I Corrupt local governments as resource farmers: The helping hand and the grabbing hand

Avajironon filow Healdink 16.03.06

Engin Dalgic^a and Ngo Van Long^{<u>b</u>, <u>c</u>, <u>d</u>, 🖼, 🖂}

^aInternational Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431, USA

^bDepartment of Economics, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 2T7 ^cCIRANO, Montreal, Canada

^dCESifo, Munich, Germany

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Abstract

In our model, the central government sets the tax rate and its share of revenue, while local governments maximize their private benefits, by engaging in two classes of activities. The first one consists of providing public goods which help firms to make more profit, thus enlarging the tax base. The second one consists of extortionary activities. We show that given any initial capital stock, there are corresponding threshold levels of transparency of governance, between tenure length, and local government tax share, above which the economy will grow without bound, and below which it will fall into a poverty trap.

Keywords: «Corruption; Governance»; Tax share; Poverty trap; Growth

Corresponding author. Department of Economics, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3A 2T7. Tel.: +1 514 398 4844; fax: +1 514 398 4938.

European Journal of Political Economy

Volume 22, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 115-138

2 Should Asians demand both entrepreneurship and human rights?^{**} Hrishikesh D. Vinod

Department of Economics, Institute of Ethics and Economic Policy, Fordham University, Bronx, NY 10458, USA

Available online 7 February 2006.

Abstract

Local entrepreneurs, essential for creation of sustainable broad-based wealth, can provide countervailing power against local human rights violators. Our statistically testable hypothesis is that joint advocacy by promoters of entrepreneurship on the right side of the political spectrum and human rights advocates on the left side will not be at cross-purposes. Analysis of eight variables dealing with governance, corruption, entrepreneurship activity, human rights, capital markets and economic freedom finds significant correlations between left and right side variables. Since the left and the right can agree on 40 out of 50 economic freedom items, Asians should demand both, even in China.

Keywords: Good (governance); Cost of capital; (Corruption); Economic growth; Economic freedom; Left-right; Multinationals

JEL classification: M13; O15; G18; H89; K11

A larger version was presented at the Conference on Entrepreneurship and Human Pights, 1–3 August 2005, Fordham University, New York. Tel.: +1 718 817 4065; fax: +1 718 817 3518.

Asian

Journal

Volume 17. Issue 1, February 2006, Pages 14-28

Economics

of

3 Leniency policies and illegal transactions Paolo Buccirossi^{ª. ™}and Giancarlo Spagnolo^{b. c. d}, ^Ⅲ, [∞], [∞]

^aLear - Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione, Italy

^bStockholm School of Economics, Sweden

^cConsip Research Unit, Rome, Italy

^dC.E.P.R., London, UK

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Abstract

We study the consequences of leniency-reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers-on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that----when not properly designed-leniency may simultaneously provide an effective **(governance)** mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence.

Keywords: Amnesty; (Corruption); Collusion; Financial fraud; (Governance); Hold up: Hostages: Illegal trade: Immunity: Law enforcement; Leniency; Organized crime; Self-reporting; Whistleblowers

Corresponding author.

Journal of Public Economics

4 Why policy reforms fail to improve logging practices: The role of governance and norms in Peru Joyotee Smith, Violeta Colan, Cesar Sabogal and Laura Snook

Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), PO Box 6596 JKPWB, Jakarta 10065, Indonesia

Available online 2 September 2005.

Abstract

Although policies to improve forest management have been widely introduced, poor logging practices remain prevalent in tropical forests. We assess whether recent radical changes in forestry laws in Peru will result in significant improvements in logging practices. We adapt North's conceptual framework of institutional change to analyze the impact of *governance* on loggers' norms and argue that improvements in logging practices will require changes in both laws and norms. The analysis uses survey and field evaluation data on logging practices in Peru, as well as secondary sources. Results show that bringing about radical changes in logging practices is particularly difficult in countries with a history of **dovernance** failures in the timber sector. In Peru, **governance** failures that have promoted norms inconsistent with good management are government's perceived lack of interest in long-term timber management, inconsistent forestry laws, perceived discrimination against the timber sector, and ineffective law enforcement. As a result of decades of these **dovernance** failures, loggers developed a short-term perspective on timber extraction and felt entitled to violate government's laws. Poor logging practices continued under the new law because of *governance* failures. The Peruvian experience shows that changing laws radically is often easier than avoiding 4 governance» failures in implementation. While some «governance» failures were partially rectified, others assumed added significance under the provisions of the new law. Decentralization also exacerbated existing and new *dovernance* problems. These failures reinforced existing norms and may, in addition, lead to norms condoning **<corruption**. Modifications need to occur both in norms and in logging laws to reduce the inconsistency between the two. Notable improvements in 4 governance will be required to bring about changes in norms. Changes in the logging system are therefore likely to be far less revolutionary, and to take far longer, than envisioned.

Keywords: Policy; Forestry; Logging; (Governance); Amazon

🖼 Corresponding author. Ayara Surin, Villa 6A, 124/22 Moo3, Cherng Talay, Thalang, Phuket 83110, Thailand.

Forest	Policy	and	Economics
Article in Press	Corrected Proof		

Article in Press, Corrected Proof

5 Organized crime, corruption and punishment Maurice Kugler^{a, M}, Thierry Verdier^{b, c, M} and Yves Zenou^{a, d, e} II M

^aDepartment of Economics, University of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ, United Kingdom

^bDELTA-ENS, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France

^cCEPR, United Kingdom

^dIUI, The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 5501, 114 85 Stockholm, Sweden

^eGAINS, Université du Maíne, Le Mans, France

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We analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local **(corruption)** to avoid punishment. When bribing costs are low, that is badly-paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak **governance** environment, and the rents from criminal activity are sufficiently high, we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates. Indeed, beyond a threshold, further increases in intended expected punishment create incentives for organized crime to extend «corruption» rings, and ensuing impunity results in a fall of actual expected punishment that yields more rather than less crime.

Evywords: Deterrence; Organized crime; **Corruption**; Oligopoly; Free entry Corresponding author.

Journal of Public Economics

Volume 89, Issues 9-10, September 2005, Pages 1639-1663

6 Corruption in the media's gaze

Samarth Vaidya

School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Faculty of Business and Law, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Hwy, Burwood, VIC 3125, Australia

Received 2 January 2004; revised 20 January 2005; accepted 2 March 2005. Available online 15 April 2005.

Abstract

This paper examines a government's incentive to engage in **«corruption»** in the presence of independent media. Different versions of a sequential-move game show how collusion between a media-firm and a government as well as a government's ability to 'spin' the media allegations can undermine **(corruption)** deterrence. Further, because of gains from exposing scandal, the media-firm can face incentives to raise false allegations. The paper shows how such false allegations can provide perverse incentives that favor **<corruption**.

Keywords: Media; «Governance; Corruption»; Scandal

JEL classification: D72; D78; H57; K40

European Journal of Political Economy

Volume 21, Issue 3, September 2005, Pages 667-687

Politicians and banks: Political influences on government-owned banks in emerging markets

Serdar Dinc

University of Michigan Business School, 701 Tappan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA Received 1 August 2003; accepted 24 June 2004. Available online 26 April 2005. Abstract

Government ownership of banks is very common in countries other than the United States. This paper provides cross-country, bank-level empirical evidence about political influences on these banks. It shows that government-owned banks increase their lending in election years relative to private banks. This effect is robust to controlling for country-specific macroeconomic and institutional factors as well as bank-specific factors. The increase in lending is about 11% of a government-owned bank's total loan portfolio or about 0.5% of the median country's GDP per election per government-owned bank.

Keywords: Corporate governance»; Political economy; «Corruption»; State-owned Enterprises; Electoral cycle Fax: +1 734 764 2557.

Journal of Financial Economics

Volume 77, Issue 2, August 2005, Pages 453-479

8 Why a poor governance⊫ environment does not deter foreign direct investment: The case of China and its implications for investment protection Shaomin Li

Department of Business Administration, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23529, USA

Abstract

It is widely believed that countries with a poor *dovernance* environment (e.g., weak laws and rampant **(corruption)** do not attract foreign direct investment (FDI); however, our study suggests otherwise. Using China as a case study, this article argues that the prevailing theory that a good **«governance»** environment begets FDI is incomplete. When faced with a poor **(governance)** environment, investors choose direct investment over indirect (portfolio) investment because the former can be better protected by private means. In fact, China attracts a large amount of FDI because of, rather than despite, its lack of a good **devernance** environment. In conclusion, this article offers strategies to better protect investments and to chart through the pitfalls resulting from rapid changes in the **governance** environment. Keywords: «Governance» environment; Foreign direct investment; Portfolio investment; Rule-based **governance**; Relation-based **governance**; China

Business Horizons

Volume 48, Issue 4, July-August 2005, Pages 297-302

Neoliberal reform, governance and corruption» in Central America: Exploring the Nicaracuan case Ed Brown^{a, Ed} and Jonathan Cloke^b

^aDepartment of Geography, Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicestershire LE11 3TU, United Kingdom^bDepartment of Geography, Durham University, Science Site, South Road, Durham DH1 3LE, United Kingdom Available online 25 April 2005.

Abstract

This paper explores the limitations of the dominant neoliberal perspective on 4 governance and institutional reform, with a particular focus upon anti-«corruption» initiatives. Over recent years, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have been promoting a specific discourse on **«corruption»** that separates it from its historicity and the specific political economy within which it develops. The paper sets out to analyse this dominant discourse, juxtaposing the language of transparency and accountability used by those promoting anti-«corruption» initiatives with the sociopolitical reality of a specific political culture/system - in this case that of postrevolutionary Nicaragua.

Following a brief general discussion of the dynamics of **governance** reforms in Central America, the growth of international interest in combating **(corruption)** is discussed and a critique of the dominant approaches towards the issue outlined. This critique is then extended through an exploration of the evolution of anti-«corruption» initiatives in Nicaragua under the administration of President Arnoldo Alemán (1996-2001), which saw both an expansion in internationally sanctioned anti-(corruption) programmes and a catalogue of abuses that eventually culminated in Alemán's jailing under his successor.

Keywords: Corruption; Nicaragua; Governance; Neoliberalism Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1509 222738; fax: +44 1509 223930. ¹ Tel.: +44 191 3341897; fax: +44 191 3341801.

Political Geography

Volume 24, Issue 5, June 2005, Pages 601-630

10 Does Greater Accountability Improve the Quality of Public Service Delivery? **Evidence from Uganda**

Klaus Deininger and Paul Mpuga

The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA

Accepted 9 September 2004. Available online 8 December 2004.

Summary

It is now widely realized that in many developing countries, the low quality of public services and governance can limit the scope for poverty reduction and growth. Empirical micro-level evidence on the scope for improved accountability to help reduce **(corruption)** and improve the quality with which critical public services are provided is, however, limited. Using a large data set from Uganda to address this issue, we find that household knowledge on how to report inappropriate behavior by bureaucrats and unsatisfactory quality of services does help to not only reduce the incidence of (corruption) but is also associated with significant improvements in service quality.

Keywords: (governance; corruption); public service provision; poverty reduction; Uqanda

World Development

Volume 33, Issue 1, January 2005, Pages 171-191

// Management of water for irrigation agriculture in semi-arid areas: Problems and prespects Mvungi, D. Mashauri and N.F. Madulu

Department of Sociology, University of Dar es Salaam, P.O. Box 35043, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Abstract

Most of the Mwanga district is classified as semi-arid with a rainfall range of 300 and 600 mm. Rainfall patterns in the district are unpredictable and are subject to great fluctuations. Like other semi-arid areas, the district is characterized with land degradation, unreliable rainfall, repeated water shortage, periodic famine, overgrazing, dry land cultivation in the marginal areas and heavy competition for limited biomass between farmers and cattle. Vulnerability here is high due to unreliability of weather. The people of Mwanga are dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. However agriculture is difficult in the area due to inadequate rainfall. For a very long time the people have been dependent on irrigation agriculture to ensure food security. Of late the traditional irrigation system is on the decline threatening food security in the area. This paper examines the state and status of the irrigation canal system in Mwanga district with the view of recommending ways in which it can be improved. The study used participatory, survey and in-depth interviews to obtain both quantitative and qualitative data. The major findings are that social, political, environmental and demographic bases that supported the traditional irrigation system have changed drastically. As a corollary to this, the cultural and religious belief systems that supported and guided the traditional canal system management have been replaced by mistrust and corruption» in water allocation. In addition the ownership and management system of the water resources that was vested in the initiator clans has changed and now water user groups own the canals/furrows but they do not own the water sources. This has rendered the control of the water sources difficult if not impossible. Currently the system is faced by a number of problems including shortage of water and poor management as demand for water increases and this has led to serious conflicts among and between crop producers and pastoralists over water use. Water users and leaders are also not knowledgeable of the policy guiding water use, ownership and management implying their noninvolvement in the policy formulation process. The paper concludes that the traditional irrigation system in Mwanga district that has cushioned people from food insecurity for a long time is under serious threat and something urgently needs to be done. The paper recommends modernizing the irrigation infrastructure, instituting a system of *dovernance* that takes on board the interests of all the stakeholders, involving local people and their leaders in the policy formulation process not as an "excess luggage" but as an organic part of the process. The recommendations can only be effected as an organic part of the holistic approach to eradicate poverty.

Keywords:Traditional irrigation;Indigenous knowledge;Food security;Covernance>;TraditionalcanalsCorresponding author.Traditionalcanals

Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Parts A/B/C

Volume30,Issues11-16,2005,Pages809-817Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) and the Millennium DevelopmentGoals: Managing Water for Peace and Prosperity

A Regionalization, public spending and growth: a stylized model dealing with 'predatory states'

Elsa Duret^a and Bruno Ventelou^{11, 12, 12}

^a CERDI-IDREC, Université d'Auvergne, 65 Bd François Mitterrand, 63 000, Clermont-Ferrand, France

^b INSERM U 379/ORS PACA, 23 rue Stanislas Torrents, 13006, Marseille, France Accepted 24 February 2004. Available online 22 June 2004.

Abstract

In this paper, a micro-founded model analyzing the effects of 'regionalization' on economic activity is developed. It shows that the spatial division of public competencies can have an impact on the growth rate via the efficiency of governmental choices: initially advantageous for weak levels, decentralization (/reduction of regional size) becomes limited due to the risk of underestimation of the real profitability of public expenditure by local governments (non-internalized cross-border effects). In accordance with the theory, a transversal estimation for a sample of 51 countries for the 1990s establishes a 'bell-shaped' relation between indicators of regionalization and the quality of **governance**.

Author Keywords: Intergovernmental relations; Spatial economics; Public finance

Corresponding author

¹ Research fellow at OFCE-National Foundation for Political Sciences. <u>Economic Modelling</u> Volume 21, Issue 6, December 2004, Pages 1039-1050

/3 Electricity theft: a comparative analysis

Thomas B. Smith^{2, 20} Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Zayed University, P.O. Box 19282, Dubai, United Arab Emirates Available online 7 August 2003

Abstract

Electricity theft can be in the form of fraud (meter tampering), stealing (illegal connections), billing irregularities, and unpaid bills. Estimates of the extent of electricity theft in a sample of 102 countries for 1980 and 2000 are undertaken. The evidence shows that theft is increasing in most regions of the world. The financial impacts of theft are reduced income from the sale of electricity and the necessity to charge more to consumers. Electricity theft is closely related to **governance** indicators, with higher levels of theft in countries without effective accountability, political instability, low government effectiveness and high levels of **«corruption.»** Electricity theft can be reduced by applying technical solutions such as tamper-proof meters, managerial methods such as inspection and monitoring, and in some cases restructuring power systems ownership and regulation.

Author Keywords: Electricity theft; Governance; Corruption Corresponding author. Tel.:+971-4-2082-540; fax: +971-4-3522-534 Energy Policy

Volume 32, Issue 18, December 2004, Pages 2067-2076

/4 The post-.COM internet: toward regular and objective procedures for internet governance

Milton L. Mueller Mand Lee W. McKnight

The Convergence Center, School of Information Studies, Syracuse University, 4-285 CST, Comstock Ave., Syracuse, NY, 13244, USA

Received 1 April 2004; Revised 1 May 2004. Available online 23 June 2004.

Abstract

This article makes the case for using regular and objective procedures to assign new Internet top-level domain names (TLDs) instead of the unscheduled, irregular, discretionary and ad hoc processes and criteria currently used by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The paper shows that ICANNs current approach to TLD additions is anti-competitive and fosters rent-seeking, political strife, and the potential for **<corruption**. The article argues that there is now and likely always will be demand for TLD additions. The article suggests that ICANN's role is not to second-guess the marketplace by choosing which of these TLDs are "good ideas" or most likely to succeed, but simply to coordinate TLD assignments. The article concludes by anticipating arguments that might be advanced against the proposed procedure, and welcoming the initial steps of ICANN, the OECD, and WIPO to address this issue.

Author Keywords: Internet dovernance, ICANN; Domain name system (DNS);

Corresponding author

Telecommunications Policy

Volume 28, Issues 7-8, August-September 2004, Pages 487-502 A selection of papers from the 31st Annual Telecommunications Policy Research

Conference

15 Bureaucratic delays and bribe-taking

Gautam Bose

School of Economics, University of New South Wales, Sydney 2052, Australia Received 21 September 2001; Revised 28 May 2002; accepted 24 September 2002. Available online 4 December 2003

Abstract

Bureaucrats in LDCs are known to often elicit bribes by delaying the processing of documents ("applications") submitted by private agents. This paper models this practice and discusses two procedures to control the consequent social welfare loss. We show that, compared to the situation with no sanctions on bribe-taking, imperfect vigilance coupled with penalties for bribe-taking leads to more frequent delays and a pareto-inferior solution. A superior governance mechanism involves a reward/penalty scheme based upon the average time taken to clear applications. An efficiency wage may have to be paid to implement this solution.

Author Keywords:
Corruption
; Bribes; Vigilance; Efficiency wages H80: K42

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Volume 54, Issue 3, July 2004, Pages 313-320

16 Can institutions or education explain world poverty? An augmented Solow model provides some insights

Theodore R. Breton

George Mason University, 9903 Rustic Rail Lane, Vienna, VA 22181, USA Available online 31 January 2004.

Abstract

When the Solow model is augmented with variables for institutions and human capital and estimated with national data for rates of investment in education, it can explain most of the variation in cross-country standards of living. The empirical results indicate that human capital is as important as physical capital in the determination of national income and that a high government share of consumption substantially reduces total factor productivity (TFP) and national income. The results also indicate that government integrity is endogenous in the development process and has an uncertain effect on total factor productivity.

Author Keywords: Author Keywords: Governance; Corruption»; Solow model; Human capital; Economic growth Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-703-255-2257.

Journal of Socio-Economics

Volume 33. Issue 1, March 2004, Pages 45-69

/ 7 Fiscal Corruption: ▶ A Vice or a Virtue?

Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Bertil Tungodden Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration and Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway

Accepted 1 June 2002. ; Available online 14 June 2003.

Abstract

Recent literature on tax administration in poor countries suggests there are virtues in allowing fiscal **(corruption.)** By strengthening the bargaining power of corrupt tax officers, it is argued that tax evasion may be reduced and tax revenues increased.

But does such an intriguing paradox justify policies that stimulate **<corruption?** Our answer is no, and this note puts forward three arguments to support our view. First, while an increase in **dcorruption** may raise revenues in the short run, in general, the opposite will be the case in the longer run. Second, the instrumental value of reducing (corruption) goes far beyond its effects on tax evasion and tax revenues. Accepting **(corruption)** as a policy strategy to increase tax revenues may undermine values of democracy and good **4governance.** Third, eliminating corruption ▶ should be considered an end in itself. Thus, contrary to recent suggestions on incentive reforms in tax administration, the reasonable starting point for policy debates in this area should still be that an increase in fiscal **«corruption»** is not an appropriate instrument for raising tax revenues. Sustained development cannot occur in an institutional framework that fosters **(corruption)** and extra-legal tax enforcement.

Author Keywords: <a>(corruption); tax evasion; tax administration; incentives World Development

Volume 31, Issue 8, August 2003, Pages 1459-1467

GOURC + CORRI

18 Introduction to 'Valuation in Emerging Markets'

Robert F. Bruner^a, Robert M. Conroy^a, Javier Estrada^{III}, Mark Kritzman^c and Wei Li^a

^a Darden, University of Virginia, P.O. Box 6550, Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550, USA ^b IESE Business School, Av. Pearson 21, 08034, Barcelona, Spain

^c Windham Capital Management, 5 Revere Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA

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Abstract

The purpose of the Batten Institute/Association for Investment Management and Research/Emerging Markets Review conference was to examine the challenges of valuing assets in emerging markets. These challenges are immensely interesting to practitioners and scholars for many reasons, among them for what they reveal about the differences between emerging markets and developed markets. The colloquium surveyed business and research practices, stimulated critical reflection, and highlighted questions for future research. This article provides an overview of the issues discussed in the conference.

Keywords: Emerging Markets Review; Corporate governance; Author Corruption

Corresponding author. Tel.: +34-93-253-4200; fax: +34-93-253-4343; email: iestrada@iese.edu

Emerging Markets Review

Volume 3, Issue 4, 1 December 2002, Pages 310-324

A 9 Corruption and military spending Sanjeev Gupta, Luiz de Mello and Raju Sharan

Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20431, USA

Received 1 July 2000; revised 1 November 2000; accepted 1 February 2001. Available online 25 September 2001.

Abstract

Anecdotal evidence relates **(corruption)** with high levels of military spending. This paper tests empirically whether such a relationship exists. The empirical analysis is based on data from four different sources for up to 120 countries during 1985-1998.

The association between military spending and **corruption** is investigated by using cross-section and panel regression techniques. The results suggest that 4 corruption b is associated with higher military spending as a share of both GDP and total government spending, as well as with arms procurement in relation to GDP and total government spending. The results can be interpreted as evidence that defense spending may be used as a component of an indicator of the quality of 4 governance.

Author Keywords: (Corruption); Military spending; Panel data Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-202-623-5468; fax: +1-202-623-4022; email: Idemello@imf.org

European Journal of Political Economy

Volume 17, Issue 4, November 2001, Pages 749-777

Lo An analysis of judicial corruption, and its causes: An objective governingbased approach

Edgardo Buscaglia^L

^a University of Virginia School of Law, 580 Massie Road, Charlottesville, VA 22903, USA

Accepted 7 December 2000 Available online 10 July 2001.

Abstract

The economic analysis of corrupt practices has already generated significant theoretical contributions to the literature. But the empirical literature has failed to capture or objectively test the main causes of systemic **<corruption** within the court systems. For example, recent survey-based studies of corrupt practices based on just subjective perceptions of **(governance)** factors provide a good example of these limitations.

For public policy design purposes, a scientific approach to the study of public sector 4 corruption > must be empirically verifiable through objective and subjective indicators if we are to develop reliable anticorruption prescriptions. This Article presents empirical results that fill in the lacunae left by the previous studies. The Article proposes the use of six objective explanatory variables to capture the effects on corrupt practices. This dependent variable is measured in terms of the compatible subjective probabilities of corrupt practices captured through the use of surveys of lawyers, judges, and litigants. The paper later proposes an empirical model that incorporates substantive-procedural, market-related, and organizational explanatory variables tested within the judicial sectors of Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and Director of the International Law and Economic Center at the University of Virginia School of Law.

He is the Vice President of the Latin American Law and Economics Association. Tel.: +1-804-924-3768; email: <u>ebuscaglia@law5.law.virginia.edu</u>

International Review of Law and Economics

Volume 21, Issue 2, June 2001, Pages 233-249

2^{ℓ} A case study of abalone poaching in South Africa and its impact on fisheries management

M. Hauck^a and N. A. Sweijd^b

Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa^{11, 12, 13}

Department of Zoology, University of Cape Town, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa, f4, f5, f6

Received 30 October 1998; accepted 13 May 1999.; Available online 27 March 2002.

Abstract

In South Africa, as fisheries management continues to move through a transformation process, it is confronted with a myriad of uncertain scenarios which have the potential to jeopardize its objectives. One such situation, which has proved to be threatening to the sustainable utilization of marine resources, is illegal exploitation. In recent years, South Africa has witnessed an increase in poaching activities, with a particular emphasis on the lucrative abalone industry. This fishery has existed successfully for almost 50 years, with an average annual catch in the past 10 years of 615 tonnes. Dramatic cuts in the total allowable catch since late 1996, with up to 90% reductions in key areas, have placed the long-term sustainability of the fishery in question. A criminological study of abalone poaching in a community where both the legal and illegal industries are centred has clearly illustrated both the severity and the complexity of the problem. Negative ramifications have spread through several spheres, incorporating environmental, social, economic, and political dynamics. From the perspective of the community, where poaching is rife, this study highlights the impact poaching has had on a local level, representing significant obstacles for successful fisheries management. The de-legitimization of regulations, the mistrust and corruption» of authorities, the bitter and often violent conflict between resource users and the increased fear within the community exacerbate the challenges for cooperative management structures. Although there has been a historic reliance on law enforcement and crime control to address the problem of illegal exploitation, it has been recognized that a shift in **governance** needs to take place. However, such a shift will require extreme measures that consider the broad issues discussed above.

Author Keywords: abalone, co-management, poaching, South Africa

^{f1} Phone: +27 21 650 2680 ^{f2} Fax: +27 21 650 3790 ^{f3} mhauck@protem.uct.ac.za ¹⁴ Phone: +27 21 650 3632 ¹⁵ Fax: +27 21 650 3301 ¹⁶ nsweijd@botzoo.uct.ac.za

ICES Journal of Marine Science

Volume 56, Issue 6, December 1999, Pages 1024-1032

2.2 Eia and good governance)^{±1}

Issues and lessons from africa John O. Kakonge^a. ^a United Nations Development Programme, Maseru, South Africa Available online 15 November 1998.

Abstract

This article examines the issue of environmental conflict resolution through the use of environmental impact assessments (EIA). The article draws parallels between the responsibility, and participation-and their application within EIA to resolve potential or existing conflicts. The article notes that the political, economic, and social context in Eastern and Southern Africa must nonetheless be understood and assessed in successfully applying EIA. Citing examples from Eastern and Southern Africa, the article explores ways that EIA could be used more effectively in the African context, and highlights some of the current bottlenecks to more effective environmental conflict resolution, such as weak transnational mechanisms to resolve conflict, **corruption**, and obstacles in expanding greater stakeholder participation.

Index Terms:Environmental impact;Environmental protection;Environmentalimpactassessment;Environmentalconflicts*1The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarilythose of UNDP.****AddresseConflicts

Address requests for reprints to: Dr. John. O. Kakonge, United Nations Development Programme, P.O. Box 301, Maseru, 100, Lesotho; email: <u>fo.les@undp.org</u>

Environmental Impact Assessment Review

Volume 18, Issue 3, May 1998, Pages 289-305

23 The governance of waste management in urban Tanzania: towards a community based approach

J. M. Lusugga Kironde⁻ and Michael Yhdego¹

University College of Lands and Architectural Studies, PO Box 35176, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Received 15 July 1997; revised 25 August 1997; accepted 20 September 1997. Available online 27 July 1998.

Abstract

Solid waste management in urban areas in Tanzania is examined from a 4 governance point of view. Capitalising on the case of the Dar es Salaam City Council, **governance** is seen in terms of central-local government relationship and the relationship between local government and international, national, and community institutions and stakeholders. Major impediments to waste management in urban Tanzania include **<corruption**, poor relations between the politicians and the general population, politics of privatisation, and political apathy. Lack of resources is seen as the least important of all the impediments. An evaluation of the **(governance)** of waste management with respect to public participation, privatisation, citizen-rights, accountability and transparency and financial efficiency is discussed. Management of solid wastes in Dar es Salaam and other urban centres in Tanzania should shift from command-and-control approaches to systems of partnerships between the public authorities and the various stakeholders on the urban scene. A community-based solid waste management approach is suggested for wider adoption. The strategic approach to this non-conventional method should be carried out through four steps: elaboration, trial, evaluation and extension to other neighbourhoods.

Index Terms: Refuse disposal; Urban planning; Finance; Strategic planning; Community based solid waste management methods

Corresponding author.

¹resent address: Environmental Resources Consultancy, PO Box 4206, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Resources, Conservation and Recycling

Volume 21, Issue 4, December 1997, Pages 213-226

CIVIL SOCIETY – GOVERNANCE / CORRUPTION

1. Sustainable transportation institutions and regional evolution: Global and local perspectives

Kingsley E. Haynes Jonathan L. Gifford and Danilo Pelletiere School of Public Policy, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030-4444, USA

Available online 6 October 2004.

Abstract

Sustainable transportation institutions must promote efficient transport utilization and reflect regional demands that often do not align themselves with traditional patterns of political organization. These institutions must confront political legitimacy, economic efficiency and social representation as well as functional effectiveness. Increasing interdependence of mobility demands in terms of safety and efficiency and the embeddedness of transportation in **civil** society has caused issues of equity, fiscal management and environmental externalities to put new stresses on old slowly evolving transport management institutions.

Key challenges to sustainability relate to effective use of technology in management of international trade and the management of spatial externalities in complex urban infrastructure investments. In both cases significant progress has been made using regional strategies, but tension continues between issues of efficiency and privatization on the one hand and equity and public good responsibilities on the other hand. Institutions evolve and change with these cross pressures and different cultural contexts. Examples of these evolutionary changes are explored in terms of the interaction between technology and **governance** in international trade and in the frameworks intended to manage metropolitan transportation in the US.

Keywords: Transportation institutions; Sustainability; Spatial spillovers; Cost benefit analysis; Technology; International trade; Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO's) and Regional Operational Organizations (ROO's)

An early version of this paper was presented as the "Fleming Lecture in Transportation" at the Centennial Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Philadelphia (March 2004) with Dr. Richard Morrill presiding and Dr. Lay James Gibson as discussant.

Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 703 993 2280; fax: +1 703 993 2284. Journal of Transport Geography

Volume 13, Issue 3, September 2005, Pages 207-221

2. Sustainable transportation institutions and regional evolution: Global and local perspectives

Kingsley E. Haynes, Jonathan L. Gifford and Danilo Pelletiere School of Public Policy, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030-4444, USA Available online 6 October 2004.

Abstract

Sustainable transportation institutions must promote efficient transport utilization and reflect regional demands that often do not align themselves with traditional patterns of political organization. These institutions must confront political legitimacy, economic efficiency and social representation as well as functional effectiveness. Increasing interdependence of mobility demands in terms of safety and efficiency and the embeddedness of transportation in **civil** society has caused issues of equity, fiscal management and environmental externalities to put new stresses on old slowly evolving transport management institutions.

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Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 703 993 2280; fax: +1 703 993 2284.

Journal of Transport Geography

Volume 13, Issue 3, September 2005, Pages 207-221

3. New political geographies: Global civil» society and global <governance» through world city networks

Peter J. Taylor, Department of Geography, Loughborough University, Loughborough, LE11 3TU, UK Available online 18 April 2005

Abstract

This study is an investigation of network processes associated with globalization to see whether they herald ontological, new, political geographies that challenge the reproduction of modern states through Westphalian processes. Using an interlocking city network model, three world city networks are defined: an *inter*-state city network with state departments as network-makers, a supra-state city network with UN agencies as network-makers, and a trans-state city network with NGOs as networkmakers. These networks are interpreted as representing worldwide spaces of flows for Westphalian, global **4governance**, and new global **4civil** society processes. The inter-state city network is treated as a benchmark against which to compare the two newer global networks. Activity matrices describing the geographies of the network-makers are analysed and the principle components are interpreted as common global locational strategies. It is found that the three city networks exhibit very different spatialities: the inter-state city network is primarily intra-regional and horizontal; the supra-state network is primarily inter-regional and hierarchical; and the trans-state city network is primarily inter-zonal (straddling the 'North-South divide'). These spatialities are discussed in terms of what they mean for contemporary political geographies.

Keywords: Global **4governance**; Global **4civil** society; Globalization; Spatiality; Westphalian system; World city network

Political Geography

Volume 24, Issue 6, August 2005, Pages 703-730

4. Culture, Law, and Corporate Governance»

Amir N. Licht^{a.} Chanan Goldschmidt^a and Shalom H. Schwartz^b ^aInterdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel

^bDepartment of Psychology, Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Israel

Available online 19 August 2005

Abstract

This article advances a new framework for investigating a simple yet fundamental question: in what ways does the law on the books reflect cultural values? We analyze

relations between indices of investors' legal rights—as coded by La Porta et al. (LLSV)—and national cultural profiles. These indices correlate with cultural priorities that are consistent with societal acceptance of litigation. Indices of formalism in **< civil** procedure exhibit similar correlations. Such societal stance may be related to a heritage of British rule. Grouping countries according to legal families—the cornerstone of LLSV's legal approach—provides only a partial depiction of the universe of corporate **<governance** regimes. Our findings cast doubt on the alleged general supremacy of statutes in common law countries. These findings have implications for understanding diversity and convergence in corporate **<governance** systems and for a systematic analysis of the interface between law and social institutions.

Keywords: Culture; Law; Corporate
 Governance

Corresponding author at: Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Kanfe Nesharim Street, Herzliya 46150, Israel. Tel.: +972 9 9527332; fax: +972 9 9513323.

International Review of Law and Economics

Volume 25, Issue 2, June 2005, Pages 229-255

5. Engaging civil> society in global <governance:> lessons for member states and advice for <civil> society

Jessica F. Green

Sustainable Development Governance, United Nations University, Institute of Advanced Studies, 2 UN Plaza, DC2-2060, New York, NY 10017, USA Available online 29 January 2005.

Abstract

UNU Monitor is a quarterly review of the United Nations University's (UNU) current research activities, publications and forthcoming projects in the area of environment and sustainable development. This issue features an article by Jessica F. Green, United Nations University, Institute of Advanced Studies (UNU-IAS) based on recent research focused on disenfranchisement. The study examines the obstacles that **< civil** society actors and developing countries encounter in their engagement with multilateral regimes for sustainable development, and proposes remedies. This paper provides a summary of key findings from a workshop (Laxenburg, Austria—June 2004) co-hosted by UNU-IAS and International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). The article first offers some encouraging news for member states to promote the engagement of **<civil** society actors; it then provides some recommendations to the **<civil** society on how to enhance its participation. For further information, please contact Ms. Green (jgreen@ias.unu.edu).

Tel.: +1 212 963 6387; fax: +1 212 371 9454.

Global Environmental Change Part A

Volume 15, Issue 1, April 2005, Pages 69-72

6. Co-Governance» for Accountability: Beyond "Exit" and "Voice"

John Ackerman University of California, Santa Cruz, CA, USA Accepted 18 June 2003. ;

Available online 22 January 2004.

Abstract

This article explores the theory and practice of society's participation in strengthening government accountability. It argues that both "exit" solutions based in marketization and "voice" solutions grounded in "coproduction," social protest or consultation are insufficient. The best way to tap into the energy of society is through "co-4 governance,>" which involves inviting social actors to participate in the core activities of the state. By way of demonstration, the article examines case studies from a wide

range of contexts (Brazil, Mexico, the United States, India) and policy areas (poverty reduction, infrastructure provision, school reform, electoral administration, police reform).

Author Keywords: accountability; **{governance**}; participation; **{civil**} society; americas

World Development

Volume 32, Issue 3, March 2004, Pages 447-463

7. Government spending, rights, and civil liberties

Luiz de Mello'and Randa Sab

Expenditure Policy Division, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund, Suite 3-700, 700 19th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20431, USA Accepted 23 July 2002. Available online 24 September 2002.

Abstract

The government plays a critical role in protecting and enforcing rights and **{civil**} liberties. Empirical evidence provided for a sample of industrial and developing countries shows that government spending on defense, law and order, social security, education, and health care are associated with three rights indicators—property rights, equality of citizens before the law, and economic freedom. In particular, an increase in expenditures on law and order seems to improve the indicators of rights and **{civil**} liberties. Sound fiscal policies (i.e., lower budget deficits) seem to improve property rights and equality before the law. Of great importance is the finding that **{corruption**} deteriorates rights indicators. The empirical evidence reported in the paper casts doubt over the negative–positive rights dichotomy (negative rights do not entail public costs), which has become conventional in the literature.

Author Keywords: Rights; Institutions; Government spending

Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-202-623-5468; fax: +1-202-589-5468; email: ldemello@imf.org

International Review of Law and Economics

Volume 22, Issue 3, September 2002, Pages 257-276

8. Bureaucratic corruption → and the rate of temptation: do wages in the ∢civil → service affect ∢corruption, → and by how much?

Caroline Van Rijckeghem^a and Beatrice Weder^{b.}

^a Research Department, International Monetary Fund, 700 19th Street N.W., Washington, DC, 20421 USA

^b WWZ Department of Economics, University of Basel, Petersgraben 51, 4003 Basel, Switzerland

Received 1 May 1999; accepted 1 October 2000. Available online 12 June 2001. Abstract

This paper presents what is to our knowledge the first empirical estimate of the effect of pay in the **(civil)** service on **(corruption.)** First, we show that theory is

ambiguous on the relationship between **<civil** -service pay and **<corruption**. Then, we examine the issue using a new data set on wages for low-income countries. We find evidence of a statistically and economically significant relationship between relative **<civil** -service pay and **<corruption** in regressions based on cross-country averages, where we control for a wide array of variables. The relationship implies that a rather large increase in wages is required to eradicate **<corruption** solely by raising wages.

Author Keywords: **Corruption**; Government wage policy

Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-202-623-5483; fax: +1-202-623-4352; email: <u>beatrice.weder@unibas.ch</u> Journal of Development Economics

Volume 65. Issue 2, August 2001, Pages 307-331

9. Journal of International Development Volume 16, Issue 4, Pages 547 - 561

Published Online: 6 May 2004 Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Fighting governmental corruption: the New World Bank programme evaluated

Carolien M. Klein Haarhuis^{*}, Frans L. Leeuw

University of Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands

email: Carolien M. Klein Haarhuis (c.kleinhaarhuis@fss.uu.nl)

Correspondence to Carolien M. Klein Haarhuis, University of Utrecht Research School ICS - Department of Sociology, Heidelberglaan 1, 3584 CS Utrecht, The Netherlands.

Abstract

Over the past decade, the international donor community has come up with a range of initiatives to curb governmental corruption in developing countries. Topdown approaches devise administrative and judicial reforms, whereas bottom-up approaches deal with the process of awareness - raising in civil society. The World Bank currently integrates these top-down and bottom-up approaches in a combined anti-corruption programme. In this paper, the most recent version of this World Bank's training programme is reconstructed and assessed. Several core approaches in the programme, such as the strengthening of civil society and the privatisation of parastatals, turn out to have unintended consequences. The empirical support is largely case-specific and turns out to be highly conditional. It is concluded that indicators need to be developed to assess the relevance of national anti-corruption policies to country-specific governance and anti-corruption conditions. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

10. Journal of International Development Volume 15, Issue 4, Pages 413 - 426 Special Issue: Explaining Violent Conflict: Going Beyond Greed versus Grievance. Published Online: 17 Apr 2003 Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Buying peace or fuelling war: the role of corruption in armed conflicts Philippe Le Billon

Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada email: Philippe Le Billon (lebillon@geog.ubc.ca)

Correspondence to Philippe Le Billon, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, V6T 1Z2, Canada.

Abstract

Although corruption may have a corrosive effect on economies and rule-based institutions, it also forms part of the fabric of social and political relationships. This endogenous character means that conflict may be engendered more by *changes* in the pattern of corruption than by the existence of corruption itself. Such changes, frequently associated with domestic or external shocks, can lead to armed conflict as increasingly violent forms of competitive corruption between factions 'fuel war' by rewarding belligerents. Controversially, 'buying-off' belligerents can facilitate a transition to peace; but 'sticks' such as economic sanctions, rather than 'carrots', have dominated international conflict resolution instruments. While 'buying peace' can present a short-term solution, the key challenge for peace-building initiatives and

fiscal reforms is to shift individual incentives and rewards away from the competition for immediate corrupt gains. This may be facilitated by placing public revenues under international supervision during peace processes. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

11. Journal of International Development Volume 17, Issue 6, Pages 775 - 789
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Will a Marshall Plan for Africa make poverty history?

Matthew Lockwood

Independent Consultant

email: Matthew Lockwood (mflockwood@yahoo.co.uk)

Correspondence to Matthew Lockwood, C/O Simon Maxwell, Overseas Development Institute, 111 Westminster Bridge Road, London, SE1 7JD, UK. Abstract

A large increase in aid for Africa is a priority for both UK government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in 2005. Despite a history of aid dependence and low growth, there is evidence that aid has a positive effect in Africa. But more aid alone will not produce rapid growth and poverty reduction. Africa's governance record is very poor and attempts at governance reform have largely failed without commitment from leaders. Equally, the policy conditionality debate shows that domestic political considerations have driven the shaping of economic policy, more than donor pressures. The clientelist account of African politics provides a coherent explanation for poor governance, partial and gradual policy change, and also the failure of governance reforms. It also points to a different policy agenda for aid. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Governance Volume 18 Page 347 - July 2005 Volume 18 Issue 3 **The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in** EuropeMARK THATCHER*

Governments and legislatures in Europe have created or greatly strengthened independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). Yet they also retain many formal controls over those agencies. The article analyzes whether elected politicians have used their powers to create IRAs in their own image and kept IRAs under tight control or whether they have allowed IRAs to become a distinct set of actors, hence a "third force" in regulation. Principal-agent (PA) theories, largely based on U.S. experience, emphasize the importance of certain formal controls for elected politicians to limit "agency losses." However, an analysis of four European nations between 1990 and 2001 shows that elected politicians did not use their powers to appoint party politicians, force the early departures of IRA members, reverse IRA decisions, or reduce IRA budgets and powers. Using PA theory, two interpretations of this apparent puzzle are offered, each with differing implications for agency autonomy. One is that elected politicians used alternative methods of control, hence they suffered low "agency losses" and IRAs in practice had little autonomy. The other is that elected politicians found that the benefits of IRA autonomy in practice and the costs of applying their formal control outweighed agency losses, and hence accepted agency autonomy.

Governance

Volume 18 Page 399 - July 2005 Volume 18 Issue 3 Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule-Making in the Public Interest WALTER MATTLI* and TIM BÜTHE**

Over recent decades governments have increasingly delegated domestic and international regulatory functions to private-sector agents. This article examines the reasons for such delegation and how private agents differ from public ones, and then analyzes the politics of regulation post delegation. It argues that the key difference between delegation to a public agent and delegation to a private one is that in the latter case a multiple-principals problem emerges that is qualitatively different from the one usually considered in the literature. An agent's action will be determined by the relative tightness of competing principal–agent relationships. This tightness is a function of the relative importance of each principal for the agent's financial and operational viability as well as its effectiveness in rule making. Further, the article posits that exogenous changes in the macro-political climate can deeply affect the nature of principal–agent relationships. The authors test their hypotheses about the politics of regulation in the postdelegation period through the study of accounting standards setting in the United States, a case of delegation of regulatory authority to a private agent that goes back to the New Deal era and has received renewed public attention in the wake of recent corporate financial scandals.

Governance

Volume 18 Page 151 - April 2005 Volume 18 Issue 2 <u>Corporate Governance and Corruption: A Cross-Country</u> <u>Analysis</u> XUN WU*

Because the empirical literature on the causes of corruption has focused primarily on the demand side of corruption, that is, the corrupt officials who receive bribe payments, the role of the private sector as the supply side of corruption has not been examined thoroughly in this literature. In this article, it is argued that corporate governance is among the important factors determining the level of corruption. Using a cross-country data set, hypotheses that explicitly link various measures of corporate governance to the level of corruption are tested. The results show that corporate governance standards can have profound impacts on the effectiveness of the global anticorruption campaign.

Governance

Volume 18 Page 89 - January 2005 Volume 18 Issue 1 Jurisdictional Integrity, Polycentrism, and the Design of Democratic Governance CHRIS SKELCHER<u>*</u>

Political and managerial processes are creating polycentric networks that transcend the traditional ideas of jurisdictional integrity in state-centric systems. Jurisdictional integrity refers to the political and legal competence of a unit of government to operate within a spatial and functional realm. An intrinsic element of jurisdictional integrity in a democratic system is that citizens are enabled to give consent to and pass judgment on the exercise of authority by that governmental entity. The concept of jurisdictional integrity is shown to apply differentially in relation to the traditional institutions of government in comparison with the emergent complex of quasi-governmental agencies, special purpose bodies and multi-organizational collaborations. Distinctions are drawn between club, agency and polity entities within this emergent organizational field. Problems to be faced in the design of institutions for network governance under conditions of polycentrism are identified and solutions reviewed. The potential of consociationalism to enable collective decision making across a polycentric system is highlighted. Informal norms are shown to be essential in enabling such a system for network governance to operate effectively.

Governance Volume 17 Page 457 - October 2004 Volume 17 Issue 4 Managing **Value Conflict in Public Policy** David Thacher¹ and Martin Rein²

Policy issues are often characterized by conflicting values. Conventionally, students of public policy have conceptualized government's response to value conflicts as a matter of "balancing" competing goals, or striking trade-offs among values. In this paper we argue that this way of managing value conflicts represents only one possibility from a larger and more varied repertoire of strategies that draw from more complex models of practical reasoning. Policy actors do sometimes try to strike a "balance" among conflicting values, but they often avail themselves of other strategies as well: they cycle between values by emphasizing one value and then the other; they assign responsibilities for each value to different institutional structures; or they gather and consult a taxonomy of specific cases where similar conflicts arose. We argue that each of these strategies can be rational in some institutional contexts, and that conclusion challenges the view that policy values must always be treated as commensurable for rational policy choices

to be made. Government responds to value conflict in ways that are more varied and changing than existing views of public policy imply.

Governance Volume 17 Page 313 - July 2004 Volume 17 Issue 3 Competency, Bureaucracy, and Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis Christopher Hood¹ and Martin Lodge²

Competency can be considered a central theme in contemporary public service reforms. This article analyzes the development of competency frameworks for senior public servants at the national-government level in three countries (the U.S., the U.K., and Germany). By tracing the development of competency as an idea, it is shown that competency reforms drew selectively on management ideas, and by tracing the nature and timepatterns of competency reform developments in the three countries, it is shown that competency came onto the reform agenda at different times and by various routes rather than by a simple pattern of international policy transfer or business-to-government transfer. It is argued that the adoption of competency frameworks took place at critical junctures for preexisting public service bargains or agreements in each case and that they were shaped by the particularities of institutional context. However, although competency is arguably central to public service reform, it is far from clear that the competency frameworks in these three cases contributed to the declared aims of many contemporary public service reformers.

Governance Volume 17 Page 335 - July 2004 Volume 17 Issue 3 Inspecting the Inspectors: Overseeing Labor Inspectorates in Parliamentary DemocraciesChristian B. Jensen¹

Most theories of how to control bureaucracies are derived from American experience and are tested with data from the U.S. In contrast, this article uses evidence from the 15 members of the European Union to examine oversight mechanisms through which legislators attempt to control the bureaucracy. Analysis of European data shows that "police patrol" mechanisms of oversight appear in countries with relatively little gridlock as measured by the ideological range of their governments. "Deck stacking" mechanisms appear in countries that experience greater problems with gridlock measured in the same way.

Governance Volume 17 Page 169 - April 2004 Volume 17 Issue 2 Cross-National Transfer of Policy Ideas: Agencification in Britain and Japan Koichi Nakano¹

This study seeks to contribute to the policy transfer literature through a comparison of the British "Next Steps" initiative of agencification (i.e., organizational separation of policy implementation from policy formulation in central departments) and the Japanese reform that officially proclaimed to be inspired by the British example. In addition to confirming the crucial role played by domestic structural constraints in producing variant outputs in different countries, this article also shows that the transfer of policy ideas can be a highly proactive political process in which political actors in the learning country interpret and define both problems and solution as they "borrcw" from another country.

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions Volume 17 Page 1 - January 2004 Feeling the Heat? Anticorruption Mechanisms in Comparative Perspective Moshe Maor¹

This article addresses the implications of political executives losing control over corruption investigations of senior officeholders following the creation of anticorruption mechanisms (e.g., commissions, special prosecutors, independent counsels, investigating judges). When investigations hit close to home, the ensuing political fallout makes political executives eager to look for ways to derail such investigations, especially when investigators proceed with an uncharted mandate. Against this background, two hypotheses are investigated: (i) the striking outcome of this process is a concerted move by targeted political executives to undermine the credibility of anticorruption mechanisms and, when deemed necessary, to terminate their operation, and (ii) the extent to which the prosecutors are successful depends on both

institutions and media accessibility: the more centralized and fused political power is, and the less media accessible the government is, the harder it will be to carry out an investigation. These hypotheses are strongly supported by a comparative analysis of five anticorruption mechanisms in the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Australia (Queensland and New South Wales.)

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions Volume 17 Page 29 - January 2004

Innovative Governance and Development in the New Ireland: Social Partnership and the Integrated Approach J. D. House¹ and Kyla McGrath¹

Since the mid-1980s, the economy of the Republic of Ireland has displayed a remarkable turnaround. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown at a faster rate than any developed country in the world. The government's deficit has been cut severely and the debt-to-GDP ration sharply reduced. Average incomes have risen significantly, and the unemployment rate reduced dramatically. This article documents these changes.

Its main purpose, however, is to provide a plausible *explanation* for the "Irish miracle." While many factors have been important—support for the Economic Union's regional development programs, a favorable tax structure, locational and language advantages for attracting multinational corporations, strong education and training programs—these factors in themselves do not explain the emergence of the "Celtic tiger." They were in place before the mid-1980s when Ireland was suffering from a fiscal, economic, and political crisis.

Instead, the article argues, it was the creative and innovative response of Irish leaders in government, industry, and labor movement and community organizations to the crisis, and the subsequent institutionalization of this response in a new form of governance, that has been the catalyst for the Irish success story. Based on the thorough background research of the Economic and Social Research Council, a farsighted group of leaders developed a strategic plan in 1987 that provided a blueprint for constructive economic and social change. This was then formally instituted for wage restraint on the part of labor in return for income tax and social supposed provisions by government.

Irish social Partnership is modeled to some extent on Northern European corporatism. The article reviews corporatism as an early form of innovative governance, using classical corporatism in Sweden and competitive corporatism in the Netherlands to illustrate how this approach has evolved over the years. Dutch economic success in recent years is due in part to its new form of corporatism that has helped it become globally competitive. It is argued, however, that Irish social partnership goes beyond continental corporatism in several important ways. It is more *inclusive*, covering a large array of social interests; it is more *strategic*, with a well-articulated integrated approach to social and economic development that is self-corrective and articulated in a new national agreement every three years; and it is more firmly *institutionalized* in both government and nongovernment agencies in the country. Social partnership and the integrated approach have become part of the culture of the new Ireland. This innovative form of governance underlies the Irish turnaround and augurs well for the future. It can also serve as a model, with appropriate modification tailor-made to each case, for other jurisdictions hoping to emulate Ireland's success.

CIVIL SOCIETY

1 Public interest or private agenda? A meditation on the role of NGOs in environmental policy and management in Australia

Marcus B. Lane^a and T.H. Morrison^b,

^aGeographical and Environmental Studies, The University of Adelaide, Australia

^bSchool of Political & International Studies—Flinders Institute of Public Policy & Management, Flinders University, Australia

Available online 26 January 2006.

Abstract

Non-government organisations (NGOs) have come to assume an important role in environmental policy in Australia. This paper considers the institutional impacts of an enlarged and formal role for NGOs in environmental governance. To foreground the analysis that follows, the paper theorises: (i) the structural democratisation of western societies» which provides the preconditions for civic approaches to environmental governance; (ii) «civil society» organisations as political actors; and (iii) the link between non-state associations and democracy. Against this background, the paper surveys some of the ways in which NGOs are being formally involved in environmental policy and management in Australia. The paper proceeds to identify a series of risks associated with these approaches. The paper concludes by calling for a more nuanced and critical appraisal of the role of NGOs in environmental policy so political space might be reserved for the public interest and to ensure that the democratic effects of <civil society are not diminished. Keywords: NGOs; Non-state associations; Environmental policy; Governance; Civil society); Structural democratisation; Democracy

Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 08 8201 2074.

Journal of Rural Studies

Volume 22, Issue 2, April 2006, Pages 232-242

2 Wolfish Wilsonians: Existential Dilemmas of the Liberal Internationalists

Anatol <u>Lieven</u> Available online 8 February 2006.

Abstract

There are limits on America's ability to bring democracy to deeply divided societies with little or no history of democracy, and many American liberal internationalists have succumbed to intellectual and moral paralysis about America's right and ability to spread its system in the rest of the world. The principles of law-governed freedom are in fact important and nearly eternal principles, but they are best spread by America's setting the example as a peaceful democracy. The messianic approach to democracy-promotion adopted by the Bush administration and its liberal allies, rooted in faith in the "American creed" and an emerging "global <civil society, b" can only damage both American power and the cause of democratizing the world. The American approach to democratization needs instead to be governed by rigor of the intellect and generosity of spirit.

Orbis Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring 2006, Pages 243-257

3 Non-government organisations and the dialectics of state and civil society

Sue Kenny, Centre for Citizenship and Human Rights, Deakin University, Burwood campus, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood, Victoria 3125, Australia, Available online 10 February 2006.

Abstract

This paper is concerned with envisioning the development of non-government organisations (NGOs) in Australia over the next 200 years. It begins with a discussion of a hypothetical NGO, providing vignettes of its activities in 2104 and 2204, and sketching out contextual factors that might influence NGO development. This discussion is followed by an outline of the methodology upon which the projections indicated in the hypothetical case-study are based. Three methodological approaches are used. The first approach begins from an analysis of current contextual trajectories, and projects the role of NGOs within these trajectories. The second approach postulates that the changes that will occur will be affected by the reflexive nature of social change, involving continual reflection and action. The third methodological approach draws on this notion of reflexivity, but emphasises that social change is not only a reflexive process, it is also a dialectical one. The dialectical approach rests on the premise that change occurs through a process of the accumulation of contradictions, challenge and resolution. Using these methodological approaches the paper proceeds to identify three factors which will influence the Australian NGO sector in the next 200 years. These factors are the shifting relations between the state and «civil society,» including the rise of the neo-authoritarian state in the 21st century; the ways in which least advantaged people are dealt with and, finally, the idea of risk «society.» While it is more difficult to identify the contextual and NGO trajectories into the 22nd and 23rd centuries, the paper postulates a more utopian vision for NGOs in Australia in 200 years time, where the category of people who had been previously marginalised disappears, and the major roles of NGOs are to ensure cultural diversity and develop «civil» labour.

Tel.: +61 3 924 43981.

Futures

Article in Press, Corrected Proof

4. Private voluntary standards in the food system: The perspective of major food retailers in OECD countries

Linda Fulponi

Directorate for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Markets and Trade Division, 2 rue André Pascal, 75016 Paris, France Available online 19 September 2005.

Abstract

The paper examines the main economic and institutional incentives which have driven major OECD food retailers in their use of private voluntary standards and discusses their growing role in shaping the agri-food system. It is based on interviews with quality and safety directors of major OECD retailers and a brief survey of retailers' actual buyer practices. Though not all retailers are included, these firms account for over 70% of retail food sales in OECD countries. We find that the growing voice of civil society. I changing legal and institutional frameworks, increased market concentration and buying power as well as their integration with financial markets has provided the setting for development of private standards. While food safety and quality standards are seen as key to maintaining and improving reputation as well as against legal liabilities, additional standards such as labour, environmental and animal welfare are also gaining ground as strategies for customer loyalty and market shares. The grass-roots retailer move in the harmonization of food safety standards is seen as an initial step towards a global approach to managing the food system, with harmonization of other standards likely in the future. Given their buyer power, these developments can be viewed as a way of governing the food system and will be important for both OECD and non-OECD food and agricultural sector evolution in the coming years.

Keywords: Private standards; Reputation; Certification; Food safety; Labour standards; Animal welfare and environmental standards

Tel.: +33 1452 49538; fax: +33 1443 06118.

Food Policy

Volume 31, Issue 1, February 2006, Pages 1-13

5. Adoption of corporate social responsibility codes by multinational companies

Julien Levis, World Bank, Private Sector Development Vice Presidency, 2121 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA Available online 15 February 2006

Abstract

Multinational companies (MNCs) increasingly publicize their commitment to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and advertise their Codes of conduct. These CSR Codes are the result of genuine corporate intent as well as external pressure. We underline the risks of corporate self-regulation for shareholders as well as stakeholders. In a competitive environment, MNCs' managers have no incentive to adopt codes that truly limit corporate externalities. Regulation by public authorities or at the industry level provides better safeguards than regulation by the individual company itself. Keywords: Corporate social responsibility; Codes of conduct; Multinational companies; Regulation; Civil society); Litigation; Corporate governance; Legitimacv

A larger version was presented at the Conference on Entrepreneurship and Human Rights, August 1–3, 2005, Fordham University, New York. Tel.: +1 202 458 7480; fax: +1 202 4735758.

Journal of Asian Economics

Volume 17, Issue 1, February 2006, Pages 50-55

6. bLinking the web and the street: Internet-based "dotcauses" and the "anti-globalization" movement

John D. Clark^a and Nuno S. Themudo^a World Bank, Washington, DC, USA University of Pittsburgh, PA, USA

Available online 11 November 2005.

Summary

Dotcauses (Internet-based networks) and the transnational protest movement about globalization are prominent features of contemporary civil society. We argue that these phenomena are related. Dotcauses are important mobilizing structures within the movement, attracting support, coordinating action, and disseminating alternatives. They therefore influence many of its characteristics—its transnational action, leaderlessness, profusion of concerns, tactical schisms, and digital/language divides. Social movement theory is employed to study these issues. Dotcauses, and the Internet more generally, are changing social movement and activist dynamics. Policy makers have difficulty in responding to this dispersed organizational design, as do traditional <civil society[▶] organizations.

Key words: Internet; globalization; ∢civil society⊮; social movements; advocacy; NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations)

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World Development

Volume 34, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 50-74

7. Terror outrages drive infosec Down Under

lan Grant

Available online 18 February 2006.

9/11 and the Bali bombs almost a year later were a security wake-up call to many Western governments, perhaps none more so than Australia and New Zealand. These events now overshadow the <u>development of infosecurity in civil society</u> Down Under.

Infosecurity Today

Volume 3, Issue 1, January-February 2006, Pages 25-29

8 Policy discourse and data retention: The technology politics of surveillance in the United Kingdom

Edgar A. Whitley and Ian Hosein, Department of Information Systems, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK

Abstract

This article presents an analysis of UK legislation on the retention of communications data that was introduced in the aftermath of the attacks of

September 11, 2001. It presents a review of the discourses surrounding this legislation in parliament, in the wider international policy arena, in business and in terms of technology. The review of these discourses demonstrates that, in understanding policies involving a significant technological component such as communications data retention, policy alternatives may be evaluated only with an appreciation of technological characteristics alongside the traditional concerns of legislators, civil society and the business community. While academia has developed many forms of analysis for political, international, and regulatory discourses, the same must be undertaken for technological discourse, i.e. the interactions between the policies in question, the actors, and the technologies. Developing forms of analysis for technological discourses will likely lead to further understanding of both the policy problem and the actors' interests. The paper also shows how current institutions are slowly developing the necessary skills to incorporate the technological aspects of policy into political debate, and calls for a similar development for the law.

Keywords: Data retention; Technology; Surveillance; Policy <u>Telecommunications Policy</u> Volume 29, Issue 11, December 2005, Pages 857-874 Network Security, Survivability and Surveillance

CIVIL SOCIETY – BRIBERY

<u>Thunderbird International Business Review Volume 43, Issue 2</u>, Pages 171 - 200 Published Online: 22 Feb 2001

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Ethical dilemmas of relationship building in china

Robin Stanley Snell¹, Choo-sin Tseng²

¹Lingnan University ²City University of Hong Kong

Abstract

We analyze and discuss some ethical dilemmas of doing business on the Chinese Mainland, referring to detailed accounts of the gift-giving and contract-getting experiences of two overseas Chinese managers in dealings with Mainland Chinese managers in the sporting and leisure industries. We compare these cases with accounts of transactions in worldwide ship repair, and with a newspaper report of a sport-related case in Hong Kong. Using a version of Kohlberg's moral-stages model, and identifying key differences between guanxi and rational-legal ethics, we explain how guanxi can become entangled with corruption in China. We link our explanations to the absence of rational-legal moral governance, and to the sociological phenomena of anomie and relative deprivation. We conclude with suggestions about the conduct of China business. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Public Administration and Development

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People must change before institutions can: a model addressing the challenge from administering to managing the maltese public service

Vincent Cassar¹*, Christopher Bezzina²

¹Department of Psychology, Faculty of Education, University of Malta, Msida, Malta ²Department of Education Studies, Faculty of Education, University of Malta, Msida, Malta

[•]Correspondence to Vincent Cassar, Department of Psychology, Faculty of Education, University of Malta, Msida, MSD 06, Malta.

Keywords

Malta • public sector • change

Abstract

The Maltese public service is currently undergoing major organisational changes to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness in its service delivery. The great majority of these changes have focussed on re-organising the macro-level, namely strategy, processes and structures. This is not an easy feat as local external power forces leave their impact in the process. It is argued, however, that one way to circumvent these resisting forces is to empower the real agents of change: the administrators of the public service. For some reason, the micro-level has been neglected and has been generally absent from the agenda of the major change programme with a few exceptions. This article throws light on this level by proposing an intrapersonal, psychological and pedagogical model for change that may *complement* and *accompany* the larger macro changes. The authors suggest that the model can be developed in a practical way to motivate change from *within* the person and not just push change *around* the person. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Whistleblower protection: is Africa ready?

William de Maria*

UQ School of Business, The University of Queensland, Australia

email: William de Maria (b.demaria@business.uq.edu.au)

whilstleblowing • Africa • corruption • neo-colonialism

Abstract

The article critically examines propositions driving the exportation of western whistleblower concepts into the developing world.[Note 1][The full definition used in the article is that whistleblowing is an act of ethical reporting by concerned citizen, totally or predominantly motivated by the public interest, who initiate of their own free will an open disclosure about significant wrongdoing to a person or agency capable of investigating the disclosure, and who suffers accordingly. This definition was developed in the course of the Queensland Whistleblower Study, Australia's largest inquiry into whistleblowers. Whistleblowing is a different reporting mode to that used by informants, hot line users, witnesses, public interest

denunciators, and disclosures in confidence (De Maria, 1994; De Maria & Jan, 1994; De Maria, 1999, pp. 24-35). Africa, throughout the article means sub-Saharan Africa. Abridged versions of this paper were presented to the 4th National Business Ethics Conference, Zanzibar, 1 September 2004 and a staff seminar in the School of Sociology, University of Johannesburg, 25 August 2004.] Specifically it attacks the prevailing view that public interest disclosure is somehow a culture-free, or at least a culture-muted phenomenon, governed by a set of rules and conventions detached from local histories and practices. The article concludes that this exportation is in the spirit of neo-colonialism and issues a note of warning about the dangers of dispersing western conceived forms of corruption reporting to Africa. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Money for our people? Decentralisation and corruption in Romania: the cases of the equalisation, infrastructure and pre-university education funds

Sorin Ioniță*

Romanian Academic Society (SAR), Bucharest, Romania

decentralisation • corruption • local finance • party affiliation • Romanian local governments

Abstract

In spite of the attempts, in the most recent years, to introduce simple, accountable and rule-based mechanisms governing the flows of funds for Romanian local governments (LGs) there is evidence showing that deviations from the norms are still widespread and undermine the stated goals of many policies. This article aims to explore to what extent the political factor (party affiliation, i.e. local informal power networks) interferes with the allocation of public funds as far as three main areas of decentralised policy are concerned: (i) the general purpose equalisation transfers; (ii) the Roads Fund grants and (iii) the transfers for financing the preuniversity education. These components represent a relatively large share of the local budgets and are illustrative for two important attributions Romanian LGs perform today: maintaining the local infrastructure and providing essential social services. Through a set of variables - measuring, on the one hand, the real pattern of resource allocation and on the other hand, the intensity of politicisation in the three areas - we tested the hypothesis that intergovernmental financial flows in Romania are to a large extent captured by rent-seeking groups. It turns out that this is indeed the case with the funds for infrastructure, and much less so with the transfers financing pre-university education. Some conclusions from these contrasting situations are drawn which reflect on the broader discussion, the link between decentralisation and corruption. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Book Review Where corruption lives. Gerald E. Caiden, O. P. Dwivedi and Joseph Jabbra Kumarian Press, Inc., 2001, xii 273 pp., ISBN 1 56549 133 5 A cautionary tale: ten major flaws in combatting corruption. Gerald Caiden Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas, Vol. X, No. 2, 2004

Professor Alan Doig

Fraud Management Studies Unit, Teesside Business School, University of Teesside, Middlesbrough, England

No Abstract.

Public Administration Review

Volume 66 Page 177 - March 2006 Volume 66 Issue 2 Political **Control versus Bureaucratic Values: Reframing the Debate** Kenneth J. Meier^a Laurence J. O'Toole Jr.^b

The literature on political control of bureaucracy reveals that bureaucracies are highly responsive to political forces. This paper argues that the political control literature misses evidence from other academic literature that bears directly on this phenomenon. Specifically, researchers need to consider the values of the bureaucracy in any effort to assess the degree of political control. An empirical test is presented using a data set from public education. Results show bureaucratic values to be far more influential in explaining bureaucratic outputs and outcomes than political factors. These findings suggest that a reinterpretation of previous empirical research is urgently in order.

Public Administration Review

Volume 66 Page 228 - March 2006 Volume 66 Issue 2 Assessing the Impact of Bureaucracy Bashing by Electoral Campaigns R. Sam Garrett¹ James A. Thurber² A. Lee Fritschler³ David H. Rosenbloom⁴

The literature on the implications of electoral "bureaucracy bashing" for public management is thin. This is partly because of the difficulty of defining basic terms and measuring results in meaningful ways. Using focus group data, this article explores how senior federal managers perceive campaign bureaucracy bashing and assess its consequences. The participants perceive that candidate-based bashing affects federal management on two levels: one emotional, the other programmatic. The emotional impact is pronounced, producing frustration and hostility from senior managers toward political candidates, political appointees, and the media. Senior managers report that bashing adversely affects policy implementation through low morale, poor recruitment, and training and by fostering an environment of distrust toward bureaucracy. Grounded in a diverse literature relating to public administration, the presidency, campaigns and elections, and political communication, this inquiry finds that senior managers confirm many of the speculations these works raise about how bashing affects public employees and public policy.

Public Administration Review

Volume 66 Page 6 - January 2006 Volume 66 Issue 1 **The Tides of Reform Revisited: Patterns in Making Government Work, 1945– 2002** Paul C. Light^a

The past six decades have witnessed acceleration in both the number and variety of major administrative reform statutes enacted by Congress. This increase can be explained partly by the increased involvement of Congress, a parallel decrease in activity and resistance by the presidency, and heightened public distrust toward government. At least part of the variation in the tides or philosophies of reform involves a "field of dreams" effect in which the creation of new governmental structure during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s generated increased interest in process reforms. However, part of the acceleration and variety of reform appears to be related to the lack of hard evidence of what actually works in improving government performance. Measured by federal employees' perceptions of organizational performance, what matters most is not whether organizations were reformed in the past, but whether organizations need reform in the future and can provide essential resources for achieving their mission.

Public Administration Review

Volume 65 Page 301 - May 2005 Volume 65 Issue 3 **How Financial Managers Deal with Ethical Stress** Gerald J. Miller¹ Samuel J. Yeager² W. Bartley Hildreth² Jack Rabin³

This article explores the way public-sector financial managers cope with ethical challenges created by undue political pressure and demands for special treatment. A nationwide survey of financial managers revealed that fiscal stress exacerbates ethical pressure for most financial managers, including chief financial officers (CFOs) and those who report to CFOs. Financial managers do not work in an ethical vacuum; they respond to supervisors who encourage ethical action and to coworkers who demonstrate high standards of personal integrity. Supervisors of CFOs who emphasize political responsiveness in employee evaluations can threaten the ethical behavior of CFOs, while timely feedback can mitigate ethical pressure. In turn, CFOs as supervisors can temper the harsh work environment in fiscally stressed times by encouraging ethical action and by giving adequate feedback to those who report to them. **Public Administration** Volume 84 Page 1 - March 2006 **The Impact of Institutional Forces Upon Knowledge Sharing in the UK NHS: The Triumph of Professional Power and the Inconsistency of Policy** Graeme Currie¹ and Olga Suhomlinova²

Academics, policy-makers and practitioners are increasingly interested in the contribution that effective management of knowledge across organizational and professional boundaries can make to improved public services. Examining knowledge sharing within the context of the UK NHS, we ground our investigation in neo-institutional organizational sociology. We highlight the influence of regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive aspects of institutions operating in the health care field on the boundaries that impede knowledge sharing. We illustrate how institutional isomorphic processes facilitate convergence within groups of organizations and occupations subject to the same institutional pressures, but, by the same token, inhibit convergence across different organizational and occupational groupings. In short, the development of a learning organization, where knowledge is shared freely across boundaries, will be difficult to realize.

Public Administration Volume 84 Page 31 - March 2006 **Pathways of Change: Organizations in Transition** Ljiljana Erakovic¹ and Michael Powell²

This article discusses and illustrates organizational changes as initiated by ownership transition. It develops and elaborates three different pathways that organizations might follow through the process of transformation from government departments to state-owned enterprises, and then to privately-owned companies: the incremental, radical and reductive pathways. The research reported here is based on 11 case studies of New Zealand privatized companies. The pathway approach develops and extends existing models of transitional organizational trajectories, emphasizing the importance of antecedent conditions of organizational development, current environmental patterns and the strategic choices of the government and new owners.

Public Administration volume 84 Page 59 - March 2006 **Lost in Translation: A Multi-Level Case Study of the Metamorphosis of Meanings and Action in Public Sector Organizational Innovation** Catherine Pope¹, Glenn Robert², Paul Bate², Andrée Le May¹ and John Gabbay³

This paper explores the early implementation of an organizational innovation in the UK National Health Service (NHS) - Treatment Centres (TCs) designed to dramatically reduce waiting lists for elective care. The paper draws on case studies of 8 TCs (each at varying stages of their development) and aims to explore how meanings about TCs are created and evolve, and how these meanings impact upon the development of the organizational innovation. Research on organizational meanings needs to take greater account of the fact that modern organizations like the NHS are complex multilevel phenomena, comprising layers of interlacing networks. To understand the pace, direction and impact of organizational innovation and change we need to study the interconnections between meanings across different organizational levels. The data presented in this paper show how the apparently simple, relatively unformed, concept of a TC framed by central government is translated and transmuted by subsequent layers in the health service administration, and by players in local health economies, and, ultimately, in the TCs themselves, picking up new rationales, meanings and significance as it goes along. The developmental histories of TCs reveal a range of significant re-workings of macro policy with the result that there is considerable diversity and variation between local TC schemes. The picture is of important disconnections between meanings, that in many ways mirror Weick's (1976) 'loosely coupled systems'. The emergent meanings and the direction of micro-level development of TCs appear more strongly determined by interactions within the local TC environment, notably between what we identify as groups of 'idealists', 'pragmatists', 'opportunists' and 'sceptics' than by the framing (Goffman 1974) provided by macro and meso organizational levels. While this illustrates the limitations of top down and policy-driven attempts at change, and highlights the crucial importance of the front-line local 'micro-systems' (Donaldson and Mohr 2000) in the overall scheme of implementing organizational innovations, the space or headroom provided by

frames at the macro and meso levels can enable local change, albeit at variable speed and with uncertain outcomes.

Public Administration Volume 84 Page 81 - March 2006 **Developing New Forms of Partnership With the 'Market' in the Procurement of Public Services** Tony Bovaird¹

This article provides a conceptual framework for understanding the key differences between newly emerging 'market' relationships and more traditional forms of procurement by public sector organizations. It highlights how multiple relationships between service clients in the public sector and other stakeholders mean that service clients may often co-produce welfare changes in their communities in ways which professional and commercial providers cannot easily control and may not fully understand. It highlights the very different nature of collaborations which affect single commissioners and contractors (relational contracting), multiple commissioning bodies with a unified procurement policy (partnership procurement) and multiple commissioning bodies with diverse procurement policies empowered by a single purchasing body (distributed commissioning). The article suggests that traditional conceptions of the 'market' and of 'market management' are now outdated and need to be revised to take into account the potential of collaborative relationships between multiple stakeholders in the public domain.

Public Administration Volume 84 Page 103 - March 2006 **Crossing the Great Divide – Using Multi-method Analysis to Understand Opposition to Windfarms** Claire Haggett¹ and David Toke²

This paper demonstrates the possibilities for the complementary use of regression analysis and discourse analysis to further understand issues in public administration. To do so, an empirical study of opposition to wind energy planning applications is used. The application of logistical regression to analyse the factors which may influence windfarm planning applications is discussed, factors including the attitudes of local people. Discourse analytical techniques are then used to consider how anti-windfarm campaigners

manage accusations of 'Not In My Back Yard' (NIMBYism). This is done partly by linking their cause with wider environmental objectives. Although discourses and logistical regression models have very different ontologies, the paper demonstrates that there is no inevitable conflict between the epistemologies used in these two different methods, despite differences in the type of data being analysed.

Public Administration Volume 84 Page 185 - March 2006 **Public Sector Growth: Comparing Politicians' and Administrators' Spending Preferences** Dag Ingvar Jacobsen¹

The notion that appointed bureaucrats act as budget maximizers still stands strong within theories attempting to explain the growth in the size of the public sector. This paper reports the results of a case study that included local authority politicians and bureaucrats in 30 Norwegian municipalities and where differences in spending preferences was empirically investigated. Counter to the original theory, bureaucrats seem to be less expansive than their political counterparts. The most expansive were found to be members of political left-wing parties, the more peripheral politicians and administrators, women, those with lower education and those working in the public sector. Nevertheless, there is some support given to a modified hypothesis that administrators have stronger preferences for 'slack' (that is, organizational slack in terms of spending more money on internal administration) than politicians. The data also strongly support the notion that within a specialized sector, both politicians and administrators have similar preferences for higher spending to their specific sector.

Public Administration Volume 83 Page 443 - June 2005 **Analysis of Public Management Change Processes: The Case of Local Government Accounting Reforms in Germany** Hans-Gerd Ridder¹, Hans-Jürgen Bruns¹ and Fabian Spier¹

In Germany, financial pressure and a lack of efficiency have caused the need for several reform processes in the local governments of German municipalities. These local governments are facing a growing contradiction between decreasing levels of financial support and increasing responsibilities. In order to address this tension, municipalities are starting to change their accounting systems by implementing accrual accounting and output-based budgeting. Starting from a description of reform processes in German municipalities, we use the concept both of the resource-based view and of dynamic capabilities in order to observe the implementation of these new accounting standards. Based on six case studies, our empirical findings show that the idiosyncratic adaptation of new standards in municipalities leads to a diversity of outcomes in the implementation process. Finally, the future prospects of further public financial management reform processes in Germany are presented.

Public Administration Volume 83 Page 473 - June 2005 From Bilateral to Trilateral Governance in Local Government Contracting in France Karen West¹

In France, the tradition of contracting out local public services has been predominantly one of partnership and co-operation rather than competition and antagonism. However, in recent years the traditional approach has come under intense criticism, something which has far-reaching implications for public-private governance. Adopting the socio-legal approach to the study of contract governance set out by Peter Vincent-Jones, this paper explores the discrepancy between descriptions of a traditional French approach to local public services governance, in which the bilateral values of trust and cooperation are emphasized, and a new discourse of local public services governance, which argues for detailed contract planning and close contract monitoring. It is argued that this discrepancy reveals the beginning of a shift in the governance of public service exchange relationships from relatively noncontractual and bilateral to relatively contractual and trilateral. The French case highlights the importance of regulatory and accountability frameworks to the manner in which contracting parties perceive exchange governance. **Public Administration** Volume 83 Page 89 - March 2005 **Governance in the UK Public Sector: the Involvement of the Governing Board** Catherine M. Farrell¹

Governing boards are a prominent feature of many public sector organizations today. These boards have been modelled on the private sector board of directors. Like company boards, one of their main functions is to provide strategic leadership and policy direction for the organization. The role of managers and chief executives is to implement this. This paper examines the extent of involvement of one public sector board, the school governing body, in strategic activity. Using empirical evidence from a number of semi-structured interviews conducted in schools, its findings indicate that governing bodies are not involved at a high level in strategy within schools. Rather, headteachers are more likely to be undertaking this activity. Reflections are made about the relevance of the 'board of directors' model for both governing bodies and the public sector more generally.

Public Administration Volume 83 Page 135 - March 2005 **The Formation of Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons from Nine Transport Infrastructure Projects in The Netherlands** J. (Joop) F.M. Koppenjan¹

Despite high expectations, in The Netherlands the formation of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the field of transport infrastructure is stagnating. This article addresses the question of why this is the case. On the basis of a comparative analysis of 9 case studies concerning the building of partnerships, 3 patterns are identified. The first is the successful formation of partnerships resulting in enriched projects. The second pattern is that of early interaction resulting in ambitious proposals for which there is no support. The third pattern shows ineffective market consultations followed by unilateral public planning, leading to stagnating contract negotiations.

These patterns are coherent and are caused by a number of generic factors. An important explanation for stagnation is the lack of interaction. As a result, public and private parties will fail to reach a common understanding, will be unable to contribute to the enrichment of the project content and will fail to develop mutual trust. If parties engage in early interaction, the lack of embeddedness of their efforts may result in an uncritical piling up of ambitions and an absence of the capability to realize trade-offs and generate support. These explanations are related to the absence of conscious and systematic attempts to manage and arrange interaction processes aimed at the formation of PPPs. On the basis of these findings the author formulates a number of suggestions to improve the quality and effectiveness of these processes.