

THE AEGEAN "DISPUTE"

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PANHELLENIC SOCIALIST MOUVEMENT

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

HOW DID WE REACH THE DANGEROUS CRISIS IN THE AEGEAN? FROM EXORMISI,
PASOK NEWSPAPER, AUGUST 13, 1976

There had been no problem in the Aegean since the Treaty of Lausanne (1922). But the Turks stoked the embers on November 1, 1973, by advocating a division of the Aegean based on their definition of the continental shelf and aerial space, and they applied pressure in this direction right up to August of 1974.

Turkey successfully managed to block all of Greece's attempts to assert her rightful limits in the Aegean to 12 miles, something which would have made Greece's territorial rights over the area clear to all. If she had accomplished this, any Turkish transgression would constitute a violation of the United Nations and International Law, but now Turkey can cast a blanket of confusion over the issue by speaking of "disputed waters". In essence, Turkey is claiming the Eastern half of the Aegean:

- a) Aerially, by extending air patrols to the Greek islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Rhodes etc.
 - b) On the surface by establishing a University of the Aegean, and an Aegean army - so that its claims will be based on conditions existing "prior" to the whole issue.
 - c) Underwater, by denying the Treaty of Geneva (1958), which recognized the existence of the Greek island's continental shelf and states that these rights are valid without the sanction of the countries concerned.
2. The Aegean issue was brought to life when American oil companies began oil exploration (1972-73) in Turkey and Greece:
- a) Oceanic company discovered petroleum reserves on Thasos in January of 1974.
 - b) The Texas Geophysical Company discovered oil for Turkey in May, 1974.

Meanwhile, Turkey printed a map of the 27 disputed underwater regions of the Eastern Aegean in the Government newspaper (1.11.73), while simultaneously establishing the Petroleum Exploration Company.

Greece officially protested the last act on February 23, 1975 according to the rules of the Geneva Treaty. As Mr. Karamanlis has stated in Parliament, Turkey's response to these protests was to fall back on the principle of tolerance.

3. In a multi-party national policy consisting of Government and opposition, Turkey discussed the issue but based all its arguments on bogus NATO logic:

- a) There exists a problem, but it is "technical and legal", not political.
- b) That the "continental plateau of the Aegean" is a matter of "definition".
- c) That the problem is one of restricting Greece's territorial waters to 6 and not 12 miles from Greek land, something which openly challenges the existence of a Greek island shelf and violates the Geneva Treaty.

Simultaneously, Turkey demanded NATO intervention - through the appropriate channels (not the Minister of External Affairs but the Minister of Defense) in order to avoid a rupture.

4. Following Greece's original refusal to push the issue except for defining her island and continental shelf, the U.S brought the dispute to NATO in support of Turkey while pressuring Greece to begin talks and bow its head:

- a) On the principle of territorial unity and preservation of her sea power.
- b) To the proposal made on 24.5.74 which delineated the Greek island shelf and the Turkish continental shelf.

The oil companies lobby bore down hard in June, 1974 and Nixon and Kissinger presented the issue to NATO:

- a) At the NATO foreign Ministers' conference where an agreement to begin discussions between the two countries' heads of state was revealed.
- b) On June 26, 74 at NATO heads of State conference in Brussels where Etcevit and Androutsopoulos did not come up with any agreements.

5. In response to Greece's threat of extending its limits from 6 to 12 miles, a move that would solve the Aegean dispute "de jure" no international or disputed waters would exist any longer, the American Turkish-Greek compromise was made known, in July of 74.

- a) Article 5a: Greece will not extend its coastal belt.
- b) That Turkey will cease army exercises and forbid the exploration vessel "Tsanterli" to complete a second mission and take over half of Cyprus according to the Attila II plan:

6. Turkey brings the matter up once more in the beginning of January 1975 immediately after Karamanlis victory and after the incident between Averof who said we will protect the Aegean (12.1.75) and Santsar whose threats had forced Greece to clarify its position.

- a) Greece submits to Kissinger's lackey Eagleton and accepts his proposal on 24-25 January 75 for a "Package Deal" solution of Cyprus and the Aegean.
- b) Greece acknowledges the Aegean question as an "international dispute" with a proposal for international jurisdiction on the 27th of February 1975.
- c) At an extraordinary parliamentary session the 10th of February 1975 the Greek government covers up NATO's role (see section 4 and 5 above) - in the whole matter. On the 2nd of October of 75 the General Press Secretary does not refer to NATO's intervention and formula solution but seeks to shift focus by revealing Turkey's strategy within the NATO and U.S.A scheme.

"The continental shelf issue is not a valid problem in itself but only in conjunction with other issues - so that it will be possible to discuss the broader aspects of the Aegean question".

7. According to the word of the Greek-American agreement Greece recognizes not only that its waters are disputable but America's jurisdiction in the matter as witnessed by Kissinger's announcement calling for a "peaceful settlement without military pressures".

8. Already Greece has appealed to the Security Council without any prospects of concrete justice being meted out, and with the certainty that Greece will have to once more resort to meaningless negotiations, a victory for the U.S "formula of NATO".

DECALOGUE ON THE AEGEAN

(The following announcement of the position of PASOK on the Aegean crisis and Greek-Turkish relations, in general, was issued by the President and the Executive Committee of PASOK, July 30, 1976).

At this critical moment for the nation PASOK, wants to make its position on the "dispute" between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea crystal clear:

1. Greece signed the Geneva Convention in 1958. In accordance with it, our islands have a shelf which is accurately defined. Our island shelf cuts into the mainland continental shelf of Turkey. Turkey did not sign the 1958 convention and consequently, it does not recognize our island shelf as Greek. As for us, for Greece, there is no doubt about our sovereign rights. And this must be made clear once and for all by means of the publication of an official map defining our frontiers.
2. Any country wishing to carry out research may do so on the sea surface beyond our coastal zone. Yet, the research on our shelf (at the bottom of the sea) are of two categories:

The first category is of strictly scientific nature - and bears no relation to the discovery and probable intention of exploiting the underwater wealth. A research of this sort requires the Greek government's prior permission as well as the other country's obligation to announce the scientific results of its research. Under the present circumstances of tension in the relations between us and Turkey, of continuous Turkish provocations and occupation of a part of Cyprus, granting Turkey such a permission is inconceivable - and, consequently, the matter of "scientific" research is non-existent. The second category concerns research which does aim at the exploitation of underwater wealth. Research of this kind directly transgresses the sovereign rights of Greece and is therefore inadmissible.

3. The conclusion is that any research whatsoever carried out by the "Seismic" on our island shelf constitutes a transgression of our sovereign rights. And the response of Greece must be immediate, resolute and hard.
4. The tactics of Turkey - with the guidance of NATO and the U.S

- are to set legal precedents by using the route of "Seismic" in combination with threats, pressure and, simultaneously, by means of creating confusion about the sovereign rights of Greece on the island shelf. Their purpose is to create a climate of Greek tolerance for their so-called "scientific" research - which, in the main, constitutes a transgression of our national territory, and to set a precedent for the Hague. So, we must make it absolutely clear to the Turks that we will not accept any form of "scientific" research on our island shelf.

5. At the same time we must extend our coastal zone to twelve miles - we are entitled to do so on the strength of the international law. This very action once and for all destroys all controversy about the largest and most important part of our island shelf.

6. The resolute attitude of Greece will remove the possibility of a war. Because confusion encourages the opponent to try his luck - this finally leads to confrontation.

7. Since it is known that both the U.S and NATO support the Turkish expansion at the expense of Greece, our attitude towards them should harden resolutely. This remark is independent of the position of PASOK: that Greece must close down the U.S and NATO military bases and withdraw from the Alliance, adhering to a Greek, independent foreign policy.

8. Any vagueness about the "dispute" and the way of our country's reaction in the case of transgression of our national territory, favors the psychological warfare that Turkey is so skillfully carrying out against us and undermines the fighting spirit of our people. Consequently, it is urgent that we make a clear statement to Turkey and the "allies". This is necessary for the creation of a climate of struggle which is indispensable to a warlike contest - a contest which our opponent will avoid, if he knows that we are ready, not only materially but also morally.

9. In order that we cement a unity and fraternity between our people and the armed forces, our national issue should not be used as an argument for the practice of an economic and social policy which squeezes the income of the working people, whereas it increases the income of the foreign and local monopolistic oligarchy.

10. Finally, in order that the unity of the people may be solidified, there must be reconciliation between the state and the citizen - the citizen must regard the state as his own.

The democratization of the state as well as its Hellenization are directly connected with our national struggle.

A NEW ESTABLISHMENT UNDER FORMATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Interview with Andreas Papandreou in Kathimerini, Aug. 24, 1976

Question: Mr. President, do you believe that the Aegean crisis after the violation of the Greek continental shelf by "Seismic 1" can be overcome? Is the possibility of war distant?

Answer: You will allow me to give a different meaning to the word "overcome". At first glance there seem to be two alternative possibilities. One is war. The other, as I stated in parliament during the pertinent discussion, is for Greece to retreat. But there exists a third alternative, a solution, a way in which to overcome the problem. That is for the nation to be well armed, the people so united, and our determination so strong that we can defend all areas where Greeks live so that we avoid war without giving an inch.

I did not mention the third solution immediately following your question because for me this solution demands an enormous effort on the part of the nation, a spirited political leadership and a climate that I don't see on the horizon at this point - which we must strive to create.

I truly feel that the Turks have decided to form a new regime in the Aegean. And I believe that this decision has the backing of the U.S and NATO generally. This new regime raises again for us here in Greece the Eastern question.

Question: What are Turkey's immediate goals?

Answer: This is clear. Co-government or partition of the Aegean continental shelf, co-government of the aerial space and de-militarization of the Aegean.

The second phase - unknown when - consists of taking over the

Aegean islands. One could even specify which islands, but that is not necessary. Thrace will also become an issue, which will become knottier in the near future.

If these are accepted as Turkey's objectives, and we should emphasize that Turkey is directed by its armed forces and at odds with its people on this issue, then there is no question that Greece is facing a deadly danger. And either Greece should be ready to give in without a battle - something I find difficult to imagine, or she should be on the alert for war. I would like to elaborate on the second point. Full alert does not lead necessarily to war. In fact, the only hope of avoiding war is to be ready for it, and Turkey will be forced to revise its goals. Otherwise, when the moment of truth arrives, neither the proper climate and psychological conditioning, nor the iron unity necessary to avoid, or in case of conflict, to win the war will exist.

Question: How would one characterize the Greek-Turkish crisis?

Answer: It would be a mistake to characterize it simply as a Greek-Turkish dispute. There is no doubt that one exists, but it would be incomprehensible for Turkey to advance without covering her soft spots. These have been strengthened first, by open American support and behind the scenes, Western German support, a country that more and more has become America's strong arm in Western Europe.

Second, Turkey needed coverage from the Soviet Union. This, too, she accomplished. The Soviet Union views the situation as a dispute between two NATO countries and therefore it is of secondary importance.

The same cannot be said of its interests in the Cypriot case. That was a case of international stature where the United Nations was the arbitrator. If Greece had not succeeded in de-internationalization I mean if the government had not entered into negotiations with Turkey under Kissinger's auspices. The burden of the present problem lies on those who displaced the issue. From this springs all of today's disputes over Cyprus. It was a tactical mistake of the first degree.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it does not matter whether Turkey wrests islands from Greece or extends its continental

shelf in the Aegean, or takes a piece of Thrace.

Question: Are you saying that the Soviet Union follows a policy of neutrality in the Aegean?

Answer: Not even that, unfortunately. It is a pro-Turkish policy, for a variety of reasons. The first is that she maintains lively and constructive relations with Turkey. Turkey managed to avoid foreign infiltration because it didn't involve itself in wars or face a civil war so that the Truman Doctrine had smaller consequences for her than for us, and thus she can pursue a relatively independent policy within the NATO boundaries. While there is much give and take between the U.S and Turkey, something incomprehensible to the Greek government, at the same time Turkey will shut down America's bases in the midst of negotiations and threatens the U.S daily. On our side we see Kissinger preparing our great defeat at the Security Council while simultaneously the Greek government announces that these remarks that we make are detrimental to the situation. Meanwhile, America performs landing exercises at the climax of Greek-Turkish relations and when chances of conflict with Turkey in the Aegean are great.

Turkey, then, has a certain freedom of movement. The Soviet Union's prime minister visited Ankara. Turkey's prime minister will visit Moscow. There is a totally different climate than the one which exists between Greece and the Soviet Union. In addition, the announcement originating from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece concerning the Soviet Union's ambassador's visits to Greek political leaders (that this was interference in our internal affairs) was an unnecessary statement that yielded nothing. It was in fact an insult.

Aside from this, it should be noted that Turkey has not allowed military installations to be established in its country. It only has information gathering centers and as such does not constitute as big a threat to the Soviet Union as Greece.

Third, Turkey is on the Soviet Union's borders, with a large and growing population. Sooner or later Turkey will play a significant role in the Middle East. The Soviet Union recognizes all this and has no reason to remain neutral in a Greek-Turkish conflict. By supporting Turkey, the Soviet Union advances its own interests.

Question: Does a broader rearrangement scheme in the Mediterranean region exist?

Answer: I believe so. I will complete my last answer and pass on to this question. For similar reasons Turkey has been chosen by the U.S as its organ of control in the Aegean and the power axis (under construction - Turkey, Persia and Israel). It is clear that Turkey will play a major and most likely a primary role. And it is precisely because Turkey is difficult, or pretends to be, that to hold her in your camp you must offer her much. I have emphasized that the odd policy "we belong to the West no matter what" robs us of the right to claim even a few things for our country. The responsibility weighs like an incubus in the brains of the ministers.

You asked a more general question. Yes, a new establishment is being formed in the Mediterranean. I alluded to this in parliament April 17, 1976. This is the famous Sonnerfeld dogma in action. My opinion is that the Soviet Union and the U.S have reached an agreement not to antagonize each other. This is the meaning of detente. Apart from this there are certain rules of competition which are accepted and codified more and more within the game-plan. Each recognizes the right of the other to advance its own interests in certain areas. The means and methods depend on the regions. For instance, Latin America is reserved for the U.S whereas the Soviet Union holds the cards in Eastern Europe.

The Vietnam issue is finished and Russia is the winner. Somewhat free and to a degree unrestricted competition allows both super-powers to have a hand in the pie in Africa. It is here that we should expect the "judgement day" between the powers, but not at the nuclear level. But the area that interests us is possibly the most important and most sensitive to both. Observations lead us to conclude that the Soviet Union is retreating from the Middle East. It allowed Arab unity to be undermined and this created impossible contraction and fertile ground for the U.S. Simultaneously it allowed the obliteration of Lebanon, which is moving towards partition, and an insurmountable defeat of the Palestinian movement, the truest of revolutionary movements in conjunction with liberation in the Mediterranean. The question arises whether all of this had been agreed upon previously. I have concluded that the Soviet Union

was defeated apart from any plan as far as the Middle East goes. The Soviet Union did not manage to assure the Arab countries of adequate protection in case of American intervention. Rejection of the Soviet Union is most manifest in Egypt. Compared to the U.S., the Soviet Union appears to be ponderous and slow in the decision-making process. Its bureaucracy cannot mobilize itself with the acrobatic efficiency of a Kissinger.

Concerning the Aegean one can, I feel, speak of an outline of at least a workable framework between the two superpowers. This framework includes Turkish extension in the Aegean. This to me is clear.

The passage of the Kiev is the key and the Press has made great fuss about it. Turkey certainly expected something in exchange for allowing the Kiev to pass. And she got it. The exchange, in essence was the two positions taken by the Soviet Union. First, that the Aegean dispute must be solved at the table which means - what else - that Greece must give something up. Secondly, that Greece should not extend its Aegean shelf to the 12 mile limit so that the Aegean does not become a "Greek lake".

Question: What do you have to say about that?

Answer: Extending the 12 mile limit is our right, internationally sanctioned, and we are the only country not to put this into effect in the Mediterranean. If along with this decision we allowed free navigation we would not threaten Soviet interests. As an exchange the U.S will allow the Soviet Union to interfere with Yugoslavia to a greater extent than before. In this decision lies the embryo of future problems. Let us not forget that Yugoslavia managed to overcome great difficulties and establish national sovereignty, a very respectable achievement. To some degree this is true of Rumania which is under great pressure to keep in line with Soviet policy. Yugoslavia is under similar pressures.

It is clear to me that in the Balkans and the Aegean there is a new climate between the U.S and the Soviet Union. These are not good omens for Greece. It is not like me to pad or pretty up a situation. This is it.. In this country we've grown accustomed to complaining that nothing will go forward without a protector. We've forgotten the message of our age. This message, from World War II until through

today, is that any country, regardless of its size that decided to take the uphill road towards national independence has succeeded. It achieved this under conditions of general mobilization and a worthy leadership. The powers have learned that interventions cost much and do not rely on them anymore but rather pressure, infiltrate, force, "buy-off", in pursuit of their objectives. If Greece would take note of this, if it would be unyielding, despite a negative climate and in spite of absence of outside support, then it would be successful in achieving national independence.

Question: You travelled to Mytilene, Thrace and Evrow. What were your impressions?

Answer: I was sincerely moved. I was moved by the intense pulse of the people. I found an aggressive, militant and patriotic young and old population. They were dismayed by the way the situation had been handled and realized that Turkey would not dare to spark up a war if it knows we are ready. One would expect to find a fighting spirit in Athens, far from the front lines and fear. There they are psychologically united for the task of protecting their land, and the centers should learn from them.

Question: Mr. President, you have been accused that your slogan "Sink the Hora" was untimely. Mikis Theodorakis said as much in recent statements. Would you like to answer?

Answer: I will answer your question, but not Mikis Theodorakis with whom I refuse to discuss political matters. I will gladly discuss matters of cultural interest but I find it fruitless to discuss anything else with him. You asked about the slogan "Sink the Hora" and I will answer because all the vultures pounced on this with great relish. It was a quote from my speeches in Drama and Alexandroupolis. It must be cleared up that this was placed within the general context of the Aegean and our relations with the Turks, NATO and the U.S.

I am convinced that if the government had defined our borders, published a map of the continental shelf - something explicit according to the Geneva Treaty of 1958 - and thus establishing a precedent consistent with international tradition, and simultaneously announced that any violation of our borders, including seismic exploration, would receive a dynamic answer, and this includes three

- blocking, arresting, sinking - then Turkey would never have dared.

Hence, Turkey had guarantees that Greece would never do any such thing. Except if Turkey had decided to do it in any case. But if this was true, it means Turkey was ready to go to war, and then war would be inevitable no matter what Greece did. The right moment would be then and not after we had already stuck our necks out by a series of retreats and misdirected our people. The words "Sink the Hora" are merely a symbolic sum-up of Greece's stance in the face of provocation.

I am not a military expert and cannot know all the military capabilities available to halt violations of our country. One thing is certain: Only such a position would guarantee as far as possible that there are no losses for the nation.

Let's make the mistake to believe that Turkey will not exploit the fact that it has already moved on our continental shelf. It has set a precedent and all legally involved recognize it. It would be a mistake for Greece to believe that this is a simple trip that the Press - breathed life into it. It is a serious event.

"Sink the Hora" sums up a position. It was symbolic. It could have embodied that form of reaction but also many other forms of reaction, not political or diplomatic. Where we have arrived I don't feel that there are political or diplomatic ways to confront the problem.

I pointed out to the Government that the appeal to the Security Council would be a great historical mistake. And I predicted that the most that we could expect was that they would force us to negotiate, and ask us not to aggravate the situation, which doesn't mean that the Seismic (the Hora) would go away. Unfortunately, my pessimistic predictions were verified. We went to the Security Council which is dominated by the U.S and the Soviet Union. We must have known their positions. There are appropriate and inappropriate psychological moments. In any case the only way to avoid a war is the one I have mentioned. This has not been perceived enough. It is not enough to take dynamic stand. You must get rid of all illusions and deceptions on which you have built a shaky foundation, i.e that the U.S and NATO, are our allies....that the Intelligence (information gathering) bases that the Americans fear here will not

be used against us at a critical moment..... That in the State Department we have pro-Greek people. How is it possible without a new foreign policy which will be the basis for our national independence to even deal with it the problem of our country's integrity? So far our policy of independence and subordination has meant that we did not rule our country politically. From now on we will pay more. We will lose land.

Question: What would you have to propose Mr. President.

Answer: I propose a series of measures some of which are immediate and some long term.

First: The president of Democracy must invite the leaders of the political parties. In this meeting we must attempt to reform our policy for national survival. To the degree that something will not be reformed every party must bear its own responsibility towards history and people. We have reached that point. To the degree that I could determine the program of national survival I would say: It must include certain immediate measures and certain immediate efforts. Possibly each one alone would not hold. One must see everything as a whole. These measures are: extension of the Aegean zone to 12 miles at once. This is our inalienable, legal, and international - right. In this case the Security Council has the authority. In this case we should and we could have gone to the Security Council; on the contrary, we are going to it on the issue of the continental shelf, which is not its responsibility. At the same time an announcement that free navigation is going to be permitted.

There is another solution as well: To extend the Aegean zone to 12 miles everywhere except in two or three places where the Aegean narrows in order for a passage way to exist. In these places the Aegean zone remains at six miles. In this way the problem of circulation has been resolved automatically.

Second: To declare clearly that our islands are not going to be de-militarized.

Third: To make clear that the aerial space of the Aegean is Greek and we are determined to apply our rights.

Fourth: To inform Turkey that we are not going to allow any more violations of our national space and that our reactions when and in

any way we are to judge, are not going to be political and diplomatic basically but dynamic. To give them a minimum time to consider what has to be done.

This is the top of the pyramid. At the second level immediately afterwards is the the immediate withdrawal of the American bases in Greece and in the case of the intelligence bases immediate measures be taken so that they will not be used against our national defense in case of confrontation with Turkey. This is critical because the outcome of modern wars is determined by communications.

At the same time we must move to the procedures for withdrawal from NATO which has led us to disaster. And the most important, most basic, is national mobilization. It must be clear to the political leadership of the country that the survival of the nation takes priority over all. This means that there must be information, awareness and education of the people. At the same time economic measures must be taken to control the activities of the Bunks - especially the foreign Bands - and the multinationals which at a critical moment could undermine the economy of the country, decisively.

Under these conditions I believe that the struggle will succeed. That if there is a possibility of avoiding war it is going to be avoided. Or if there is not it is going to be a victory for us.

DECISION OF SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council of the United Nations
released this statement on Aug. 26, 1976

The Security Council took into consideration the letter of the permanent representative of Greece, dated 10th of August, 1976.

- Having heard and taken into consideration the different opinions that have been set forward in the declarations of the ministers of foreign affairs of Greece and Turkey.
- Expressing its worry over the present tension between Greece and Turkey in relation to the Aegean.
- Taken into consideration the principles of the Constitution of the U.N in relation to the peaceful arrangement of defferences as well as the different regulations of chapter 6 of the

Constitution with reference to the procedure and the means for peaceful arrangement of differences.

- Noticing the necessity of the re-activation and continuation of negotiations between Greece and Turkey for the solution of their differences.
- Being aware of the necessity for both parties firstly, to respect the international interests and obligations of each other and secondly, to avoid every incident that could lead to the deterioration of the situation which, consequently, could put in danger their efforts in the direction of a peaceful solution, the Security Council:
 1. Addresses an appeal to the government of Greece and Turkey to show the greatest possible self-control at the present time.
 2. Advises the governments of Greece and Turkey to do whatever is possible to reduce the present tension in the area, in order to make easier the realization of the negotiations.
 3. Calls the governments of Greece and Turkey to start again direct negotiations on their differences and appeals to them to do whatever is possible to be sure that these negotiations are going to end with solutions that are going to be accepted by both parties.
 4. Calls the governments of Greece and Turkey, in this case to bear in mind that the proper judicial authorities, and especially the International Court, are the appropriate organs to help in the settlement of any kind of unsettled legal differences which (both parties) may notice in relation to their present disagreement.

"OUR WORST FORECAST CAME TRUE"

Statement of the President of PASOK after the
Security Council decision on the Aegean,

Aug. 26, 1976

Unfortunately, our worst forecast has come true. The Security Council under the guidance of the U.S and with the support

of the Soviet Union has dealt with aggressive Turkey and Greece on equal terms when Greece is only concerned with the protection of her national territory. The Government has the duty at this difficult moment to tell the truth to the people. And the truth is that with our recourse to the Security Council, we are obliged to begin negotiations with Turkey - something that Turkey had in mind at the very beginning.

What we will negotiate? Clearly the compromise of the sovereign rights of our country in the Aegean Sea, the continental shelf and our air space. What are we expecting to get from Turkey in exchange?

The "Hora" certainly will continue its so-called seismic investigations on the Greek continental shelf. Not even the cessation of these investigations was secured by the Security Council. In this fashion the "fait accompli" of Turkey is legalized to the detriment of Greece, which will certainly have its consequences at the International Court of the Hague.

What issues will be brought up at the Hague? Perhaps only the issue of the continental shelf? Or also the issue of the demilitarization of the islands of the Aegean?

The government of Greece cannot accept such a decision. It will bear a heavy historical responsibility. And we pre-announce that consistent with the Constitution of 1975, no compromise on the sovereign rights of our country can be made without being approved by the majority of parliament. When the issue is brought to parliament we will insist on a vote by name so that each deputy will be required to take a stand before the people and the nation.