

INSIDE EUROPE
Paul Taylor
ECB caution might not be a virtue

Inflexible, behind the curve, and still fighting yesterday's war — the European Central Bank has become the latest fashionable blood pig.

The ECB, in charge of monetary policy for the eurozone, has done better than it should have. It has been slower than the U.S. Federal Reserve of the Bank of England to lower interest rates and to ease its monetary policy and to begin to fight recession.

But as the bank seeks an exit strategy from the crisis that avoids an excessive rise in inflation that could result from the monetary easing in Washington and London, Europe may be left with a double-edged sword of tight monetary policy and a super-strong currency.

The Fed has already begun quantitative easing — buying public or private debt, effectively by printing money.

In the EU treaty prohibits the ECB from providing credit to member governments or from buying their debt directly, and an EU regulation has decreed that this rule cannot be circumvented by buying public debt on the secondary market.

The European bank had to build its credibility from scratch when the euro was introduced in 1999. It has done well to err on the side of caution.

But critics charge that the ECB, based in Frankfurt, remains obsessed with fighting inflation even though price growth is close to zero and the European economy is contracting faster than at any time since World War II.

Data released Thursday showed that industrial production in the euro zone plunged by a record amount in December, pointing to a deepening recession and adding pressure on the ECB to cut rates.

The bank's defenders say that it is right to resist being stampeded into a zero interest rate policy and that a government that ignores the duration of the recession is so uncertain. It may also be keeping some ammunition in reserve to combat a slump deepens.

So far, bank liquidity problems are more acute in the United States and Britain than in the euro zone, except for Ireland.

The ECB has a treaty mandate to maintain price stability, in contrast to the dual objectives of fighting inflation and promoting growth assigned to the Fed and the Bank of England.

But legal restraints are only part of the story. Critics say the "stability culture" inherited from the Bundesbank, the German central bank that was the most influential forerunner to the ECB, is impeding it from rescuing the economy.

Political factors also weigh. The ECB president, Jean-Claude Trichet, is sensitive to the need to maintain consensus for European monetary union, a relatively young enterprise in historic terms.

Throwing caution to the winds would alienate countries that are sticklers for fiscal and monetary orthodoxy — above all Germany and the Netherlands.

In general agreement, Trichet had a good start to the crisis. He was the first to provide a measure of liquidity to banks when fallout from U.S. subprime mortgage defaults froze money markets in August 2007. The Fed followed suit, but through a less familiar channel — the asset-liability swap — than the ECB, while the Bank of England fretted about a moral hazard.

The ECB's most blunder, in many eyes, was to raise its benchmark interest rate to 4.25 percent in July 2008, when inflation hit a 16-year low and commodities fell.

The ECB's main rate is now at 2 percent, although it has flagged a cut in March, while the Bank of England has cut its rate to 1 percent and the Fed to a range of zero to 0.25 percent.

But there is scant evidence that the ECB's rates are doing enough to banks from lending to each other and to businesses. The main reason is fear of future losses and a lack of confidence, which can be exacerbated by the ECB's tough pawk measures.

After all, has commercial bank lending eased in the United States or Britain because of looser monetary policy?

The ECB has taken longer to react partly because of a more erroneous initial view that the crisis would mostly affect the United States and Britain, with limited effects on the euro zone.

"At first, we thought in Europe that the crisis only affects countries with large financial centers," an ECB Governing Council member, Erik Likanov, said in a Finnish newspaper interview published Thursday.

U.S. bank plan appears to bypass 'lesson from Japan'

By Hiroshi Ito

TOKYO For all the money the United States has committed to rescuing banks so far, the veterans of Japan's own banking crisis have two words of advice: **move faster**.

The Japanese have been here before. They endured a decade of economic stagnation in the 1990s as their banks labored under slipping debt and successive governments waded trillions of yen on half measures to rescue them.

Only in 2003 did the government finally take the actions that led to a recovery: forcing major banks to submit to merciless audits and declare their bad debts spending two trillion yen or \$22.3 billion at today's rates, effectively nationalizing a major bank at the expense of shareholders, and allowing weaker banks to fail.

By then, the Nikkei stock index had dropped by almost three quarters from its heights. Real estate prices would ultimately fall for 15 consecutive years. Public debt had grown to exceed gross domestic product. And deflation stalked the land.

Some students of the Japanese debacle say they see the United States heading for a similar train wreck.

"I thought America had studied Japan's failures," said Hirofumi Gomi, a top official at the Japanese Financial Services Agency during the crisis. "Why is it making the same mistakes?"

Some U.S. critics of the plan announced Tuesday by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said it lacked

details. Experts on Japan found it timid — especially given the size of the banking crisis the administration faces.

"I don't think they know how big it is, but they don't want to say how big it is," said John Makin, an economist at the American Enterprise Institute, referring to administration officials. "It's so big they can't acknowledge it."

He added: "The lesson from Japan in the 1990s was that they should have stripped up and nationalized the banks."

Instead, the Japanese first tried many of the same remedies that the administration of President George W. Bush tried and the administration of President Barack Obama is trying — low interest rates, fiscal stimulus and indefinite cash infusions, among other things. The Japanese even tried to tap

private capital to buy some of the bad assets from banks, as Geithner has proposed.

The reason Japan was so timid was fear of public outrage, which grew with each act of the bailout.

But the Japanese experience shows that resolving the mess will require a firm government hand and will be extremely expensive. Delay will only raise the price tag.

A further lesson is that the bank rescue will determine the fate of the wider economy. While Obama has prioritized his stimulus plan, no stimulus is likely to succeed unless the banking sector is repaired. "I think Obama made a tactical mistake," Makin said.

The Japanese crisis of the 1990s and early 2000s had roots similar to the American crisis: a real estate bubble

that collapsed, leaving banks holding trillions of yen in loans that were nearly worthless.

Initially, Japanese leaders underestimated how badly the real estate collapse would hurt banks. As in the United States, a policy of easy money had driven stock and real estate speculation as well as reckless lending by banks.

Many in Japan thought low interest rates and income stimulus measures would help banks recover on their own. But in late 1997, a string of bank failures set off a crippling credit crisis.

President Clinton's administration injected \$11 billion, or nearly \$20 billion in current exchange rates, into Japan's main banks. But the injections —

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By Laurence Frost
 Bloomberg News

PARIS — On Monday President Nicolas Sarkozy granted PSA Peugeot Citroën €3 billion to safeguard jobs in France. Two days later, Peugeot's chief executive, Christian Streiff, said he would seek to reduce the home work force by 3,000 and pledged to continue buying cars abroad.

Peugeot's plans "respect the spirit of the agreement with the government," as well as the letter, Streiff said Wednesday in an interview.

"Mr. Streiff has given signed undertakings," Sarkozy said Wednesday while on a visit to Kuwait. "I still make sure they are respected."

The apparent clash between the leader of France and the leader of Peugeot says a lot about the pressures on companies to cast the net wide for solutions as the economic doom lengthens, and on governments to ensure that taxpayer-financed aid benefits the local economy.

Sarkozy granted Peugeot aid and its domestic rival, Renault, a total of €6 billion, or \$7.7 billion, in five-year loans after the automakers promised to keep French factories running and avoid compulsory layoffs this year.

The French president also criticized Peugeot for importing the Peugeot 107 and Citroën cars from a plant in the Czech Republic.

Streiff said the Czech plant would remain open. "We've always been very clear," he said. "I don't believe in investing massively in low-cost countries to supply the French market, but being present in different countries is critical. That's the policy we're sticking to."

Analysts said the Peugeot chief's comments were intended to show strength to the face of rising government involvement in the private sector.

"Streiff wants to show that Peugeot's still in charge and isn't just going to fall into line," said Philippe Houillon, an analyst in London with UBS. "He's someone who doesn't shy away from conflict, but he wouldn't be doing this if he didn't



Eric Farnsworth/European Pressphoto Agency



Christian Streiff, on screen above, the chief of PSA Peugeot Citroën. President Nicolas Sarkozy, below, has promised to keep Peugeot jobs in France. Streiff plans to cut more jobs in France and keep importing cars from plants, like the joint venture, below left, with Toyota in the Czech Republic.

Photo photo by Michel Euler

Peugeot sets up a clash with Sarkozy

have the Peugeot family's support in standing up to the government."

Peugeot is stepping up job cuts as it fights the worst auto slump in 15 years. After outperforming the European market for much of the year, French registrations fell 14 percent in November and 10 percent in December, pushing the company to report a loss of €100 billion for the second half, compared with net income of €93 million a year earlier.

Peugeot, the biggest French carmaker, is seeking 3,000 voluntary departures this year, in addition to 6,500 local job cuts announced in December. Streiff said Strategy is on hand and will continue to spread production assets. Western Europe and lower value countries, he said.

The division of future job cuts between France and the rest of Europe will be the same as in the past, Streiff said. There are no plans for French assembles of the Citroën C1 plug-in minivan, which is going into production in November, he added.

The company's chief financial officer, Isabel Maré-Semper said Peugeot is aiming to repay its state loans in two years, the earliest possible under the aid terms, after which it would in any case be freed of its commitments to the government.

"It is in Peugeot's interests, as well as the state's, if we can get cheaper finance elsewhere," Maré-Semper said.

The company anticipates that the money made available at affordable prices, following the "restoring" outcome of the aid talks, she said.

Including the 3,000 additional job cuts in France, which the company aims to achieve through worker buyouts, Peugeot will eliminate 14,000 posts in Western Europe this year, most of them in France, Maré-Semper said.

Adam Jonas, an analyst in London for Morgan Stanley, said, "They're bound to do some hidden restructuring in France, following a softly softly approach." He added, "Even if you don't chase plants for two years or five years, there are still things you can do. That's the only way."

Renault, unlike Peugeot, ruled out any French

job cuts in addition to those announced in 2008. About 9,000 European positions will be eliminated this year under existing plans, with about half the cuts in France, Carlos Ghosn, chief executive of Renault, said Thursday.

The French government owns 15 percent of Renault, which is based in the Paris suburb of Boulogne-Billancourt.

Streiff said he had the full support of the Peugeot family, the carmaker's largest shareholder with a 30 percent stake. Tim Leck, S.A. and aid negotiators reached a conclusion, Leck said, a French financial deal, citing an anonymous government official, reported that the family was split over whether to remove Streiff.

A call to the secretary of Thierry Ervande, the chairman of Peugeot's supervisory board, was not immediately returned.

• **Renault eliminates its dividend**

Renault announced Thursday it would scrap its dividend, but development of three models and further cut its payroll to face what its chief executive, Carlos Ghosn, said was a crisis of "massive proportions" that would transform the industry.

The Associated Press reported from Paris.

Renault reported a net loss of €982 million for the second half of 2008, compared with a profit of €1.2 billion in the similar period of 2007. Ghosn said he expected the outlook to darken further as the economic and financial crisis ravaged car sales.

Renault scrapped its dividend and said it was cutting staff by 50,000 down to 200,000.

The company is also relaxing inventories, cutting costs, selling real estate and looking to squeeze an extra €250 million in cost savings from its alliance with Nissan Motor.

Russia this week announced an aggressive restructuring plan of its own, including eliminating 200,000 jobs.

China firm to invest \$1.9 billion in Rio Tinto

By Inela Wediger and Bettina Wassner

LONDON — The state-owned Chinese aluminum company Chalco agreed to invest \$1.9 billion to the mining giant Rio Tinto on Thursday, a deal that would help guarantee its access to raw materials but was also likely to set off opposition from politicians and other shareholders worried about China's growing influence over the global supply of resources.

Under the deal, the biggest foreign investment ever by a Chinese company, Aluminum Corp. of China, as Chalco formally known, would purchase 37.2 billion in bonds convertible into Rio Tinto stock. It would also pay \$12.3 billion in cash for stakes in Rio Tinto's aluminum, iron ore and copper assets in the United States, Australia and Chile.

Chalco would own 18 percent of Rio Tinto. If the bonds were converted, and the transaction, which is subject to the approval of regulators in five countries, is likely to draw criticism.

For Rio Tinto, which has headquarters in Australia, the deal provides a much needed cash injection as it seeks to reduce \$30 billion in debt through its 2007 bond purchase of the Canadian aluminum maker Alcan. The company pledged to reduce debt by \$10 billion this year, but efforts were made more difficult by sagging profits and lower raw-material prices.

"This is all part of the recycling of financial reserves around the world," said Justin Ligibart, Stewart, co-founder of New Investment Management in London. "Rio shareholders may feel upset as they're being bypassed for people who have money but in the long run it's good news to have a large client as a shareholder."

Some analysts have criticized Rio Tinto's willingness to allow Chalco to raise its existing stake, saying it would limit Rio Tinto's flexibility and upset some shareholders. Rio Tinto's stock has dropped 64 percent over the past 12 months. In London on Thursday, the stock fell 10 percent, or 15 pence, to close at 85.80, or \$274.

Rio Tinto's chief executive, Tom Albanese, defended the deal, saying it would have been "extremely challenging" to raise the same amount of cash via a rights issue in the current markets.

In addition, Rio Tinto said it would retain "operational control of the joint venture assets, with clear governance arrangements."

Although Chalco, which is based in Beijing, would be entitled to nominate two new non-executive board members to add to Rio Tinto's current board members, Rio emphasized that "independent non-executive" directors would continue to make up a majority of Rio Tinto's board.

But analysts cautioned that the deal would lead China greater leverage in operations, and that the transaction, because of an apparent disagreement over how to cut debt.

The Australian government also tightened some possible trouble for the deal. Australian law has limited foreign ownership to 15 percent of equity. Australia's treasurer, Wayne Swan, said last Thursday that the government would revise its foreign ownership laws to treat convertible debt as if it were equity, a change that effectively tightens the regulations and would apply to the China deal.

Chalco and Rio Tinto said they did not take the move as a "negative signal," Leck said, the Shanghai-based analyst, said. "The perception is that the

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 Flood, Normis is an analyst. Follow his blog.

