illusion and without fear.

We've accomplished much in the last year -- in Afghanistan and beyond. We have much yet to do -- in Afghanistan and beyond. Many nations represented here have joined in the fight against global terror, and the people of the United States are grateful.

The United Nations was born in the hope that survived a world war -- the hope of a world moving toward justice, escaping old patterns of conflict and fear. The founding members resolved that the peace of the world must never again be destroyed by the will and wickedness of any man. We created the United Nations Security Council, so that, unlike the League of Nations, our would be more than talk, our resolutions would be more than wishes. After generations of deceitful dictators and broken treaties and squandered lives, we dedicated ourselves to standards of human dignity shared by all, and to a system of security defended by all.

Today, these standards, and this security, are challenged. Our commitment to human dignity is challenged by persistent poverty and raging disease. The suffering is great, and our responsibilities are clear. The United States is joining with the world to supply aid where it reaches people and lifts up lives, to extend trade and the prosperity it brings, and to bring medical care where it is desperately needed.

As a symbol of our commitment to human dignity, the United States will return to UNESCO. (Applause.) This organization has been reformed and America will participate fully in its mission to advance human rights and tolerance and learning.

Our common security is challenged by regional conflicts -- ethnic and religious strife that is ancient, but not inevitable. In the Middle East, there can be no peace for either side without freedom for both sides. America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine, living side by side with Israel in peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a government that serves their interests and listens to their voices. My nation will continue to encourage all parties to step up to their responsibilities as we seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict.



Above all, our principles and our security are challenged today by outlaw groups and regimes that accept no law of morality and have no limit to their violent ambitions. In the attacks on America a year ago, we saw the destructive intentions of our enemies. This threat hides within many nations, including my own. In cells and camps, terrorists are plotting further destruction, and building new bases for their war against civilization. And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale.

In one place -- in one regime -- we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to confront.

Twelve years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait without provocation. And the regime's forces were poised to continue their march to seize other countries and their resources. Had Saddam Hussein been appeased instead of stopped, he would have endangered the peace and stability of the world. Yet this aggression was stopped -- by the might of coalition forces and the will of the United Nations.

To suspend hostilities, to spare himself, Iraq's dictator accepted a series of commitments. The terms were clear, to him and to all. And he agreed to prove he is complying with every one of those obligations.

He has proven instead only his contempt for the United Nations, and for all his pledges. By breaking every pledge -- by his deceptions, and by his cruelties -- Saddam Hussein has made the case against himself.

In 1991, Security Council Resolution 688 demanded that the Iraqi regime cease at once the repression of its own people, including the systematic repression of minorities -- which the Council said, threatened international peace and security in the region. This demand goes ignored.

Last year, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights found that Iraq continues to commit extremely grave violations of human rights, and that the regime's repression is all pervasive. Tens of thousands of political opponents and ordinary citizens have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, summary execution, and torture by beating and burning, electric shock, starvation, mutilation, and rape. Wives are tortured in front of their husbands, children in the presence of their parents -- and all of these horrors concealed from the world by the apparatus of a totalitarian state.

In 1991, the U.N. Security Council, through Resolutions 686 and 687, demanded that Iraq return all prisoners from Kuwait and other lands. Iraq's regime agreed. It broke its promise. Last year the Secretary General's high-level coordinator for this issue reported that Kuwait, Saudi, Indian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iranian, Egyptian, Bahraini, and Omani nationals remain unaccounted for -- more than 600 people. One American pilot is among them.

In 1991, the U.N. Security Council, through Resolution 687, demanded that Iraq renounce all involvement with terrorism, and permit no terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq. Iraq's regime agreed. It broke this promise. In violation of Security Council Resolution 1373, Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western governments. Iraqi dissidents abroad are targeted for murder. In 1993, Iraq attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait and a former American President. Iraq's government openly praised the attacks of September the 11th. And al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq.

In 1991, the Iraqi regime agreed to destroy and stop developing all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, and to prove to the world it has done so by complying with rigorous inspections. Iraq has broken every aspect of this fundamental pledge.



From 1991 to 1995, the Iraqi regime said it had no biological weapons. After a senior official in its weapons program defected and exposed this lie, the regime admitted to producing tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents for use with Scud warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks. U.N. inspectors believe Iraq has produced two to four times the amount of biological agents it declared, and has failed to account for more than three metric tons of material that could be used to produce biological weapons. Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons.

United Nations' inspections also revealed that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical agents, and that the regime is rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of producing chemical weapons.

And in 1995, after four years of deception, Iraq finally admitted it had a crash nuclear weapons program prior to the Gulf War. We know now, were it not for that war, the regime in Iraq would likely have possessed a nuclear weapon no later than 1993.

Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about its nuclear program -- weapons design, procurement logs, experiment data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign assistance. Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians. It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. And Iraq's state-controlled media has reported numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons.

Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U.N. Work at testing and production facilities shows that Iraq is building more long-range missiles that it can inflict mass death throughout the region.

In 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the world imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. Those sanctions were maintained after the war to compel the regime's compliance with Security Council resolutions. In time, Iraq was allowed to use oil revenues to buy food. Saddam Hussein has subverted this program, working around the sanctions to buy missile technology and military materials. He blames the suffering of Iraq's people on the United Nations, even as he uses his oil wealth to build lavish palaces for himself, and to buy arms for his country. By refusing to comply with his own agreements, he bears full guilt for the hunger and misery of innocent Iraqi citizens.

In 1991, Iraq promised U.N. inspectors immediate and unrestricted access to verify Iraq's commitment to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. Iraq broke this promise, spending seven years deceiving, evading, and harassing U.N. inspectors before ceasing cooperation entirely. Just months after the 1991 cease-fire, the Security Council twice renewed its demand that the Iraqi regime cooperate fully with inspectors, condemning Iraq's serious violations of its obligations. The Security Council again renewed that demand in 1994, and twice more in 1996, deploring Iraq's clear violations of its obligations. The Security Council renewed its demand three more times in 1997, citing flagrant violations; and three more times in 1998, calling Iraq's behavior totally unacceptable. And in 1999, the demand was renewed yet again.

As we meet today, it's been almost four years since the last U.N. inspectors set foot in Iraq, four years for the Iraqi regime to plan, and to build, and to test behind the cloak of secrecy.

We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left? The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of



millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take.

Delegates to the General Assembly, we have been more than patient. We've tried sanctions. We've tried the carrot of oil for food, and the stick of coalition military strikes. But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has a -- nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one. We owe it to all our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from coming.

The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?

The United States helped found the United Nations. We want the United Nations to be effective, and respectful, and successful. We want the resolutions of the world's most important multilateral body to be enforced. And right now those resolutions are being unilaterally subverted by the Iraqi regime. Our partnership of nations can meet the test before us, by making clear what we now expect of the Iraqi regime.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately end all support for terrorism and act to suppress it, as all states are required to do by U.N. Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will cease persecution of its civilian population, including Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkomans, and others, again as required by Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still unknown. It will return the remains of any who are deceased, return stolen property, accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, and fully cooperate with international efforts to resolve these issues, as required by Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still unknown. It will return the remains of any who are deceased, return stolen property, accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, and fully cooperate with the international efforts to resolve these issues, as required by Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program. It will accept U.N. administration of funds from that program, to ensure that the money used fairly and promptly for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

If all these steps are taken, it will signal a new openness and accountability in Iraq. And it could open the prospect of the United Nations helping to build a government that represents all Iraqis -- a government based on respect for human rights, economic liberty, and internationally supervised elections.

The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people; they've suffered too long in silent captivity. Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause, and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it; the security of all nations requires it. Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder. The United States supports political and economic liberty in a unified Iraq.



We can harbor no illusions -- and that's important today to remember. Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990. He's fired ballistic missiles at Iran and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Israel. His regime once ordered the killing of every person between the ages of 15 and 70 in certain Kurdish villages in northern Iraq. He has gassed many Iranians, and 40 Iraqi villages.

My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.

Events can turn in one of two ways: If we fail to act in the face of danger, the people of Iraq will continue to live in brutal submission. The regime will have new power to bully and dominate and conquer its neighbors, condemning the Middle East to more years of bloodshed and fear. The regime will remain unstable -- the region will remain unstable, with little hope of freedom, and isolated from the progress of our times. With every step the Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow. And if an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September the 11th would be a prelude to far greater horrors.

If we meet our responsibilities, if we overcome this danger, we can arrive at a very different future. The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world. These nations can by their example that honest government, and respect for women, and the great Islamic tradition of learning can triumph in the Middle East and beyond. And we will show that the promise of the United Nations can be fulfilled in our time.

Neither of these outcomes is certain. Both have been set before us. We must choose between a world of fear and a world of progress. We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather. We must stand up for our security, and for the permanent rights and the hopes of mankind. By heritage and by choice, the United States of America will make that stand. And, delegates to the United Nations, you have the power to make that stand, as well.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

END 11:04 A.M. EDT

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# IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

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## **FOREWORD BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE TONY BLAIR MP**

The document published today is based, in large part, on the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The JIC is at the heart of the British intelligence machinery. It is chaired by the Cabinet Office and made up of the heads of the UK's three Intelligence and Security Agencies, the Chief of Defence Intelligence, and senior officials from key government departments. For over 60 years the JIC has provided regular assessments to successive Prime Ministers and senior colleagues on a wide range of foreign policy and international security issues.

Its work, like the material it analyses, is largely secret. It is unprecedented for the Government to publish this kind of document. But in light of the debate about Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), I wanted to share with the British public the reasons why I believe this issue to be a current and serious threat to the UK national interest.

In recent months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence from inside Iraq that despite sanctions, despite the damage done to his capability in the past, despite the UN Security Council Resolutions expressly outlawing it, and despite his denials, Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon the region, and the stability of the world.

Gathering intelligence inside Iraq is not easy. Saddam's is one of the most secretive and dictatorial regimes in the world. So I believe people will understand why the Agencies cannot be specific about the sources, which have formed the judgements in this document, and why we cannot publish everything we know. We cannot, of course, publish the detailed raw intelligence. I and other Ministers have been briefed in detail on the intelligence and are satisfied as to its authority. I also want to pay tribute to our Intelligence and Security Services for the often extraordinary work that they do.

What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile programme. I also believe that, as stated in the document, Saddam will now do his utmost to try to conceal his weapons from UN inspectors.

The picture presented to me by the JIC in recent months has become more not less worrying. It is clear that, despite sanctions, the policy of containment has not worked sufficiently well to prevent Saddam from developing these weapons.

I am in no doubt that the threat is serious and current, that he has made progress on WMD, and that he has to be stopped.

Saddam has used chemical weapons, not only against an enemy state, but against his own people. Intelligence reports make clear that he sees the building up of his WMD capability, and the belief overseas that he would use these weapons, as vital to his



strategic interests, and in particular his goal of regional domination. And the document discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them.

I am quite clear that Saddam will go to extreme lengths, indeed has already done so, to hide these weapons and avoid giving them up.

In today's inter-dependent world, a major regional conflict does not stay confined to the region in question. Faced with someone who has shown himself capable of using WMD, I believe the international community has to stand up for itself and ensure its authority is upheld.

The threat posed to international peace and security, when WMD are in the hands of a brutal and aggressive regime like Saddam's, is real. Unless we face up to the threat, not only do we risk undermining the authority of the UN, whose resolutions he defies, but more importantly and in the longer term, we place at risk the lives and prosperity of our own people.

The case I make is that the UN Resolutions demanding he stops his WMD programme are being flouted; that since the inspectors left four years ago he has continued with this programme; that the inspectors must be allowed back in to do their job properly; and that if he refuses, or if he makes it impossible for them to do their job, as he has done in the past, the international community will have to act.

I believe that faced with the information available to me, the UK Government has been right to support the demands that this issue be confronted and dealt with. We must ensure that he does not get to use the weapons he has, or get hold of the weapons he wants.



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Under Saddam Hussein Iraq developed chemical and biological weapons, acquired missiles allowing it to attack neighbouring countries with these weapons and persistently tried to develop a nuclear bomb. Saddam has used chemical weapons, both against Iran and against his own people. Following the Gulf War, Iraq had to admit to all this. And in the ceasefire of 1991 Saddam agreed unconditionally to give up his weapons of mass destruction.
2. Much information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is already in the public domain from UN reports and from Iraqi defectors. This points clearly to Iraq's continuing possession, after 1991, of chemical and biological agents and weapons produced before the Gulf War. It shows that Iraq has refurbished sites formerly associated with the production of chemical and biological agents. And it indicates that Iraq remains able to manufacture these agents, and to use bombs, shells, artillery rockets and ballistic missiles to deliver them.
3. An independent and well-researched overview of this public evidence was provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on 9 September. The IISS report also suggested that Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months of obtaining fissile material from foreign sources.
4. As well as the public evidence, however, significant additional information is available to the Government from secret intelligence sources, described in more detail in this paper. This intelligence cannot tell us about everything. However, it provides a fuller picture of Iraqi plans and capabilities. It shows that Saddam Hussein attaches great importance to possessing weapons of mass destruction which he regards as the basis for Iraq's regional power. It shows that he does not regard them only as weapons of last resort. He is ready to use them, including against his own population, and is determined to retain them, in breach of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR).
5. Intelligence also shows that Iraq is preparing plans to conceal evidence of these weapons, including incriminating documents, from renewed inspections. And it confirms that despite sanctions and the policy of containment, Saddam has continued to make progress with his illicit weapons programmes.
6. As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has:
  - continued to produce chemical and biological agents;
  - military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them;
  - command and control arrangements in place to use chemical and biological weapons. Authority ultimately resides with Saddam Hussein. (There is intelligence that he may have delegated this authority to his son Qusai);



- developed mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier reports about the mobile production of biological warfare agents;
- pursued illegal programmes to procure controlled materials of potential use in the production of chemical and biological weapons programmes;

- 
- tried covertly to acquire technology and materials which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons;
  - sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear power programme that could require it;
  - recalled specialists to work on its nuclear programme;

- 
- illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles, with a range of 650km, capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads;
  - started deploying its al-Samoud liquid propellant missile, and has used the absence of weapons inspectors to work on extending its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations;
  - started producing the solid-propellant Ababil-100, and is making efforts to extend its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations;
  - constructed a new engine test stand for the development of missiles capable of reaching the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus and NATO members (Greece and Turkey), as well as all Iraq's Gulf neighbours and Israel;
  - pursued illegal programmes to procure materials for use in its illegal development of long range missiles;

- 
- learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and has already begun to conceal sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors.

7. These judgements reflect the views of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). More details on the judgements and on the development of the JIC's assessments since 1998 are set out in Part 1 of this paper.
8. Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are in breach of international law. Under a series of UN Security Council Resolutions Iraq is obliged to destroy its holdings of these weapons under the supervision of UN inspectors. Part 2 of the paper sets out the key UN Security Council Resolutions. It also summarises the history of the UN inspection regime and Iraq's history of deception, intimidation and concealment in its dealings with the UN inspectors.



9. But the threat from Iraq does not depend solely on the capabilities we have described. It arises also because of the violent and aggressive nature of Saddam Hussein's regime. His record of internal repression and external aggression gives rise to unique concerns about the threat he poses. The paper briefly outlines in Part 3 Saddam's rise to power, the nature of his regime and his history of regional aggression. Saddam's human rights abuses are also catalogued, including his record of torture, mass arrests and summary executions.
10. The paper briefly sets out how Iraq is able to finance its weapons programme. Drawing on illicit earnings generated outside UN control, Iraq generated illegal income of some \$3 billion in 2001.



## PART 1

# IRAQ'S CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMMES

### CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

1. Since UN inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq in 1998, there has been little overt information on Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Much of the publicly available information about Iraqi capabilities and intentions is dated. But we also have available a range of secret intelligence about these programmes and Saddam Hussein's intentions. This comes principally from the United Kingdom's intelligence and analysis agencies – the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the Security Service, and the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). We also have access to intelligence from close allies.
2. Intelligence rarely offers a complete account of activities which are designed to remain concealed. The nature of Saddam's regime makes Iraq a difficult target for the intelligence services. Intelligence, however, has provided important insights into Iraqi programmes and Iraqi military thinking. Taken together with what is already known from other sources, this intelligence builds our understanding of Iraq's capabilities and adds significantly to the analysis already in the public domain. But intelligence sources need to be protected, and this limits the detail that can be made available.
3. Iraq's capabilities have been regularly reviewed by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which has provided advice to the Prime Minister and his senior colleagues on the developing assessment, drawing on all available sources. Part 1 of this paper includes some of the most significant views reached by the JIC between 1999 and 2002.

#### Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)

The JIC is a Cabinet Committee with a history dating back to 1936. The JIC brings together the Heads of the three Intelligence and Security Agencies (Secret Intelligence Service, Government Communications Headquarters and the Security Service), the Chief of Defence Intelligence, senior policy makers from the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office, the Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry and representatives from other Government Departments and Agencies as appropriate. The JIC provides regular intelligence assessments to the Prime Minister, other Ministers and senior officials on a wide range of foreign policy and international security issues. It meets each week in the Cabinet Office.



## CHAPTER 2

### IRAQ'S PROGRAMMES: 1971-1998

1. Iraq has been involved in chemical and biological warfare research for over 30 years. Its **chemical warfare** research started in 1971 at a small, well guarded site at Rashad to the north east of Baghdad. Research was conducted there on a number of chemical agents including mustard gas, CS and tabun. Later, in 1974 a dedicated organisation called al-Hasan Ibn al-Haitham was established. In the late 1970s plans were made to build a large research and commercial-scale

#### Effects of Chemical Weapons

**Mustard** is a liquid agent, which gives off a hazardous vapour, causing burns and blisters to exposed skin. When inhaled, mustard damages the respiratory tract; when ingested, it causes vomiting and diarrhoea. It attacks and damages the eyes, mucous membranes, lungs, skin, and blood-forming organs.

**Tabun, sarin and VX** are all nerve agents of which VX is the most toxic. They all damage the nervous system, producing muscular spasms and paralysis. As little as 10 milligrammes of VX on the skin can cause rapid death.

production facility in the desert some 70km north west of Baghdad under the cover of Project 922. This was to become Muthanna State Establishment, also known as al-Muthanna, and operated under the front name of Iraq's State Establishment for Pesticide Production. It became operational in 1982-83. It had five research and development sections, each tasked to pursue different programmes. In addition, the al-Muthanna site was the main chemical agent production facility, and it also took the lead in weaponising chemical and biological agents including all aspects of weapon development and testing, in association with the military. According to information, subsequently supplied by the Iraqis, the total production capacity in 1991 was 4,000 tonnes of agent per annum, but we assess it could have been higher. Al-Muthanna was supported by three separate storage and precursor production facilities known as Fallujah 1, 2 and 3 near Habbaniyah, north west of Baghdad, parts of which were not completed before they were heavily bombed in the 1991 Gulf War.

2. Iraq started **biological warfare** research in the mid-1970s. After small-scale research, a purpose-built research and development facility was authorised at al-Salman, also known as Salman Pak. This is surrounded on three sides by the Tigris river and situated some 35km south of Baghdad. Although some progress was made in biological weapons research at this early stage, Iraq decided to concentrate on developing chemical agents and their delivery systems at al-Muthanna. With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, in the early 1980s, the biological weapons programme was revived. The appointment of Dr Rihab Taha in 1985, to head a small biological weapons research team at al-Muthanna,



#### The effects of biological agents

**Anthrax** is a disease caused by the bacterium *Bacillus Anthracis*. Inhalation anthrax is the manifestation of the disease likely to be expected in biological warfare. The symptoms may vary, but can include fever and internal bleeding. The incubation period for anthrax is 1 to 7 days, with most cases occurring within 2 days of exposure.

**Botulinum toxin** is one of the most toxic substances known to man. The first symptoms of poisoning may appear as early as 1 hour post exposure or as late as 8 days after exposure, with the incubation period between 12 and 22 hours. Paralysis leads to death by suffocation.

**Aflatoxins** are fungal toxins, which are potent carcinogens. Most symptoms take a long time to show. Food products contaminated by aflatoxins can cause liver inflammation and cancer. They can also affect pregnant women, leading to stillborn babies and children born with mutations.

**Ricin** is derived from the castor bean and can cause multiple organ failure leading to death within one or two days of inhalation.

helped to develop the programme. At about the same time plans were made to develop the Salman Pak site into a secure biological warfare research facility. Dr Taha continued to work with her team at al-Muthanna until 1987 when it moved to Salman Pak, which was under the control of the Directorate of General Intelligence. Significant resources were provided for the programme, including the construction of a dedicated production facility (Project 324) at al-Hakam. Agent production began in 1988 and weaponisation testing and later filling of munitions was conducted in association with the staff at Muthanna State Establishment. From mid-1990, other civilian facilities were taken over and some adapted for use in the production and research and development of biological agents. These included:

- al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Vaccine Institute which produced botulinum toxin and conducted virus research. There is some intelligence to suggest that work was also conducted on anthrax;
  - al-Fudaliyah Agriculture and Water Research Centre where Iraq admitted it undertook aflatoxin production and genetic engineering;
  - Amariyah Sera and Vaccine Institute which was used for the storage of biological agent seed stocks and was involved in genetic engineering.
3. By the time of the Gulf War Iraq was producing very large quantities of chemical and biological agents. From a series of Iraqi declarations to the UN during the 1990s we know that by 1991 they had produced at least:
- 19,000 litres of botulinum toxin, 8,500 litres of anthrax, 2,200 litres of aflatoxin and were working on a number of other agents;



- 2,850 tonnes of mustard gas, 210 tonnes of tabun, 795 tonnes of sarin and cyclosarin, and 3.9 tonnes of VX.
4. Iraq's **nuclear programme** was established under the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission in the 1950s. Under a nuclear co-operation agreement signed with the Soviet Union in 1959, a nuclear research centre, equipped with a research reactor, was built at Tuwaitha, the main Iraqi nuclear research centre. The research reactor worked up to 1991. The surge in Iraqi oil revenues in the early 1970s supported an expansion of the research programme. This was bolstered in the mid-1970s by the acquisition of two research reactors powered by highly enriched uranium fuel and equipment for fuel fabrication and handling. By the end of 1984 Iraq was self-sufficient in uranium ore. One of the reactors was destroyed in an Israeli air attack in June 1981 shortly before it was to become operational; the other was never completed.
  5. By the mid-1980s the deterioration of Iraq's position in the war with Iran prompted renewed interest in the military use of nuclear technology. Additional resources were put into developing technologies to enrich uranium as fissile material (material that makes up the core of a nuclear weapon) for use in nuclear weapons. Enriched uranium was preferred because it could be more easily produced covertly than the alternative, plutonium. Iraq followed parallel programmes to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU), electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gas centrifuge enrichment. By 1991 one EMIS enrichment facility was nearing completion and another was under construction. However, Iraq never succeeded in its EMIS technology and the programme had been dropped by 1991. Iraq decided to concentrate on gas centrifuges as the means for producing the necessary fissile material. Centrifuge facilities were also under construction, but the centrifuge design was still being developed. In August 1990 Iraq instigated a crash programme to develop a single nuclear weapon within a year. This programme envisaged the rapid development of a small 50 machine gas centrifuge cascade to produce weapons-grade HEU using fuel from the Soviet research reactor, which was already substantially enriched, and unused fuel from the reactor bombed by the Israelis. By the time of the Gulf War, the crash programme had made little progress.
  6. Iraq's declared aim was to produce a missile warhead with a 20-kiloton yield and weapons designs were produced for the simplest implosion weapons. These were similar to the device used at Nagasaki in 1945. Iraq was also working on more

#### **Effect of a 20-kiloton nuclear detonation**

A detonation of a 20-kiloton nuclear warhead over a city might flatten an area of approximately 3 square miles. Within 1.6 miles of detonation, blast damage and radiation would cause 80% casualties, three-quarters of which would be fatal. Between 1.6 and 3.1 miles from the detonation, there would still be 10% casualties.



advanced concepts. By 1991 the programme was supported by a large body of Iraqi nuclear expertise, programme documentation and databases and manufacturing infrastructure. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iraq had:

- experimented with high explosives to produce implosive shock waves;
- invested significant effort to understand the various options for neutron initiators;
- made significant progress in developing capabilities for the production, casting and machining of uranium metal.

#### SCUD missiles

The short-range mobile SCUD ballistic missile was developed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, drawing on the technology of the German V-2 developed in World War II.

For many years it was the mainstay of Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical missile forces and it was also widely exported. Recipients of Soviet-manufactured SCUDs included Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya, although not all were sold directly by the Soviet Union.

7. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had a well-developed **ballistic missile** industry. Many of the missiles fired in the Gulf War were an Iraqi modified version of the SCUD missile, the al-Hussein, with an extended range of 650km. Iraq had about 250 imported SCUD-type missiles prior to the Gulf War plus an unknown number of indigenously produced engines and components. Iraq was working on other stretched SCUD variants, such as the al-Abbas, which had a range of 900km. Iraq was also seeking to reverse-engineer the SCUD engine with a view to producing new missiles. Recent intelligence indicates that they may have succeeded at that time. In particular, Iraq had plans for a new SCUD-derived missile with a range of 1200km. Iraq also conducted a partial flight test of a multi-stage satellite launch vehicle based on SCUD technology, known as the al-Abid. Also during this period, Iraq was developing the Badr-2000, a 700-1000km range two-stage solid propellant missile (based on the Iraqi part of the 1980s CONDOR-2 programme run in co-operation with Argentina and Egypt). There were plans for 1200-1500km range solid propellant follow-on systems.

#### The use of chemical and biological weapons

8. Iraq had made frequent use of a variety of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. Many of the casualties are still in Iranian hospitals suffering from the long-term effects of numerous types of cancer and lung diseases. In 1988 Saddam also used mustard and nerve agents against Iraqi Kurds at Halabja in northern Iraq (see box on p15). Estimates vary, but according to Human Rights Watch up to 5,000 people were killed.



9. Iraq used significant quantities of mustard, tabun and sarin during the war with Iran resulting in over 20,000 Iranian casualties. A month after the attack on Halabja, Iraqi troops used over 100 tonnes of sarin against Iranian troops on the al-Fao peninsula. Over the next three months Iraqi troops used sarin and other nerve agents on Iranian troops causing extensive casualties.

#### **The Attack on Halabja**

On Friday 17th March 1988 the village of Halabja was bombed by Iraqi warplanes. The raid was over in minutes. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against his own people. A Kurd described the effects of a chemical attack on another village:

"My brothers and my wife had blood and vomit running from their noses and their mouths. Their heads were tilted to one side. They were groaning. I couldn't do much, just clean up the blood and vomit from their mouths and try in every way to make them breathe again. I did artificial respiration on them and then I gave them two injections each. I also rubbed creams on my wife and two brothers."

(From "Crimes Against Humanity" Iraqi National Congress.)



*Among the corpses at Halabja, children were found dead where they had been playing outside their homes. In places, streets were piled with corpses.*

10. From Iraqi declarations to the UN after the Gulf War we know that by 1991 Iraq had produced a variety of delivery means for chemical and biological agents including over 16,000 free-fall bombs and over 110,000 artillery rockets and shells. Iraq also admitted to the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) that it had 50 chemical and 25 biological warheads available for its ballistic missiles.



### The use of ballistic missiles

11. Iraq fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War at both civilian and military targets, and 93 SCUD-type missiles during the Gulf War. The latter were targeted at Israel and Coalition forces stationed in the Gulf region.
12. At the end of the Gulf War the international community was determined that Iraq's arsenal of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles should be dismantled. The method chosen to achieve this was the establishment of UNSCOM to carry out intrusive inspections within Iraq and to eliminate its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with a range of over 150km. The IAEA was charged with the abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. Between 1991 and 1998 UNSCOM succeeded in identifying and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles as well as associated production facilities. The IAEA also destroyed the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and removed key nuclear materials. This was achieved despite a continuous and sophisticated programme of harassment, obstruction, deception and denial (see Part 2). Because of this UNSCOM concluded by 1998 that it was unable to fulfil its mandate. The inspectors were withdrawn in December 1998.
13. Based on the UNSCOM report to the UN Security Council in January 1999 and earlier UNSCOM reports, we assess that when the UN inspectors left Iraq they were unable to account for:
  - up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent;
  - up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, including approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi chemical warfare programme, were unique to the production of VX;
  - growth media procured for biological agent production (enough to produce over three times the 8,500 litres of anthrax spores Iraq admits to having manufactured);
  - over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents.
14. The departure of UNSCOM meant that the international community was unable to establish the truth behind these large discrepancies and greatly diminished its ability to monitor and assess Iraq's continuing attempts to reconstitute its programmes.



## CHAPTER 3

### THE CURRENT POSITION: 1998–2002

1. This chapter sets out what we know of Saddam Hussein's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, drawing on all the available evidence. While it takes account of the results from UN inspections and other publicly available information, it also draws heavily on the latest intelligence about Iraqi efforts to develop their programmes and capabilities since 1998. The **main conclusions** are that:
  - Iraq has a useable chemical and biological weapons capability, in breach of UNSCR 687, which has included recent production of chemical and biological agents;
  - Saddam continues to attach great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles which he regards as being the basis for Iraq's regional power. He is determined to retain these capabilities;
  - Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive range of artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles;
  - Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons, in breach of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in breach of UNSCR 687. Uranium has been sought from Africa that has no civil nuclear application in Iraq;
  - Iraq possesses extended-range versions of the SCUD ballistic missile in breach of UNSCR 687 which are capable of reaching Cyprus, Eastern Turkey, Tehran and Israel. It is also developing longer-range ballistic missiles;
  - Iraq's current military planning specifically envisages the use of chemical and biological weapons;
  - Iraq's military forces are able to use chemical and biological weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place. The Iraqi military are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so;
  - Iraq has learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and is already taking steps to conceal and disperse sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors;
  - Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missiles programmes are well-funded.

### CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

#### Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment: 1999–2002

2. Since the withdrawal of the inspectors the JIC has monitored evidence, including from secret intelligence, of continuing work on Iraqi offensive chemical and biological warfare capabilities. In the first half of 2000 the JIC noted



intelligence on Iraqi attempts to procure dual-use chemicals and on the reconstruction of civil chemical production at sites formerly associated with the chemical warfare programme. Iraq had also been trying to procure dual-use materials and equipment which could be used for a biological warfare programme. Personnel known to have been connected to the biological warfare programme up to the Gulf War had been conducting research into pathogens. There was intelligence that Iraq was starting to produce biological warfare agents in mobile production facilities. Planning for the project had begun in 1995 under Dr Rihab Taha, known to have been a central player in the pre-Gulf War programme. The JIC concluded that Iraq had sufficient expertise, equipment and material to produce biological warfare agents within weeks using its legitimate bio-technology facilities.

3. In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq retained some chemical warfare agents, precursors, production equipment and weapons from before the Gulf War. These stocks would enable Iraq to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within weeks and of nerve agent within months. The JIC concluded that intelligence on Iraqi former chemical and biological warfare facilities, their limited reconstruction and civil production pointed to a continuing research and development programme. These chemical and biological capabilities represented the most immediate threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Since 1998 Iraqi development of mass destruction weaponry had been helped by the absence of inspectors and the increase in illegal border trade, which was providing hard currency.
4. In the last six months the JIC has confirmed its earlier judgements on Iraqi chemical and biological warfare capabilities and assessed that Iraq has the means to deliver chemical and biological weapons.

#### Recent intelligence

5. Subsequently, intelligence has become available from reliable sources which complements and adds to previous intelligence and confirms the JIC assessment that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons. The intelligence also shows that the Iraqi leadership has been discussing a number of issues related to these weapons. This intelligence covers:
  - **Confirmation that chemical and biological weapons play an important role in Iraqi military thinking:** intelligence shows that Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of chemical and biological weapons which he regards as being the basis for Iraqi regional power. He believes that respect for Iraq rests on its possession of these weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them. Intelligence indicates that Saddam is determined to retain this capability and recognises that Iraqi political weight would be diminished if Iraq's military power rested solely on its conventional military forces.
  - **Iraqi attempts to retain its existing banned weapons systems:** Iraq is already taking steps to prevent UN weapons inspectors finding evidence of



its chemical and biological weapons programme. Intelligence indicates that Saddam has learnt lessons from previous weapons inspections, has identified possible weak points in the inspections process and knows how to exploit them. Sensitive equipment and papers can easily be concealed and in some cases this is already happening. The possession of mobile biological agent production facilities will also aid concealment efforts. Saddam is determined not to lose the capabilities that he has been able to develop further in the four years since inspectors left.

- **Saddam's willingness to use chemical and biological weapons:** intelligence indicates that as part of Iraq's military planning Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological weapons, including against his own Shia population. Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so.

#### **Chemical and biological agents: surviving stocks**

6. When confronted with questions about the unaccounted stocks, Iraq has claimed repeatedly that if it had retained any chemical agents from before the Gulf War they would have deteriorated sufficiently to render them harmless. But Iraq has admitted to UNSCOM to having the knowledge and capability to add stabiliser to nerve agent and other chemical warfare agents which would prevent such decomposition. In 1997 UNSCOM also examined some munitions which had been filled with mustard gas prior to 1991 and found that they remained very toxic and showed little sign of deterioration.
7. Iraq has claimed that all its biological agents and weapons have been destroyed. No convincing proof of any kind has been produced to support this claim. In particular, Iraq could not explain large discrepancies between the amount of growth media (nutrients required for the specialised growth of agent) it procured before 1991 and the amounts of agent it admits to having manufactured. The discrepancy is enough to produce more than three times the amount of anthrax allegedly manufactured.

#### **Chemical agent: production capabilities**

8. Intelligence shows that Iraq has continued to produce chemical agent. During the Gulf War a number of facilities which intelligence reporting indicated were directly or indirectly associated with Iraq's chemical weapons effort were attacked and damaged. Following the ceasefire UNSCOM destroyed or rendered harmless facilities and equipment used in Iraq's chemical weapons programme. Other equipment was released for civilian use either in industry or academic institutes, where it was tagged and regularly inspected and monitored, or else placed under camera monitoring, to ensure that it was not being misused. This monitoring ceased when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq in 1998. However, capabilities remain and, although the main chemical weapon production facility at al-Muthanna was completely destroyed by UNSCOM and has not been



rebuilt, other plants formerly associated with the chemical warfare programme have been rebuilt. These include the chlorine and phenol plant at Fallujah 2 near Habbaniyah. In addition to their civilian uses, chlorine and phenol are used for precursor chemicals which contribute to the production of chemical agents.

9. Other dual-use facilities, which are capable of being used to support the production of chemical agent and precursors, have been rebuilt and re-equipped. New chemical facilities have been built, some with illegal foreign assistance, and are probably fully operational or ready for production. These include the Ibn Sina Company at Tarmiyah (see figure 1), which is a chemical research centre. It undertakes research, development and production of chemicals previously imported but not now available and which are needed for Iraq's civil industry. The Director General of the research centre is Hikmat Na'im al-Jalu who prior to the Gulf War worked in Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and after the war was responsible for preserving Iraq's chemical expertise.




FIGURE 1: THE IBN SINA COMPANY AT TARMIAH

10. Parts of the al-Qa'qa' chemical complex damaged in the Gulf War have also been repaired and are operational. Of particular concern are elements of the phosgene production plant at al-Qa'qa'. These were severely damaged during the Gulf War, and dismantled under UNSCOM supervision, but have since been rebuilt. While phosgene does have industrial uses it can also be used by itself as a chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agent.
11. Iraq has retained the expertise for chemical warfare research, agent production and weaponisation. Most of the personnel previously involved in the programme remain in country. While UNSCOM found a number of technical manuals (so called "cook books") for the production of chemical agents and critical precursors, Iraq's claim to have unilaterally destroyed the bulk of the documentation cannot be confirmed and is almost certainly untrue. Recent intelligence indicates that Iraq is still discussing methods of concealing such documentation in order to ensure that it is not discovered by any future UN inspections.



### **The Problem of Dual-Use Facilities**

Almost all components and supplies used in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes are dual-use. For example, any major petrochemical or biotech industry, as well as public health organisations, will have legitimate need for most materials and equipment required to manufacture chemical and biological weapons. Without UN weapons inspectors it is very difficult therefore to be sure about the true nature of many of Iraq's facilities.

For example, Iraq has built a large new chemical complex, Project Baiji, in the desert in north west Iraq at al-Sharqat (see figure 2). This site is a former uranium enrichment facility which was damaged during the Gulf War and rendered harmless under supervision of the IAEA. Part of the site has been rebuilt, with work starting in 1992, as a chemical production complex. Despite the site being far away from populated areas it is surrounded by a high wall with watch towers and guarded by armed guards. Intelligence reports indicate that it will produce nitric acid which can be used in explosives, missile fuel and in the purification of uranium.



**FIGURE 2: AL-SHARQAT CHEMICAL PRODUCTION FACILITY**

### **Biological agent: production capabilities**

12. We know from intelligence that Iraq has continued to produce biological warfare agents. As with some chemical equipment, UNSCOM only destroyed equipment that could be directly linked to biological weapons production. Iraq also has its own engineering capability to design and construct biological agent associated fermenters, centrifuges, sprayer dryers and other equipment and is judged to be self-sufficient in the technology required to produce biological weapons. The



experienced personnel who were active in the programme have largely remained in the country. Some dual-use equipment has also been purchased, but without monitoring by UN inspectors Iraq could have diverted it to their biological weapons programme. This newly purchased equipment and other equipment previously subject to monitoring could be used in a resurgent biological warfare programme. Facilities of concern include:

- the Castor Oil Production Plant at Fallujah: this was damaged in UK/US air attacks in 1998 (Operation Desert Fox) but has been rebuilt. The residue from the castor bean pulp can be used in the production of the biological agent ricin;
  - the al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute: which was involved in biological agent production and research before the Gulf War;
  - the Amariyah Sera and Vaccine Plant at Abu Ghraib: UNSCOM established that this facility was used to store biological agents, seed stocks and conduct biological warfare associated genetic research prior to the Gulf War. It has now expanded its storage capacity.
13. UNSCOM established that Iraq considered the use of mobile biological agent production facilities. In the past two years evidence from defectors has indicated the existence of such facilities. Recent intelligence confirms that the Iraqi military have developed mobile facilities. These would help Iraq conceal and protect biological agent production from military attack or UN inspection.

#### Chemical and biological agents: delivery means

14. Iraq has a variety of delivery means available for both chemical and biological agents. These include:
- free-fall bombs: Iraq acknowledged to UNSCOM the deployment to two sites of free-fall bombs filled with biological agent during 1990–91. These bombs were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq also acknowledged possession of four types of aerial bomb with various chemical agent fills including sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin and cyclosarin;
  - artillery shells and rockets: Iraq made extensive use of artillery munitions filled with chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq War. Mortars can also be used for chemical agent delivery. Iraq is known to have tested the use of shells and rockets filled with biological agents. Over 20,000 artillery munitions remain unaccounted for by UNSCOM;
  - helicopter and aircraft borne sprayers: Iraq carried out studies into aerosol dissemination of biological agent using these platforms prior to 1991. UNSCOM was unable to account for many of these devices. It is probable that Iraq retains a capability for aerosol dispersal of both chemical and biological agent over a large area;
  - al-Hussein ballistic missiles (range 650km): Iraq told UNSCOM that it filled 25 warheads with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq also



developed chemical agent warheads for al-Hussein. Iraq admitted to producing 50 chemical warheads for al-Hussein which were intended for the delivery of a mixture of sarin and cyclosarin. However, technical analysis of warhead remnants has shown traces of VX degradation product which indicate that some additional warheads were made and filled with VX;

- al-Samoud/Ababil-100 ballistic missiles (range 150km plus): it is unclear if chemical and biological warheads have been developed for these systems, but given the Iraqi experience on other missile systems, we judge that Iraq has the technical expertise for doing so;
- L-29 remotely piloted vehicle programme (see figure 3): we know from intelligence that Iraq has attempted to modify the L-29 jet trainer to allow it to be used as an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) which is potentially capable of delivering chemical and biological agents over a large area.




FIGURE 3: THE L-29 JET TRAINER

#### Chemical and biological warfare: command and control

15. The authority to use chemical and biological weapons ultimately resides with Saddam but intelligence indicates that he may have also delegated this authority to his son Qusai. Special Security Organisation (SSO) and Special Republican Guard (SRG) units would be involved in the movement of any chemical and biological weapons to military units. The Iraqi military holds artillery and missile systems at Corps level throughout the Armed Forces and conducts regular training with them. The Directorate of Rocket Forces has operational control of strategic missile systems and some Multiple Launcher Rocket Systems.

#### Chemical and biological weapons: summary

16. Intelligence shows that Iraq has covert chemical and biological weapons programmes, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687 and has continued to produce chemical and biological agents. Iraq has:
  - chemical and biological agents and weapons available, both from pre-Gulf War stocks and more recent production;
  - the capability to produce the chemical agents mustard gas, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX capable of producing mass casualties;



- a biological agent production capability and can produce at least anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. Iraq has also developed mobile facilities to produce biological agents;
- a variety of delivery means available;
- military forces, which maintain the capability to use these weapons with command, control and logistical arrangements in place.

## NUCLEAR WEAPONS

### Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessments: 1999–2001

17. Since 1999 the JIC has monitored Iraq's attempts to reconstitute its nuclear weapons programme. In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq had continued its nuclear research after 1998. The JIC drew attention to intelligence that Iraq had recalled its nuclear scientists to the programme in 1998. Since 1998 Iraq had been trying to procure items that could be for use in the construction of centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium.

### Iraqi nuclear weapons expertise

18. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Chapter 2 describe the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme prior to the Gulf War. It is clear from IAEA inspections and Iraq's own declarations that by 1991 considerable progress had been made in both developing methods to produce fissile material and in weapons design. The IAEA dismantled the physical infrastructure of the Iraqi nuclear weapons

#### Elements of a nuclear weapons programme: nuclear fission weapon

A typical nuclear fission weapon consists of:

- fissile material for the core which gives out huge amounts of explosive energy from nuclear reactions when made "super critical" through extreme compression. Fissile material is usually either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or weapons-grade plutonium:
  - HEU can be made in gas centrifuges (see separate box on p25);
  - plutonium is made by reprocessing fuel from a nuclear reactor;
- explosives which are needed to compress the nuclear core. These explosives also require a complex arrangement of detonators, explosive charges to produce an even and rapid compression of the core;
- sophisticated electronics to fire the explosives;
- a neutron initiator to provide initial burst of neutrons to start the nuclear reactions.



### **Weaponisation**

Weaponisation is the conversion of these concepts into a reliable weapon. It includes:

- developing a weapon design through sophisticated science and complex calculations;
- engineering design to integrate with the delivery system;
- specialised equipment to cast and machine safely the nuclear core;
- dedicated facilities to assemble the warheads;
- facilities to rigorously test all individual components and designs;

The complexity is much greater for a weapon that can fit into a missile warhead than for a larger Nagasaki-type bomb.

programme, including the dedicated facilities and equipment for uranium separation and enrichment, and for weapon development and production, and removed the remaining highly enriched uranium. But Iraq retained, and retains, many of its experienced nuclear scientists and technicians who are specialised in the production of fissile material and weapons design. Intelligence indicates that Iraq also retains the accompanying programme documentation and data.

19. Intelligence shows that the present Iraqi programme is almost certainly seeking an indigenous ability to enrich uranium to the level needed for a nuclear weapon. It indicates that the approach is based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, one of the routes Iraq was following for producing fissile material before the Gulf War. But Iraq needs certain key equipment, including gas centrifuge components and components for the production of fissile material before a nuclear bomb could be developed.

### **Gas centrifuge uranium enrichment**

Uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride is separated into its different isotopes in rapidly spinning rotor tubes of special centrifuges. Many hundreds or thousands of centrifuges are connected in cascades to enrich uranium. If the lighter U235 isotope is enriched to more than 90% it can be used in the core of a nuclear weapon.

20. Following the departure of weapons inspectors in 1998 there has been an accumulation of intelligence indicating that Iraq is making concerted covert efforts to acquire dual-use technology and materials with nuclear applications. Iraq's known holdings of processed uranium are under IAEA supervision. But there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Iraq has no active civil nuclear power programme or nuclear power plants and therefore has no legitimate reason to acquire uranium.



#### **Iraq's civil nuclear programme**

- Iraq's long-standing civil nuclear power programme is limited to small scale research. Activities that could be used for military purposes are prohibited by UNSCR 687 and 715.
- Iraq has no nuclear power plants and therefore no requirement for uranium as fuel.
- Iraq has a number of nuclear research programmes in the fields of agriculture, biology, chemistry, materials and pharmaceuticals. None of these activities requires more than tiny amounts of uranium which Iraq could supply from its own resources.
- Iraq's research reactors are non-operational; two were bombed and one was never completed.

21. Intelligence shows that other important procurement activity since 1998 has included attempts to purchase:

- vacuum pumps which could be used to create and maintain pressures in a gas centrifuge cascade needed to enrich uranium;
- an entire magnet production line of the correct specification for use in the motors and top bearings of gas centrifuges. It appears that Iraq is attempting to acquire a capability to produce them on its own rather than rely on foreign procurement;
- Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride (AHF) and fluorine gas. AHF is commonly used in the petrochemical industry and Iraq frequently imports significant amounts, but it is also used in the process of converting uranium into uranium hexafluoride for use in gas centrifuge cascades;
- one large filament winding machine which could be used to manufacture carbon fibre gas centrifuge rotors;
- a large balancing machine which could be used in initial centrifuge balancing work.

22. Iraq has also made repeated attempts covertly to acquire a very large quantity (60,000 or more) of specialised aluminium tubes. The specialised aluminium in question is subject to international export controls because of its potential application in the construction of gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium, although there is no definitive intelligence that it is destined for a nuclear programme.

#### **Nuclear weapons: timelines**

23. In early 2002, the JIC assessed that UN sanctions on Iraq were hindering the import of crucial goods for the production of fissile material. The JIC judged



that while sanctions remain effective Iraq would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon. If they were removed or prove ineffective, it would take Iraq at least five years to produce sufficient fissile material for a weapon indigenously. However, we know that Iraq retains expertise and design data relating to nuclear weapons. We therefore judge that if Iraq obtained fissile material and other essential components from foreign sources the timeline for production of a nuclear weapon would be shortened and Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in between one and two years.

## BALLISTIC MISSILES

### Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment: 1999–2002

24. In mid-2001 the JIC drew attention to what it described as a “step-change” in progress on the Iraqi missile programme over the previous two years. It was clear from intelligence that the range of Iraqi missiles which was permitted by the UN and supposedly limited to 150kms was being extended and that work was under way on larger engines for longer-range missiles.
25. In early 2002 the JIC concluded that Iraq had begun to develop missiles with a range of over 1,000kms. The JIC assessed that if sanctions remained effective the Iraqis would not be able to produce such a missile before 2007. Sanctions and the earlier work of the inspectors had caused significant problems for Iraqi missile development. In the previous six months Iraqi foreign procurement efforts for the missile programme had been bolder. The JIC also assessed that Iraq retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles from before the Gulf War.

### The Iraqi ballistic missile programme since 1998

26. Since the Gulf War, Iraq has been openly developing two short-range missiles up to a range of 150km, which are permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. The al-Samoud liquid propellant missile has been extensively tested and is being deployed to military units. Intelligence indicates that at least 50 have




FIGURE 4: ABABIL-100

been produced. Intelligence also indicates that Iraq has worked on extending its range to at least 200km in breach of UN Security Resolution 687. Production of the solid propellant Ababil-100 (Figure 4) is also underway, probably as an unguided rocket at this stage. There are also plans to extend its range to at least 200km. Compared to liquid propellant missiles, those powered by solid



propellant offer greater ease of storage, handling and mobility. They are also quicker to take into and out of action and can stay at a high state of readiness for longer periods.

27. According to intelligence, Iraq has retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles (Figure 5), in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687. These missiles were either hidden from the UN as complete systems, or re-assembled using illegally retained engines and other components. We judge that the engineering expertise available would allow these missiles to be maintained effectively, although the fact that at least some require re-assembly makes it difficult to judge exactly how many could be available for use. They could be used with conventional, chemical or biological warheads and, with a range of up to 650km, are capable of reaching a number of countries in the region including Cyprus, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel.




FIGURE 5: AL-HUSSEIN



28. Intelligence has confirmed that Iraq wants to extend the range of its missile systems to over 1000km, enabling it to threaten other regional neighbours. This work began in 1998, although efforts to regenerate the long-range ballistic missile programme probably began in 1995. Iraq's missile programmes employ hundreds of people. Satellite imagery (Figure 6) has shown a new engine test stand being constructed (A), which is larger than the current one used for al-Samoud (B), and that formerly used for testing SCUD engines (C) which was dismantled under UNSCOM supervision. This new stand will be capable of testing engines for medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with ranges over 1000km, which are not permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. Such a facility would not be needed for systems that fall within the UN permitted range of 150km. The Iraqis have recently taken measures to conceal activities at this site. Iraq is also working to obtain improved guidance technology to increase missile accuracy.




FIGURE 6: AL-RAFAH/SHAHIYAT LIQUID PROPELLANT ENGINE STATIC TEST STAND



29. The success of UN restrictions means the development of new longer-range missiles is likely to be a slow process. These restrictions impact particularly on the:
- availability of foreign expertise;
  - conduct of test flights to ranges above 150km;
  - acquisition of guidance and control technology.
30. Saddam remains committed to developing longer-range missiles. Even if sanctions remain effective, Iraq might achieve a missile capability of over 1000km within 5 years (Figure 7 shows the range of Iraq's various missiles).
31. Iraq has managed to rebuild much of the missile production infrastructure destroyed in the Gulf War and in Operation Desert Fox in 1998 (see Part 2). New missile-related infrastructure is also under construction. Some aspects of this, including rocket propellant mixing and casting facilities at the al-Mamoun Plant, appear to replicate those linked to the prohibited Badr-2000 programme (with a planned range of 700–1000km) which were destroyed in the Gulf War or dismantled by UNSCOM. A new plant at al-Mamoun for indigenously producing ammonium perchlorate, which is a key ingredient in the production of solid propellant rocket motors, has also been constructed. This has been provided illicitly by NEC Engineers Private Limited, an Indian chemical engineering firm with extensive links in Iraq, including to other suspect facilities such as the Fallujah 2 chlorine plant. After an extensive investigation, the Indian authorities have recently suspended its export licence, although other individuals and companies are still illicitly procuring for Iraq.
32. Despite a UN embargo, Iraq has also made concerted efforts to acquire additional production technology, including machine tools and raw materials, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 1051. The embargo has succeeded in blocking many of these attempts, such as requests to buy magnesium powder and ammonium chloride. But we know from intelligence that some items have found their way to the Iraqi ballistic missile programme. More will inevitably continue to do so. Intelligence makes it clear that Iraqi procurement agents and front companies in third countries are seeking illicitly to acquire propellant chemicals for Iraq's ballistic missiles. This includes production level quantities of near complete sets of solid propellant rocket motor ingredients such as aluminium powder, ammonium perchlorate and hydroxyl terminated polybutadiene. There have also been attempts to acquire large quantities of liquid propellant chemicals such as Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and diethylenetriamine. We judge these are intended to support production and deployment of the al-Samoud and development of longer-range systems.





FIGURE 7: CURRENT AND PLANNED/POTENTIAL BALLISTIC MISSILES



## FUNDING FOR THE WMD PROGRAMME

33. The UN has sought to restrict Iraq's ability to generate funds for its chemical, biological and other military programmes. For example, Iraq earns money legally under the UN Oil For Food Programme (OFF) established by UNSCR 986, whereby the proceeds of oil sold through the UN are used to buy humanitarian supplies for Iraq. This money remains under UN control and cannot be used for military procurement. However, the Iraqi regime continues to generate income outside UN control either in the form of hard currency or barter goods (which in turn means existing Iraqi funds are freed up to be spent on other things).

### UN Sanctions

UN sanctions on Iraq prohibit all imports to and exports from Iraq. The UN must clear any goods entering or leaving. The UN also administers the Oil for Food (OFF) programme. Any imports entering Iraq under the OFF programme are checked against the Goods Review List for potential military or weapons of mass destruction utility.

34. These illicit earnings go to the Iraqi regime. They are used for building new palaces, as well as purchasing luxury goods and other civilian goods outside the OFF programme. Some of these funds are also used by Saddam Hussein to maintain his armed forces, and to develop or acquire military equipment, including for chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. We do not know what proportion of these funds is used in this way. But we have seen no evidence that Iraqi attempts to develop its weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missile programme, for example through covert procurement of equipment from abroad, has been inhibited in any way by lack of funds. The steady increase over the last three years in the availability of funds will enable Saddam to progress the programmes faster.

### Iraq's illicit earnings

Year	Amount in \$billions
1999	0.8 to 1
2000	1.5 to 2
2001	3
2002	3 (estimate)



## PART 2

### HISTORY OF UN WEAPONS INSPECTIONS

1. During the 1990s, beginning in April 1991 immediately after the end of the Gulf War, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions [see box] establishing the authority of UNSCOM and the IAEA to carry out the work of dismantling Iraq's arsenal of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes and long-range ballistic missiles.

#### UN Security Council Resolutions relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction

**UNSCR 687, April 1991** created the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and required Iraq to accept, unconditionally, "the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision" of its chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km, and their associated programmes, stocks, components, research and facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. UNSCOM and the IAEA must report that their mission has been achieved before the Security Council can end sanctions. They have not yet done so.

**UNSCR 707, August 1991**, stated that Iraq must provide full, final and complete disclosure of all its programmes for weapons of mass destruction and provide unconditional and unrestricted access to UN inspectors. For over a decade Iraq has been in breach of this resolution. Iraq must also cease all nuclear activities of any kind other than civil use of isotopes.

**UNSCR 715, October 1991** approved plans prepared by UNSCOM and IAEA for the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) arrangements to implement UNSCR 687. Iraq did not accede to this until November 1993. OMV was conducted from April 1995 to 15 December 1998, when the UN left Iraq.

**UNSCR 1051, March 1996** stated that Iraq must declare the shipment of dual-use goods which could be used for mass destruction weaponry programmes.

These resolutions were passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which is the instrument that allows the UN Security Council to authorise the use of military force to enforce its resolutions.

2. As outlined in UNSCR 687, Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes were also a breach of Iraq's commitments under:
  - The 1925 Geneva Protocol which bans the use of chemical and biological weapons;



- the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological weapons;
  - the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which prohibits Iraq from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons.
3. UNSCR 687 obliged Iraq to provide declarations on all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction programmes within 15 days and accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its chemical, biological and nuclear programmes, and all ballistic missiles with a range beyond 150km. Iraq did not make a satisfactory declaration within the specified time-frame.

Iraq accepted the UNSCRs and agreed to co-operate with UNSCOM. The history of the UN weapons inspections was characterised by persistent Iraqi obstruction.


UNSCOM and the IAEA were given the remit to designate any locations for inspection at any time, review any document and interview any scientist, technician or other individual and seize any prohibited items for destruction.

#### **Iraqi Non-Co-operation with the Inspectors**

4. The former Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, reported to the UN Security Council in January 1999 that in 1991 a decision was taken by a high-level Iraqi Government committee to provide inspectors with only a portion of its proscribed weapons, components, production capabilities and stocks. UNSCOM concluded that Iraqi policy was based on the following actions:
- to provide only a portion of extant weapons stocks, releasing for destruction only those that were least modern;
  - to retain the production capability and documentation necessary to revive programmes when possible;
  - to conceal the full extent of its chemical weapons programme, including the VX nerve agent project; to conceal the number and type of chemical and biological warheads for proscribed long-range missiles;
  - and to conceal the existence of its biological weapons programme.
5. In December 1997 Richard Butler reported to the UN Security Council that Iraq had created a new category of sites, "Presidential" and "sovereign", from which it claimed that UNSCOM inspectors would henceforth be barred. The terms of the ceasefire in 1991 foresaw no such limitation. However, Iraq consistently refused to allow UNSCOM inspectors access to any of these eight Presidential sites. Many of these so-called "palaces" are in fact large compounds which are an integral part of Iraqi counter-measures designed to hide weapons material (see photograph on p35).



A photograph of a "presidential site" or what have been called "palaces".





#### **Iraq's policy of deception**

Iraq has admitted to UNSCOM to having a large, effective, system for hiding proscribed material including documentation, components, production equipment and possibly biological and chemical agents and weapons from the UN. Shortly after the adoption of UNSCR 687 in April 1991, an Administrative Security Committee (ASC) was formed with responsibility for advising Saddam on the information which could be released to UNSCOM and the IAEA. The Committee consisted of senior Military Industrial Commission (MIC) scientists from all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes. The Higher Security Committee (HSC) of the Presidential Office was in overall command of deception operations. The system was directed from the very highest political levels within the Presidential Office and involved, if not Saddam himself, his youngest son, Qusai. The system for hiding proscribed material relies on high mobility and good command and control. It uses lorries to move items at short notice and most hide sites appear to be located close to good road links and telecommunications. The Baghdad area was particularly favoured. In addition to active measures to hide material from the UN, Iraq has attempted to monitor, delay and collect intelligence on UN operations to aid its overall deception plan.



## Intimidation

6. Once inspectors had arrived in Iraq, it quickly became apparent that the Iraqis would resort to a range of measures (including physical threats and psychological intimidation of inspectors) to prevent UNSCOM and the IAEA from fulfilling their mandate.
7. In response to such incidents, the President of the Security Council issued frequent statements calling on Iraq to comply with its disarmament and monitoring obligations.

### **Iraqi obstruction of UN weapons inspection teams**

- firing warning shots in the air to prevent IAEA inspectors from intercepting nuclear related equipment (June 1991);
- keeping IAEA inspectors in a car park for 4 days and refusing to allow them to leave with incriminating documents on Iraq's nuclear weapons programme (September 1991);
- announcing that UN monitoring and verification plans were "unlawful" (October 1991);
- refusing UNSCOM inspectors access to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture. Threats were made to inspectors who remained on watch outside the building. The inspection team had reliable evidence that the site contained archives related to proscribed activities;
- in 1991-2 Iraq objected to UNSCOM using its own helicopters and choosing its own flight plans. In January 1993 it refused to allow UNSCOM the use of its own aircraft to fly into Iraq;
- refusing to allow UNSCOM to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two key missile sites (June-July 1993);
- repeatedly denying access to inspection teams (1991- December 1998);
- interfering with UNSCOM's helicopter operations, threatening the safety of the aircraft and their crews (June 1997);
- demanding the end of U2 overflights and the withdrawal of US UNSCOM staff (October 1997);
- destroying documentary evidence of programmes for weapons of mass destruction (September 1997).

## Obstruction

8. Iraq denied that it had pursued a biological weapons programme until July 1995. In July 1995, Iraq acknowledged that biological agents had been produced on an industrial scale at al-Hakam. Following the defection in August 1995 of Hussein Kamil, Saddam's son-in-law and former Director of the Military Industrialisation Commission, Iraq released over 2 million documents relating to its mass destruction weaponry programmes and acknowledged that it had



pursued a biological programme that led to the deployment of actual weapons. Iraq admitted producing 183 biological weapons with a reserve of agent to fill considerably more.

#### **Inspection of Iraq's biological weapons programme**

In the course of the first biological weapons inspection in August 1991, Iraq claimed that it had merely conducted a military biological research programme. At the site visited, al-Salman, Iraq had removed equipment, documents and even entire buildings. Later in the year, during a visit to the al-Hakam site, Iraq declared to UNSCOM inspectors that the facility was used as a factory to produce proteins derived from yeast to feed animals. Inspectors subsequently discovered that the plant was a central site for the production of anthrax spores and botulinum toxin for weapons. The factory had also been sanitised by Iraqi officials to deceive inspectors. Iraq continued to develop the al-Hakam site into the 1990s, misleading UNSCOM about its true purpose.

Another key site, the Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute at al-Dawrah which produced botulinum toxin and probably anthrax was not divulged as part of the programme. Five years later, after intense pressure, Iraq acknowledged that tens of tonnes of bacteriological warfare agent had been produced there and at al-Hakam.

As documents recovered in August 1995 were assessed, it became apparent that the full disclosure required by the UN was far from complete. Successive inspection teams went to Iraq to try to gain greater understanding of the programme and to obtain credible supporting evidence. In July 1996 Iraq refused to discuss its past programme and doctrine forcing the team to withdraw in protest. Monitoring teams were at the same time finding undisclosed equipment and materials associated with the past programme. In response, Iraq grudgingly provided successive disclosures of its programme which were judged by UNSCOM and specially convened international panels to be technically inadequate.

In late 1995 Iraq acknowledged weapons testing the biological agent ricin, but did not provide production information. Two years later, in early 1997, UNSCOM discovered evidence that Iraq had produced ricin.

9. Iraq tried to obstruct UNSCOM's efforts to investigate the scale of its biological weapons programme. It created forged documents to account for bacterial growth media, imported in the late 1980s, specifically for the production of anthrax, botulinum toxin and probably plague. The documents were created to indicate that the material had been imported by the State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing for use in hospitals and distribution to local authorities. Iraq also censored documents and scientific papers provided to the first UN inspection team, removing all references to key individuals, weapons and industrial production of agents.



10. Iraq has yet to provide any documents concerning production of agent and subsequent weaponisation. Iraq destroyed, unilaterally and illegally, some biological weapons in 1991 and 1992 making accounting for these weapons impossible. In addition, Iraq cleansed a key site at al-Muthanna, its main research and development, production and weaponisation facility for chemical warfare agents, of all evidence of a biological programme in the toxicology department, the animal-house and weapons filling station.
11. Iraq refused to elaborate further on the programme during inspections in 1997 and 1998, confining discussion to previous topics. In July 1998 Tariq Aziz personally intervened in the inspection process stating that the biological programme was more secret and more closed than other mass destruction weaponry programmes. He also played down the significance of the programme. Iraq has presented the biological weapons programme as the personal undertaking of a few misguided scientists.
12. At the same time, Iraq tried to maintain its nuclear weapons programme via a concerted campaign to deceive IAEA inspectors. In 1997 the IAEA Director General stated that the IAEA was "severely hampered by Iraq's persistence in a policy of concealment and understatement of the programme's scope".

#### Inspection achievements

13. Despite the conduct of the Iraqi authorities towards them, both UNSCOM and the IAEA Action Team have valuable records of achievement in discovering and exposing Iraq's biological weapons programme and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons stocks and missiles as well as the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.
14. Despite UNSCOM's efforts, following the effective ejection of UN inspectors in December 1998 there remained a series of significant unresolved disarmament issues. In summarising the situation in a report to the UN Security Council, the UNSCOM Chairman, Richard Butler, indicated that:
  - contrary to the requirement that destruction be conducted under international supervision "Iraq undertook extensive, unilateral and secret destruction of large quantities of proscribed weapons and items";
  - and Iraq "also pursued a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons, and a cover up of its activities in contravention of Council resolutions".

Overall, Richard Butler declared that obstructive Iraqi activity had had "a significant impact upon the Commission's disarmament work".



#### **UNSCOM and IAEA achievements**

UNSCOM surveyed 1015 sites in Iraq, carrying out 272 separate inspections. Despite Iraqi obstruction and intimidation, UN inspectors uncovered details of chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Major UNSCOM/IAEA achievements included:

- the destruction of 40,000 munitions for chemical weapons, 2,610 tonnes of chemical precursors and 411 tonnes of chemical warfare agent;
- the dismantling of Iraq's prime chemical weapons development and production complex at al-Muthanna and a range of key production equipment;
- the destruction of 48 SCUD-type missiles, 11 mobile launchers and 56 sites, 30 warheads filled with chemical agents, and 20 conventional warheads;
- the destruction of the al-Hakam biological weapons facility and a range of production equipment, seed stocks and growth media for biological weapons;
- the discovery in 1991 of samples of indigenously-produced highly enriched uranium, forcing Iraq's acknowledgement of uranium enrichment programmes and attempts to preserve key components of its prohibited nuclear weapons programme;
- the removal and destruction of the infrastructure for the nuclear weapons programme, including the al-Athir weaponisation/testing facility.

#### **Withdrawal of the inspectors**

15. By the end of 1998 UNSCOM was in direct confrontation with the Iraqi Government which was refusing to co-operate. The US and the UK had made clear that anything short of full co-operation would make military action unavoidable. Richard Butler was requested to report to the UN Security Council in December 1998 and stated that, following a series of direct confrontations, coupled with the systematic refusal by Iraq to co-operate, UNSCOM was no longer able to perform its disarmament mandate. As a direct result on 16 December the weapons inspectors were withdrawn. Operation Desert Fox was launched by the US and the UK a few hours afterwards.

#### **Operation Desert Fox (16–19 December 1998)**

Operation Desert Fox targeted industrial facilities related to Iraq's ballistic missile programme and a suspect biological warfare facility as well as military airfields and sites used by Iraq's security organisations which are involved in its weapons of mass destruction programmes. Key facilities associated with Saddam Hussein's ballistic missile programme were significantly degraded.



#### **The situation since 1998**

16. There have been no UN-mandated weapons inspections in Iraq since 1998. In an effort to enforce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament and monitoring obligations, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1284 in December 1999. This established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as a successor organisation to UNSCOM and called on Iraq to give UNMOVIC inspectors "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport". It also set out the steps Iraq needed to take in return for the eventual suspension and lifting of sanctions. A key measure of Iraqi compliance would be full co-operation with UN inspectors, including unconditional, immediate and unrestricted access to any and all sites, personnel and documents.
17. For the past three years, Iraq has allowed the IAEA to carry out an annual inspection of a stockpile of nuclear material (depleted natural and low-enriched uranium). This has led some countries and western commentators to conclude erroneously that Iraq is meeting its nuclear disarmament and monitoring obligations. As the IAEA has pointed out in recent weeks, this annual inspection does "not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council".
18. Dr Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, and Dr Mohammed El-Baradei, the Director General of the IAEA, have declared that in the absence of inspections it is impossible to verify Iraqi compliance with its UN disarmament and monitoring obligations. In April 1999 an independent UN panel of experts noted that "the longer inspection and monitoring activities remain suspended, the more difficult the comprehensive implementation of Security Council resolutions becomes, increasing the risk that Iraq might reconstitute its proscribed weapons programmes".
19. The departure of the inspectors greatly diminished the ability of the international community to monitor and assess Iraq's continuing attempts to reconstitute its chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.



## PART 3

### IRAQ UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN

#### Introduction

1. The Republic of Iraq is bounded by Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and the Persian Gulf. Its population of around 23 million is ethnically and religiously diverse. Approximately 77% are Arabs. Sunni Muslims form around 17% of the Arab population and dominate the government. About 60% of Iraqis are Shias and 20% are Kurds. The remaining 3% of the population consists of Assyrians, Turkomans, Armenians, Christians and Yazidis.

#### Saddam Hussein's rise to power

Saddam Hussein was born in 1937 in the Tikrit district, north of Baghdad. In 1957 he joined the Ba'ath Party. After taking part in a failed attempt to assassinate the Iraqi President, Abdul Karim Qasim, Saddam escaped, first to Syria and then to Egypt. In his absence he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.

Saddam returned to Baghdad in 1963 when the Ba'ath Party came to power. He went into hiding after the Ba'ath fell from power later that year. He was captured and imprisoned, but in 1967 escaped and took over responsibility for Ba'ath security. Saddam set about imposing his will on the Party and establishing himself at the centre of power.

The Ba'ath Party returned to power in 1968. In 1969 Saddam became Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Deputy to the President, and Deputy Secretary General of the Regional Command of the Ba'ath. In 1970 he joined the Party's National Command and in 1977 was elected Assistant Secretary General. In July 1979, he took over the Presidency of Iraq. Within days, five fellow members of the Revolutionary Command Council were accused of involvement in a coup attempt. They and 17 others were summarily executed.

2. Public life in Iraq is nominally dominated by the Ba'ath Party (see box on p44). But all real authority rests with Saddam and his immediate circle. Saddam's family, tribe and a small number of associates remain his most loyal supporters. He uses them to convey his orders, including to members of the government.
3. Saddam uses patronage and violence to motivate his supporters and to control or eliminate opposition. Potential rewards include social status, money and better access to goods. Saddam's extensive security apparatus and Ba'ath Party network provides oversight of Iraqi society, with informants in social, government and military organisations. Saddam practises torture, execution and



other forms of coercion against his enemies, real or suspected. His targets are not only those who have offended him, but also their families, friends or colleagues.

#### **The Iraqi Ba'ath Party**

The Ba'ath Party is the only legal political party in Iraq. It pervades all aspects of Iraqi life. Membership, around 700,000, is necessary for self-advancement and confers benefits from the regime.

4. Saddam acts to ensure that there are no other centres of power in Iraq. He has crushed parties and ethnic groups, such as the communists and the Kurds, which might try to assert themselves. Members of the opposition abroad have been the targets of assassination attempts conducted by Iraqi security services.

#### **Saddam Hussein's security apparatus**

Saddam relies on a long list of security organisations with overlapping responsibilities. The main ones are:

- The **Special Security Organisation** oversees Saddam's security and monitors the loyalty of other security services. Its recruits are predominantly from Tikrit.
- The **Special Republican Guard** is equipped with the best available military equipment. Its members are selected on the basis of loyalty to the regime.
- The **Directorate of General Security** is primarily responsible for countering threats from the civilian population.
- The **Directorate of General Intelligence** monitors and suppresses dissident activities at home and abroad.
- The **Directorate of Military Intelligence's** role includes the investigation of military personnel.
- The **Saddam Fidayeen**, under the control of Saddam's son Udayy, has been used to deal with civil disturbances.

5. Army officers are an important part of the Iraqi government's network of informers. Suspicion that officers have ambitions other than the service of the President leads to immediate execution. It is routine for Saddam to take pre-emptive action against those who he believes might conspire against him.

#### **Internal Repression – the Kurds and the Shias**

6. Saddam has pursued a long-term programme of persecution of the Iraqi Kurds, including through the use of chemical weapons. During the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam appointed his cousin, Ali Hasan al-Majid, as his deputy in the north. In



1987-88, al-Majid led the "Anfal" campaign of attacks on Kurdish villages. Amnesty International estimates that more than 100,000 Kurds were killed or disappeared during this period.

**Repression and control: some examples**

- A campaign of mass arrests and killing of Shia activists led to the execution of the Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr and his sister in April 1980.
  - In 1983 80 members of another leading Shia family were arrested. Six of them, all religious leaders, were executed.
  - A massive chemical weapons attack on Kurds in Halabja town in March 1988 killing 5000 and injuring 10,000 more.
  - A large number of officers from the Jabbur tribe were executed in the early 1990s for the alleged disloyalty of a few of them.
7. After the Gulf War in 1991 Kurds in the north of Iraq rose up against Baghdad's rule. In response the Iraqi regime killed or imprisoned thousands, prompting a humanitarian crisis. Over a million Kurds fled into the mountains and tried to escape Iraq.
  8. Persecution of Iraq's Kurds continues, although the protection provided by the northern No-Fly Zone has helped to curb the worst excesses. But outside this zone the Baghdad regime has continued a policy of persecution and intimidation.
  9. The regime has used chemical weapons against the Kurds, most notably in an attack on the town of Halabja in 1988 (see Part 1 Chapter 2 paragraph 9). The implicit threat of the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and others is an important part of Saddam's attempt to keep the civilian population under control.
  10. The regime has tried to displace the traditional Kurdish and Turkoman populations of the areas under its control, primarily in order to weaken Kurdish claims to the oil-rich area around the northern city of Kirkuk. Kurds and other non-Arabs are forcibly ejected to the three northern Iraqi governorates, Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyah, which are under de facto Kurdish control. According to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) Special Rapporteur for Iraq, 94,000 individuals have been expelled since 1991. Agricultural land owned by Kurds has been confiscated and redistributed to Iraqi Arabs. Arabs from southern Iraq have been offered incentives to move into the Kirkuk area.
  11. After the 1979 revolution that ousted the Shah in Iran, Saddam intensified a campaign against the Shia Muslim majority of Iraq, fearing that they might be encouraged by the new Shia regime in Iran.
  12. On 1 March 1991, in the wake of the Gulf War, riots broke out in the southern city of Basra, spreading quickly to other cities in Shia-dominated southern Iraq.



The regime responded by killing thousands. Many Shia tried to escape to Iran and Saudi Arabia.

13. Some of the Shia hostile to the regime sought refuge in the marshland of southern Iraq. In order to subjugate the area, Saddam embarked on a large-scale programme to drain the marshes to allow Iraqi ground forces to eliminate all opposition there. The rural population of the area fled or were forced to move to southern cities or across the border into Iran.

#### **Saddam Hussein's Wars**

14. As well as ensuring his absolute control inside Iraq, Saddam has tried to make Iraq the dominant power of the region. In pursuit of these objectives he has led Iraq into two wars of aggression against neighbours, the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait.
15. With the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979, relations between Iran and Iraq deteriorated sharply. In September 1980 Saddam renounced a border treaty he had agreed with Iran in 1975 ceding half of the Shatt al-Arab waterway to Iran. Shortly thereafter, Saddam launched a large-scale invasion of Iran. He believed that he could take advantage of the state of weakness, isolation and disorganisation he perceived in post-revolutionary Iran. He aimed to seize territory, including that ceded to Iran a few years earlier, and to assert Iraq's position as a leader of the Arab world. Saddam expected it to be a short, sharp campaign. But the conflict lasted for eight years. Iraq fired over 500 ballistic missiles at Iranian targets, including major cities.

#### **Opposition to Saddam during the Iran-Iraq war**

During the war Saddam's security apparatus ensured that any internal dissent or opposition was quickly eliminated. In 1982 he quickly purged a group within Iraq's ruling clique which had suggested that the war might be brought to an end more quickly if Saddam stood down.

16. It is estimated that the Iran-Iraq war cost the two sides a million casualties. Iraq used chemical weapons extensively from 1984. Some twenty thousand Iranians were killed by mustard gas and the nerve agents tabun and sarin, all of which Iraq still possesses. The UN Security Council considered the report prepared by a team of three specialists appointed by the UN Secretary General in March 1986, following which the President made a statement condemning Iraqi use of chemical weapons. This marked the first time a country had been named for violating the 1925 Geneva Convention banning the use of chemical weapons.
17. The cost of the war ran into hundreds of billions of dollars for both sides. Iraq gained nothing. After the war ended, Saddam resumed his previous pursuit of primacy in the Gulf. His policies involved spending huge sums of money on new



military equipment. But Iraq was burdened by debt incurred during the war and the price of oil, Iraq's only major export, was low.

18. By 1990 Iraq's financial problems were severe. Saddam looked at ways to press the oil-producing states of the Gulf to force up the price of crude oil by limiting production and waive the \$40 billion that they had loaned Iraq during its war with Iran. Kuwait had made some concessions over production ceilings. But Saddam blamed Kuwait for over-production. When his threats and blandishments failed, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. He believed that occupying Kuwait could prove profitable.

**Abuses by Iraqi forces in Kuwait**

- Robbery and rape of Kuwaitis and expatriates.
- Summary executions.
- People dragged from their homes and held in improvised detention centres.
- Amnesty International has listed 38 methods of torture used by the Iraqi occupiers. These included beatings, breaking of limbs, extracting finger and toenails, inserting bottle necks into the rectum, and subjecting detainees to mock executions.
- Kuwaiti civilians arrested for "crimes" such as wearing beards.

19. Saddam also sought to justify the conquest of Kuwait on other grounds. Like other Iraqi leaders before him, he claimed that, as Kuwait's rulers had come under the jurisdiction of the governors of Basra in the time of the Ottoman Empire, Kuwait should belong to Iraq.
20. During its occupation of Kuwait, Iraq denied access to the Red Cross, which has a mandate to provide protection and assistance to civilians affected by international armed conflict. The death penalty was imposed for relatively minor "crimes" such as looting and hoarding food.
21. In an attempt to deter military action to expel it from Kuwait, the Iraqi regime took hostage several hundred foreign nationals (including children) in Iraq and Kuwait and prevented thousands more from leaving, in direct contravention of international humanitarian law. Hostages were held as human shields at a number of strategic military and civilian sites.
22. At the end of the Gulf War, the Iraqi army fleeing Kuwait set fire to over 1,160 Kuwaiti oil wells with serious environmental consequences.
23. More than 600 Kuwaiti and other prisoners of war and missing persons are still unaccounted for. Iraq refuses to comply with its UN obligation to account for the missing. It has provided sufficient information to close only three case-files.



### Abuse of human rights

24. This section draws on reports of human rights abuses from authoritative international organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
25. Human rights abuses continue within Iraq. People continue to be arrested and detained on suspicion of political or religious activities or often because they are related to members of the opposition. Executions are carried out without due process of law. Relatives are often prevented from burying the victims in accordance with Islamic practice. Thousands of prisoners have been executed.

#### Human rights: abuses under Saddam Hussein

- 4000 prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib Prison in 1984.
- 3000 prisoners were executed at the Mahjar Prison between 1993 and 1998.
- About 2500 prisoners were executed between 1997 and 1999 in a "prison cleansing" campaign.
- 122 male prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib prison in February/March 2000. A further 23 political prisoners were executed there in October 2001.
- In October 2000 dozens of women accused of prostitution were beheaded without any judicial process. Some were accused for political reasons.
- Women prisoners at Mahjar are routinely raped by their guards.
- Methods of torture used in Iraqi jails include using electric drills to mutilate hands, pulling out fingernails, knife cuts, sexual attacks and 'official rape'.
- Prisoners at the Qurtiyya Prison in Baghdad and elsewhere are kept in metal boxes the size of tea chests. If they do not confess they are left to die.

26. Saddam has issued a series of decrees establishing severe penalties for criminal offences. These include amputation, branding, cutting off ears, and other forms of mutilation. Anyone found guilty of slandering the President has their tongue removed.



#### **Human Rights – mistreatment in Abu Ghraib Prison**

Abdallah, a member of the Ba'ath Party whose loyalty became suspect was imprisoned for four years at Abu Ghraib in the 1980s. On the second day of his imprisonment, the men were forced to walk between two rows of five guards each to receive their containers of food. While walking to get the food, they were beaten by the guards with plastic telephone cables. They had to return to their cells the same way, so that a walk to get breakfast resulted in twenty lashes. According to Abdallah, "It wasn't that bad going to get the food, but coming back the food was spilled when we were beaten." The same procedure was used when the men went to the bathroom. On the third day, the torture continued. "We were removed from our cells and beaten with plastic pipes. This surprised us, because we were asked no question. Possibly it was being done to break our morale", Abdallah speculated. The torture escalated to sixteen sessions daily. The treatment was organised and systematic. Abdallah was held alone in a 3x2-meter room that opened onto a corridor. "We were allowed to go to the toilet three times a day, then they reduced the toilet to once a day for only one minute. I went for four years without a shower or a wash", Abdallah said. He also learned to cope with the deprivation and the hunger that accompanied his detention: "I taught myself to drink a minimum amount of water because there was no place to urinate. They used wooden sticks to beat us and sometimes the sticks would break. I found a piece of a stick, covered with blood, and managed to bring it back to my room. I ate it for three days. A person who is hungry can eat anything. Pieces of our bodies started falling off from the beatings and our skin was so dry that it began to fall off. I ate pieces of my own body. "No one, not Pushkin, not Mahfouz, can describe what happened to us. It is impossible to describe what living this day to day was like. I was totally naked the entire time. Half of the original groups [of about thirty men] died. It was a slow type of continuous physical and psychological torture. Sometimes, it seemed that orders came to kill one of us, and he would be beaten to death". (Source: *Human Rights Watch*)

#### **Saddam Hussein's family**

27. Saddam's son Udayy maintained a private torture chamber known as the Red Room in a building on the banks of the Tigris disguised as an electricity installation. He created a militia in 1994 which has used swords to execute victims outside their own homes. He has personally executed dissidents, for instance in the Shia uprising at Basra which followed the Gulf War.
28. Members of Saddam's family are also subject to persecution. A cousin of Saddam, Ala Abd al-Qadir al-Majid, fled to Jordan from Iraq citing disagreements with the regime over business matters. He returned to Iraq after the Iraqi Ambassador in Jordan declared publicly that his life was not in danger. He was met at the border by Tahir Habbush, Head of the Directorate of General Intelligence (the Mukhabarat), and taken to a farm owned by Ali Hasan al-Majid. At the farm Ala was tied to a tree and executed by members of his immediate family who, following orders from Saddam, took it in turns to shoot him



29. Some 40 of Saddam's relatives, including women and children, have been killed. His sons-in-law Hussein and Saddam Kamil had defected in 1995 and returned to Iraq from Jordan after the Iraqi government had announced amnesties for them. They were executed in February 1996.

**Human Rights – individual testimony**

In December 1996, a Kurdish businessman from Baghdad was arrested outside his house by plainclothes security men. Initially his family did not know his whereabouts and went from one police station to another inquiring about him. Then they found out that he was being held in the headquarters of the General Security Directorate in Baghdad. The family was not allowed to visit him. Eleven months later the family was told by the authorities that he had been executed and that they should go and collect his body. His body bore evident signs of torture. His eyes were gouged out and the empty eye sockets filled with paper. His right wrist and left leg were broken. The family was not given any reason for his arrest and subsequent execution. However, they suspected that he was executed because of his friendship with a retired army general who had links with the Iraqi opposition outside the country and who was arrested just before his arrest and also executed. (Source: *Amnesty International*)

**Human Rights – individual testimony**

"...I saw a friend of mine, al-Shaikh Nasser Taresh al-Sa'idi, naked. He was handcuffed and a piece of wood was placed between his elbows and his knees. Two ends of the wood were placed on two high chairs and al-Shaikh Nasser was being suspended like a chicken. This method of torture is known as al-Khaygania (a reference to a former security director known as al-Khaygani). An electric wire was attached to al-Shaikh Nasser's penis and another one attached to one of his toes. He was asked if he could identify me and he said "this is al-Shaikh Yahya". They took me to another room and then after about 10 minutes they stripped me of my clothes and a security officer said "the person you saw has confessed against you". He said to me "You followers of [Ayatollah] al-Sadr have carried out acts harmful to the security of the country and have been distributing anti-government statements coming from abroad". He asked if I have any contact with an Iraqi religious scholar based in Iran who has been signing these statements. I said "I do not have any contacts with him"... I was then left suspended in the same manner as al-Shaikh al-Sa'idi. My face was looking upward. They attached an electric wire on my penis and the other end of the wire is attached to an electric motor. One security man was hitting my feet with a cable. Electric shocks were applied every few minutes and were increased. I must have been suspended for more than an hour. I lost consciousness. They took me to another room and made me walk even though my feet were swollen from beating... They repeated this method a few times." (Source: *Amnesty International, testimony from an Iraqi theology student from Saddam City*)