
Thomas W. Gallant
Department of History
University of Florida

Introduction

As an historian addressing the theme of "Greece Prepares for the 21st Century", I must frankly confess to feeling some discomfort; a sentiment, I suspect, shared by many of my colleagues in the historical profession. In his recent Presidential Address to the annual gathering of historians, William E. Leuchtenburg aptly captured the schizophrenia historians feel about becoming involved in the realm of public policy. On the one hand, historians dearly wish to take part in the debates over today’s burning issues, arguing with conviction that "history should cater to the present." On the other hand, we resemble a cat perched in our tree of 'historical objectivity', willing only most reluctantly to be coaxed down to the public realm because of the fear that we shall compromise our commitment, in John Higham’s words, to "tell the truth about the past." In the end, Leuchtenburg concludes, "one can agree that history has value wholly apart from any utilitarian end it serves without accepting the conclusion that historians must refrain from public involvement, and one can acknowledge that historians have an obligation to their community without dismissing the sage admonitions
that the skeptics raise [about the potential pitfalls of doing so]." My contribution to this conference is written in this spirit. I have no pretenses to predict what Greek society will look like in the 21st century, nor to recommend how policy makers should act and react to contemporary social developments. Instead, my purpose is to examine two key areas of society, collective action in the form of the labor movement and more individualistic acts like crime, over the last 40 years and to suggest reasons why they manifest the forms that they do today. In slightly different ways, each can tell us something important about society and social change.

The first question is why select the labor movement and strikes and crime as the means by which to draw broader conclusions about Greek society? In a number of works, the eminent historical sociologist Charles Tilly has demonstrated the centrality of collective action for an understanding of social change over the last few centuries. The keys to its importance are, first, since a number of individuals are involved, their acts enable us to generalize about more widespread motivations and attitudes, and second, because the actions they take are

---

invariably contentious, a study of them necessitates that the role of the state and the legal system must be incorporated. Moreover, Tilly and his various collaborators have repeatedly shown that the labor movement and strike activities afford one of the best measures of collective action. Furthermore, the voluminous body of literature on labor and strikes in Europe, the United States and the developing countries enables us to situate the Greek case into a global context.

An examination of crime as well can tell us much about social change. Though crime is often the activity of individuals acting alone, thus a form of atomistic action, the patterns of criminal activity reflect the behavior of much wider groups in society. Also, how the various sectors of society, the legal system and the state respond to 'criminal' activities provide us with potential insights into social developments far beyond simply the criminal realm. As with labor and strikes, we can call on comparative studies and thus situate crime in Greece into

---

wider framework of analysis. ¹

Before we can fully comprehend what changes in strike activity and crime are telling us or compare the Greek experience to developments elsewhere, we must adopt a theoretical framework of analysis: otherwise we risk sliding into parochial empiricism. I have chosen to employ a variant of modernization theory. In its most robust form this theory has come in for considerable criticism, focussing in particular on its teleological fallacy whereby all development will logical end with culture looking very much like the developed western world. I accept fully this critique. However, in its weaker version, modernization theory can provide us with a useful heuristic device for categorization or a yardstick against which we can measure developments in any specific culture. How the theory will be applied will be clarified in the introductory section to the accounts on strikes

and crime respectively.\(^4\)

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the first analytical section I discuss the development of the labor movement since the late 1940s. I begin by examining the evolution of labor law; I turn next to an assessment of the institutional framework of labor organization and then to patterns of strike activity from 1950 until April 1992. Finally, I compare the Greek experience to those of other parts of Europe, suggesting reasons both for the similarities and the differences between the Greek trade union movement and those elsewhere. Some conclusions are drawn about the position of labor as a mechanism for collective action. In the second part I turn to crime. Once more, I commence by examining the legal framework. Next, I examine how the crime rates have and are changing over time, paying attention to specific categories of crimes. I then analyze crime in relation to age, gender, and geographical location. I conclude by once more placing the Greek case into a broader comparative situation.

1. Collective Action: Unions and Strikes

1.1 The Legal Framework

"Law has almost invariably played a central role in the formation, reproduction, and discipline of wage workers and of the working class." The

correctness of Francis Snyder and Douglas Hay's proposition has been made abundantly clear by a spate of recent studies. In his work on trade unions in the United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, for example, William Forbath demonstrates that the courts and the legal system exerted very powerful influences on the union movement and that one cannot begin to analyze the development of labor organization in the US without a full understanding of the legal framework. What I intend to do in the sections which follow is to sketch out the evolution of labor law in Greece since the late 1940s, paying particular attention to how legal changes affected the rules for collective bargaining and the freedoms or restrictions placed on strikes.

1.1.1 Post-war reconstruction and the role of the United States

A key component of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) was the labor relations group headed by Clinton Golden and his assistant Alan Strachan. As Adamantia Pollis and others have pointed out, AMAG was instrumental in perpetuating and indeed consolidating a system of labor
organization and labor relations which was essentially clientist and statist. In the ideological struggle to create non-leftist unions, the greater goal of creating a labor movement which would serve the interests of workers was sacrificed.

Moreover, in terms of labor law, the period of AMAG influence witnessed the greater inclusion of the judiciary in labor disputes. Many laws still on the books dated back to the Metaxas dictatorship, while other more recent ones gave the judiciary the power to regulate free association and freedom of action. From the start of the post-war period, then, the trade union movement resembled more an appendage of the state than it did a collective interest group of workers. As Kofas concluded: "The Greek labor movement underwent experiences similar to those of trade-union movements in other underdeveloped countries during the early Cold War. Labor centrals of most underdeveloped countries failed to pursue an independent course, and were manipulated from the top down by ruling parties and international organizations." This was to shape its development over the next 40 years in powerful ways. However, invoking the immediate post-war experience as the seminal force shaping labor relations during the recent past would be a mistake. Labor relations during the late 1940s and early 1950s in both Germany and Italy closely resembled the system in Greece, it was only later that they began to traverse down divergent paths. Thus, in order to understand the system in

1.1.2 1950-1967: Tightening the Bonds

During the period from about 1950 until the coup d’etat by the Junta, a number of major legal reforms were enacted which in many ways tightened the bond between the state and the labor movement and kept it under the paternalistic hand of the state.

On the one hand, the government sought legitimacy for its policies of by final ratifying a number of important conventions of the International Labor Organization charter. Some of the more important of these were No.87 (the convention on the Freedom of Association and Protection if the Right to Organize...
and Collective Bargaining) and no. 98 (the Right to Organize and Collective
Bargaining Convention). The importance of these two conventions centers on the
issue of the right to collective bargaining, and while the Greek state did appreciate
the need to recognize these international conventions it also enacted legislation to
control the processes by which those rights were exercised.

The right to undertake collective bargaining as a means of resolving work
related grievances and demands (e.g., fringe benefits, holidays, pensions, health
provisions and the like) stands at the heart of industrial relations. Without free,
fair, and open collective bargaining, nearly all of the other rights of workers are
meaningless. As Theodore B. Koniaris has emphasized, collective "bargaining is a
major contribution to the idea of democracy and equality in labor relation." No
system of national labor relations is completely autonomous; in each country there
is a dialectical struggle over the degree of centralization versus decentralization.
Across Europe there are substantial differences in collective bargaining. Thus, in
Germany the system is more decentralized while in Italy greater central control
characterizes the system. Yet in both, the precise role of the state and the courts
is circumscribed. For Greece, it has been asserted that "the whole institutional
framework of collective agreements/disputes is highly inflated, complex and
inflexible and concomitantly allowing for excessive government intervention." In
particular, the judiciary was given a major role during the period between 1950

and 1967. The most important piece of legislation regarding collective bargaining was Law 3239/1955.

Law 3239/1955, though later supplemented by additional legislation, was the linchpin to industrial relations in Greece because it shaped the process of collective bargaining. For our purposes the most important articles of the act were the following: a) it established the nature of the collective bargain as "a contract ... which regulates working conditions for the members of these organizations, by defining the terms, the conditions and the remuneration of work." b) it formally stipulated that only workers' associations which had been legally recognized could conclude valid agreements; c) it defined four categories of collective contracts distinguished by the size of the associational unit and/or the occupation involved; d) the act provided for compulsory arbitration of disputes in Administrative Arbitration Courts. In theory, point "a" is extremely important, but as we have seen, many of the items listed there were established by law and so little scope was left for collective bargaining. "b" placed into the hands of the judiciary enormous discretionary power to bestow or withdraw recognition of an contentious workers' association. "c" allowed for fragmentation of workers'

---

demands and could inhibit collective action. "d" was the most critical because it
defbarred unions from effectively representing their members through the use of
collective action. Furthermore, since the various arbitration boards were
established and constituted by the Ministry of Labor and since the state was a
major employer (thus standing in the role of both contestant and 'neutral'
arbator), the entire process was in the hands of the state, thereby transforming
the bargaining role of the union into one more resembling governmental lobbying
group than an independent negotiating agent.9

The right to strike continued to be recognized throughout the period of
interest here. There were certain restrictions imposed, however. Law 3239/1955
mandated that no strikes or lockouts take place while the dispute is in arbitration,
and article 18 provided for severer penalties for any violation of this ban. The
courts also imposed limitations on the potential for strike activity; for example,
Ariopagos decision number 495/1966 stated that only lawfully established and
recognized trade unions could strike.10

The changes in law labor during the period from 1950 to 1967 bound the

Relations in the 1980s." Comparative Labor Law Journal. 11 (1990), 299;
Koniaris, op. cit., 46-47, 49, 172; Katsanevas, op. cit., 112-119; Golomazou-Papas,
Calliope: "The General Confederation of Workers of Greece: A Case od an
Intermediary within an Authoritarian Licensed Corporatist Practice?" Greece on the
Road to Democracy: From the Junta to PASOK 1974-1986. editor. Speros

trade union movement ever-more closely to the state and stunted the development of an industrial relations system which would have acted on behalf of the working class. As Chris Tzekinis aptly observed: "The situation of the labor movement, as it developed over the period 1955-1965, clearly showed once again all of the weaknesses of the movement." 11

1.1.3 Labor under the Junta

Not surprisingly, under the dictatorship of the Colonels the position of trade unions deteriorated. In terms of labor law, the period witnessed a complete monopolization of labor by the state. Two mechanisms were employed to ensure that total control. The first was directly through constitutional articles and the second was by legislative decree. Article 19 of the Constitution of 1968 placed stringent restrictions on the right of free association. "Any association of persons whose aim is, or whose activity is directed against, the preservation of the existing boundaries of the State, or against the existing regime, or against the existing social order, security of the State, or the political or personal liberties of the people is prohibited." The same article in paragraph 5 prohibited any strike which was motivated by 'political aims' or any goals other than those of assisting the material and moral interests of the workers was prohibited. The scope of both of these for hamstringing union activities is self-evident. Finally, a constitutional article stipulated that all public employees and employees of enterprises proclaimed a

"legal entity of public law" were debarred from union membership. Legislatively, decree 186/1969 essentially removed the right of unions to engage in collective bargaining; for example, the GSEE was deprived of its right to undertake wage agreements on a national scale and all cases of negotiations would be heard by a government appointed Permanent Labor Arbitration Court. Finally, what the Junta could not accomplish with law, it did with brute force by arresting thousands of trade unionists and dissolving hundreds of unions. The period of the Junta was dark indeed for trade unions and industrial relations generally.12

1.1.4 Restoration of labor rights, 1974-1980

The restoration of democracy in 1974 marked the start of a new chapter in the history of labor relations in Greece. This is not to imply that there were not significant hold-overs from previous years. The state, for example, has remained a pro-active, interventionist agent and Greek trade unions remained far more closely tied to the state than in other European countries. Nonetheless, some of the groundwork for union modernization were laid down.

The National Constitution of 1975 contains a number of articles which relate to unions. Article 12 para. 1 enshrines the right of citizens to form free associations in general and unions in particular. Article 23 carries this recognition

one step further: "The State shall adopt due measures safeguarding trade union freedom and the unhindered exercise of related rights against any infringement thereon within the limits of law." In addition, the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike are both constitutionally protected (in articles 22 and 23 respectively). Each of these articles also stipulated restrictions on activities, by limiting the union membership among some groups, by curtailing the right to strike for certain occupations, and by preempting the need for collective bargaining through legislative determination of key workplace conditions.13

Over the next few years, a number of decrees were passed which further curtailed the union movement. The process for collective bargaining, for example, was refined but law 3239/1955 still remained at the heart of the system, and so compulsory arbitration continued to be enforced. Law 330/1976 went beyond the control mechanisms embedded in the constitution for defining and shaping union activities (it was later abolished). In particular, this law in conjunction with article 458 of the Civil Code laid down restrictions on strike activities; especially opprobrious to labor activists was the section which made strikes called for

'political' purposes illegal and which called for severe sanctions against such strikes.

The end result of the legislative program devised and implemented between 1974 and the beginning of the PASOK government in 1981 was the establishment of a labor relations system which still bound unions tightly to the government and which consequently inhibited the potential role of these organizations in defining and fighting for workers' rights and a betterment of their material situation. Government paternalism over the unions remained in tact.

1.1.5 Labor under PASOK:

PASOK came to power promising the reform the labor laws so as to better protect workers. This move was to be a major part of their "contract with the people" to "eliminate the exploitation of man by man." A tall order indeed and one which remained unfulfilled in spite of some significant steps in the right direction. PASOK's labor reforms have provided a number of key mechanisms by which trade unions may be able to obtain greater freedom of action and thus, in my view, provide for more equitable labor relations.

The keystone to the PASOK reforms was law 1264/1982. This is a long and complicate piece of legislation, and I shall only comment on its most salient provisions. In broad terms, the law dealt with both how unions would be organized internally and with how unions may operate. Before this legislation, many unions selected their leaders through a majoritarian electoral system whereby the group
which received the most votes would be able to select all of the members of executive councils. 1264/1982 changed this by requiring unions to adopt a representative electoral system: "the ultimate purpose of this provision is to promote the unity of the union movement" by forcing factions to coalesce and in order to obtain a majority vote. The law also affected the ability of unions to strike. It made the calling of a strike easier by broadening the purposes for which a strike may be called, by prohibiting the use of preliminary court injunctions, by allowing sympathy strikes, and by extending the scope for strikes against multinational corporations. In addition, the law forbade the use of the lockout and the practice of hiring strike-breakers by employers. The law did, however, restrict the rights of certain public sector unions to strike. Nevertheless, the major thrust of 1264/1982 represented a major step forward in Greek labor relations.14

The gains enshrined in 1264/1982 were curtailed by the passing of

1365/1983, in particular by the infamous Article 4 on strikes. In an editorial, entitled "The Andreas Fault--- or How to be a Socialist Union-basher," The Economist opined the following: "Those who thought of Andreas Papandreou, Greece's Prime Minister, as a typical left-wing Socialist had better look at the bill he presented to parliament this week. Designed to impose severe restrictions on the right of public-sector workers to go on strike, it is much more radical than the mild limitations on trade unions proposed by Mrs. Thatcher in Britain." Among the restrictions set out in the bill was the need for a 50% + 1 strike vote of all union members, and even if that occurred, a tripartite panel (containing representatives of the state, labor and management) had to approve the vote. Public sector employees were severely hampered in their ability to strike. (This clause was eventually abolished in 1988.) Other legislation perpetuated governmental paternalistic control of labor relations. 1346/1983, for example, mandated many of the issues that should ideally be left to collective agreements, e.g., work-place conditions, holidays, and the like. The ATA (Automatic Index Adjustment) on wages, in both its pre-austerity and austerity forms, took away one of the most crucial matters to be mediated between labor and management. 15

In the end, the PASOK agenda on labor law did establish some key elements which are going to be essential for the development of a fully modern,

15. The Economist. May 28, 1983, 63; Koukiadis, ibid. 718-744; Koniaris, ibid. 48, 63; Koukoulis and Tzannetakos, ibid. 100-103; Spourdalakes, ibid. 230.
autonomous system of trade unionism. Nonetheless, the historical record also shows that in spite of those gains, PASOK's policies perpetuated the role of the pro-active interventionist state and both formally and informally their actions kept the unions in a clientist position vis-a-vis the state.

1.1.6 Recent developments

Since 1989, there have been a number of important developments in labor law. We have seen that collective bargaining is one of the central pillars of any labor relations system and that in Greece the legal framework for collective bargaining remained tightly controlled by the state. Committee discussions on proposals for reform of the law (which was still based largely of 3239/1955) were begun in 1987 by PASOK. The finished product was to have been submitted in 1989, but of course, political factors intervened. A modified version of the bill was finally debated and passed under the guidance of the Zolotas government in February 1990. The new law established that both parties in a dispute had to bargain in good faith with the intention of solving the dispute, even if the dispute extended to issues relating to the operation of the relevant enterprise. The bill further sets out a much more fair system of arbitration and mediation in case the negotiating process breaks down. In the view of one analyst: "It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of ...reform for the structure of collective bargaining and arbitration in Greece. It is a big step forward towards the emancipation of the
Greek industrial relations from the powerful grasp of the state...”

Since taking power in April of 1990, the New Democracy government of Konstantinos Mitsotakis has passed a number of decrees having an impact on labor relations. The most important of these was law 1915/1990. This law further restricts the right to strike, granting courts the authority to determine whether a strike is legal or not. Workers who continue to strike illegally can be dismissed without the right of appeal. The law also gives management the power to determine and impose a minimum requirement for the maintenance of 'essential services' during a strike. Workers who do not stay on as skeleton staff can be dismissed. Essential service designation was extended to cover all public utilities, civil aviation, public transport, computer information services and import/export activities.

Recent legislative changes have acted to perpetuate the state control of labor relations and to continue the pro-active interventionist role of the state.

1.1.7 Popular Attitudes to the Labor Law Code

Laws are only effective if they enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of the governed. Consequently, it is important to know what popular attitudes are toward the various labor laws. The only survey data which I have been able to find on this issue are published by Ilias Daskalakis and his co-workers in their work on crime.

They asked a sample of 400 people in 1978 the following questions and received the following results:

1. Should it be illegal for strikers to prevent strike-breakers from entering the workplace? 57% stated that the strikers should not be punished, while 35% thought that they should. Among those who considered themselves to be politically right, the figures shift to 48% against punishment and 44% for it, while for those who consider themselves to be leftist, the figures were 75% against and only 18% for punishment.

2. Should it be illegal for workers to be dismissed for union activities? People from all political persuasions believed that it should be illegal by figures ranging from 72% of those on the right to 82% of those on the left.

3. Should it be illegal for an employer to hire strikebreakers? Again, all sectors were in agreement in their opposition to the hiring of strikebreakers: rightist: 63% for, 29% against; centrists: 67% for, 26% against; leftists: 82% for and 14 against.

4. Should it be illegal for strikers to occupy the workplace during the course of a strike? On this question, there was a sharp division between respondents based on their political affiliation. Those on the right felt by a margin of 48% to 43% that strikers should not allowed to occupy the workplace; those on the left held the
opposite view by a margin of 65% to 29%\textsuperscript{18}.

Whether popular opinion today is the same as it was in 1977 is an open question. Nonetheless, what the survey suggests is that the trade union movement enjoyed widespread support among the mass of Greek society regardless of their political views and that labor law reforms which violated these cultural norms would not enjoy popular support. Clearly the attitudes expressed in the survey would have an important impact on workers' collective action in general and on strikes in particular, and it is to the subject of strikes that we turn next.

1.2 Strike activity: general characteristics

Strikes are an extremely important form of collective action in any industrial society and they are also one of the main means by which workers' associations can exert pressure on employers so as to force collective bargaining.\textsuperscript{19}

1.2.1 Chronological picture

I have tried to assemble as complete as possible a record of strikes and lockouts in Greece from 1950 until the present. To date, I have employed official statistics compiled by the International Labor Organization and by the National Statistical Service of Greece. The sequence is not complete; there is major gap during the period of the Junta and from 1988 until today. For the latter, I have


\textsuperscript{19} Shorter and Tilly, \textit{op.cit.}, 8.
tried to compensate somewhat by utilizing newspaper accounts of industrial unrest. My analyses so far suggest that it will be very valuable to include both types of sources; the official record helps to give the "big picture" while the newspaper accounts provide detailed information about the causes of the action and often newspapers report small strikes or stoppages which do not appear in the official statistics. My work in this area is incomplete. I am thus in the process of compiling a data-base of industrial disputes in Greece from ca. 1900 to 1991 through the use newspapers. As with the discussion in much of this paper, the observations made here must be seen as tentative working hypotheses.

1.2.2 Characteristics of strikes and how did they change over time

We can begin by examining the total number of strikes recorded per year. These data are presented in Figure 1. We can draw a number of inferences. First, during the 1950s, strikes were comparatively few, reflecting perhaps both the effectiveness of government control and the changing economic conditions of the time. Toward the middle of the 1960s strikes became more frequent as the economic development of the post-war reconstruction period slowed and as wages continued to lag well behind
increases in price and productivity. In the post-Junta era, two peak years stand out, 1976 and 1982. In 1976, it would seem that the fear of political instability which might be caused by collective action had ebbed while new grievances in the form of low wage hikes and unpopular proposed changes in the labor laws (discussed previously) led to a number of strikes; some, like the general strike of late May, involved huge numbers of strikes and even violent confrontations between strikers and the police. The large number of strikes in 1982 seem also to be associated with political activities in the area of labor law. There was a diminution in strikes after the passage of the initial PASOK reforms, but the level rose after the introduction of the austerity program. While no hard data are presented for the period after 1988, an examination of newspaper reports suggests that the number of strikes rose but not appreciably.

A simple measure of the number of strikes per year is insufficient for us to gauge the real impact of these actions. To do this, we need to consider as well the duration of strikes and the number of strikers involved. Figure 2 compares the average number of strikers per strike with the average number of man-days lost per strike. As the figure shows,
there is not a direct correlation between the two, suggesting that one is telling us about the size of the participating group while the other tells us about the duration of the action.

A rather different pattern appears than when we examined only the crude number of strikes. The period from 1950 to 1967 does show the same relative stability and the peak in the 1960s does appear but it is not as pronounced. On the whole strike action over this period tended to involve relatively few people and last only a short time. After the restoration of democracy the pattern changes and strike activity became more volatile. 1976, though second highest in the number of strikes, on this scale appears unexceptional; the strikes that year were short and only a few involved large numbers. The late 1970s saw rise both in the size of the number of strikers and in the duration of strikes, suggesting that the labor law reforms of mid-decade had had an impact and that union organization had jelled. The period also witnessed increasing worker disillusionment with conservative rule. During the 1980s, there was a fall off in both numbers and duration until the PASOK austerity program was implemented. After that two dominant modes of collective action appear. In one, seen best in 1986 and 1987, there were a few very large strikes, involving hundreds of thousands of individuals, and while the average number of man-hours lost also rose to higher levels than ever before, the relative increase was not as great. The second pattern, exemplified by 1988, seems to involve fewer numbers of strikers per action, but longer strikes. For the
period after 1988, newspaper accounts certainly give the impression that second
pattern seems to hold with strikes of between 24 to 48 hours but involving over
100,000 strikers. Certainly more sustained episodes did occur, such as September
1990; more common, however are the short, large bursts like last March. In order
to see the implications of these developments it is necessary to compare the
pattern of strike activity in Greece with the rest of Europe

1.3 Comparison between Greece and the rest of Europe

Throughout the post-war period Greece has manifested lower overall levels
of workers' collective action than other European countries. By any measure,
England, France German, Italy and Belgium, for example, have all witnessed more
vigorous strike action by larger numbers of workers, in spite of the fact that
Greece has a higher ratio of union membership among its labor force, especially in
the public sector. The cause of this lay, it seems to me, with the much greater
centralized control exerted by the state in Greece and the legal framework it
devised to ensure that control. A more interesting picture from our perspective
appears if we examine the trend in strike activity over time. During the immediate
post-war period and through to the mid-1960s Greece manifested neither the
volume nor the volatility of strike activity that the rest of Europe did. The obvious
clamp down by the dictatorship meant that the European-wide strike wave of the
late 1960s completely passed it by. During the 1980s, however, Greece looks very
different: while the rest of Europe, with the exception of Spain, was experiencing
declining trends in industrial unrest, the size of the average strike, the number of strikes, and the duration of strikes all rose in Greece. 20

1.4 Labor and Unions in Post-war Greece

"A challenger, to be effective, needs organization. And if the French working classes were to engage successfully in the contest for power, they would need organizations to pry loose time, money and commitment from small clusters of workers... the building of these organizations constituted the great mobilization of the working classes." In this way Shorter and Tilly introduce their discussion of the rise and development of unions in France. While its future may be in doubt, historically in the modern (or modernizing) industrial world, the trade union movement has provided the organizational force for mobilizing the working class. The importance of the movement transcends its ostensible role as the agent for securing work-place improvements and better wages to include the very important function of helping workers to see themselves, in some senses at least, as a self-identifying class. In broader terms, free, autonomous associations of workers have played and will continue to play an key part in the production and reproduction of

Consequently, I would argue that the stunted development of trade unionism in Greece has inhibited the formation of a "modern" society. By keeping the movement under strict control successive governments have kept unions from performing those important functions described above. The changes in the legal framework and the persistence of popular support for the unions have enabled them to become more of a force during the decade of the 1980s. The ability of unions to organize and effect collective action in the form of strikes has clearly been enhanced by these changes, as our analysis of strikes demonstrated. As Roger Geary has shown for England, constituitionalism, organizational autonomy, and the existence of democratic civil liberties are critical factors underpinning the ability of unions to act collectively. Only recently have these elements come to the fore in Greece. It seems to me that there should be even more freedom of action given to the union movement: the powerful hand of the state needs to be lifted. As the recent past and history suggest, such a move may well result in greater contention in the short term, but in the long term, it will allow the union movement to develop into the social force needed of a modern European country looking toward the 21st century.

1.5 Prospects for the future research.

1.5.1 We need to explore the interaction of labor law and collective
action over much longer periods of time. The analysis needs to be taken back at least to the early part of this century.

1.5.2 The problems, theories and techniques of the new labor history and its associated field of new social history need to be applied to the empirical data from Greece. Among the issues that need to be explored historically are the ways union membership affected people's lives, class perceptions, and the workplace in which they spend so much of their time. The role of the union has to be historically situated in Greek society.

1.5.3 More anthropologically orientated studies of the meaning which union membership and union activities in contemporary society and of how labor as a process has helped shape Greek culture.

2. Atomistic Actors: Crime in Greece

2.1 Crime and modernization

Much has been written lately about the possible impact of social structural and economic changes on the levels and types of criminal activities manifest in a society. In a recent, provocative study, Louise Shelly has argued strongly for the importance of modernization as the driving force behind changes in criminality. She develops the theme further by emphasizing that none of the seven main theoretical frameworks (e.g., relative depravation, differential association, anomie and opportunity theory to name only a few) for accounting for changing patterns of criminality are sufficient and that modernization is the only one which can
encompass the others and provide a satisfactory explanation. In emphasizing modernization, she is following in the mainstream of criminology as it pertains to the developing world. This line of argument has come in for severe criticism, particularly by Colin Sumner. While accepting the main part of his critique, I still feel yield Shelley's model does provide us with some yardsticks by which to assess and to categorize for comparative purposes patterns of criminality.\(^{22}\)

Shelley identifies a distinct pattern of behavior in some countries which she calls the 'developing nations' pattern and another termed the 'developed nations' pattern. She categorizes nations into one group or the other on a basis of an examination of: 1) shifts in the types of crimes committed and their relative magnitude; 2) shifts in the age and gender composition of the criminally active population; 3) the geographical locus of crime. Since this is a sequential schema, there should be a connection between the two patterns as the developing mode leads into the developed mode, thus suggesting that the distinction may be more one of calibre than of kind.

The primary characteristics of crime in developing countries are:

1) crimes against the person decrease while crimes against property skyrocket after an initial phase wherein both increase ("rising theft epitomizes the advent of industrialization");

2) overall, however, the crime rate should be less than in developed countries (on average, she found that rates per 100,000 were 40% of those rates recorded in developed countries);

3) crime rates amongst juveniles and women should begin to rise, slowly at first and then more rapidly later;

4) new forms of crime should appear and other, older crimes should become more prominent, like prostitution;

5) crime should become concentrated in crimogenic areas like cities.

This model is based on studies of crime and violence in Europe and America during the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries. During those phases of industrialization and urbanization crime rates soared precipitously, but then after a period of time, they fell to lower levels and crime took on a different profile. Various explanations have been proposed to account for the rise of crime. The primary ones are: social disorganization theory whereby individuals find themselves in a situation where the previous rules of culture-bound behavior have loosened and thus there is a lose of social control which crime more likely; anomie theory which postulates that people in the new urban environment and impersonal industrial workplace become estranged from society because of their inability to attain desired goals through socially approved means; opportunity theory states that crime increased because the new urban and workplace environments create new
and different opportunities for crime than were found in rural settings. These are only some of the explanations proposed, and there is still debate over their relative merits. A number of explanations have been proposed to account for the decline in crime as well. The most popular of these argues that with time new migrants became acculturized to the urban situation and this exerted a 'civilizing' influence on them. I shall return to these theories in section 2.5. 

In the developed countries, the following holds:

1) crimes against property far outstrip crimes against the person;

2) crime rates continue to increase but at a slower rate ("Developed countries are still experiencing growing crime rates, but the rate of increase has slowed considerably since the initial stages of the development process.");

3) while the vast majority of offenders remains adult males, in developed countries, females and juveniles assume a larger role and manifest "rapidly ascending rates of crime." And in the case of women, they tend commit a more diverse range of offenses (including more economic crime as women in larger numbers enter the business world and the market-place for the first time; the old female offenses of prostitution, shop-lifting, theft, and prostitution continue to be recorded as well);

4) vehicular offenses and drug-related crimes continue to rise, and a new range of crimes such as white-collar, "economic" crimes and environmental crimes should appear and increase precipitously;

5) a new criminal element, that of migrants, appears;

6) the locus of crime in the developed world is different, being still dominated by crimogenic urban zones but with suburban and rural areas contributing as well.

This model depends heavily on the work of criminologists and is derived from studies of the recent past. Over time in the developed world, it appears that distended, reversed "J-curve", which depicted crime during the nineteenth century becomes more of a "U-curve" with crime rates, in the manner discussed above, ascending once more beginning during the immediate post-war period. The historically documented pattern of crime in Europe and America consists of a period of increase during the nineteenth
century followed by a decline and then an upswing beginning during the
1950s which continues today. In addition to the theories discussed above,
some additional ones have been proposed to account for rising crime in the
developed countries. Krahn and his associates regressed a large number of
variables against crime rates from a range of countries and found that
income inequality in conjunction with population growth proved to be the
best predictor of crime. Others, like Hansmann and Quigley, consider social
heterogeneity to be more important, and some, Messner for example, still
consider social disorganization to be the best predictor. And as we have
seen, Shelley consider all of these to be subordinate to her protean notion of
modernization.²⁴

In the remainder of the paper, I wish to examine the data from Greece in

²⁴ Shelley, ibid., 69-81; Wilson and Herrnstein, ibid., 410-438;
Gurr, Ted R. "Crime Trends in Modern Democracies since 1947." International
Annals of Criminology 16.(1977): 41- 85; Krohn, Marvin D. "Inequality,
Summer (1976): 303-313; Krahn, Harvey, Timothy F. Hartnagel and John W.
Gartell. "Income Inequality and Homicide Rates: Cross-national Data and
Criminological Theories." Criminology 24.2 May (1986): 269-295; Hansmann,
Henry B. and John M. Quigley. "Population Heterogeneity and the Sociogenesis of
Homicide." Social Forces 61.1 September (1982): 206-224; Hagan, John and
Messner, Steven F. "Regional and Racial Effects on the Urban Homicide Rate: The
Subculture of Violence Revisited." American Journal of Sociology 88.5 March
(1983): 997-1007; Messner, Steven F. "Societal Development, Social Equality,
and Homicide: A Cross-national Test of a Durkheimian Model." Social Forces 61.1
light of the above models. I shall first discuss the empirical data and elucidate some patterns which we can discern in them. After that I present as possible explanations a number of hypotheses focusing around the themes of industrialization, urbanization, and gender roles. In regard to the modernization theory, the results of the analyses suggest that Greece does not fit neatly into either model, but instead manifests certain features of both. This could be due to: a) the models being flawed; b) Greece being in a transitional phase between the two; c) the Greek case being truly unique, or d) some combination of the above. I begin with a discussion of the general crime rate.

2.2 Crime rates over time and by categories

The first point to be made concerns the behavior of the overall crime rate as expressed in a ratio per 100,000 persons provides no further illumination because the rate in Greece falls distinctly between the mean among developing nations (of around 800) and the developed nations (measuring around 4000-5000). The rate in Greece had a mean of just over 3000. The figure for Greece is an average for the period in question. We also need to compare the trend of crime in order to see if Greece is following the same pattern.
as elsewhere. Figure 3 suggests that like most of the developed world Greece has experienced a rise in crime over the recent past. As was discussed above, in many areas, the upturn in crime commenced during the 1950s. In Greece, there seems to be a lag; I base this on a back projection of the 1970s data. Obviously this is only a very tentative supposition, and consequently what I need to do is to verify or refute it on the basis of data from the earlier period. I would propose as a working hypothesis, however, that there was a delay in the onset of greater criminal activity. 25

We can turn now to the question of the crime rate and the categories of crimes committed. Figure 4 presents data on the types of crimes committed in Greece between 1972 and 1986 by category. The figures shown here are the mean number of offenses recorded. The Department of Justice in their official publication specifies 10 categories of indictable offenses; these are presented in Table I. The first five consist of violations of the penal code and include offenses such as crimes of violence (homicide, grievous bodily harm and the like), crimes against honor, against property and violations of public (riot

25. Archer and Gartner; Gurr;
and vagrancy). The second five consist of catch-all categories, violations of the labor laws and market regulations. If we remove the catch-all category of "Any other offenses" than the two most prevalent categories of crime are motor vehicle infractions and violations of economic and market laws. This pattern fits best with the 'developed' model; however, contrary to the expectation set up by that model, crimes against property are extremely low (only 4.5%), while crimes against the person remain high at 12.3%.

In terms of the projected rate of growth, on Figures 5 and 6, I show the results of linear trend analysis of the crime rate, and far from slowing down, the overall rate of crime in Greece appears to be rising, and rising at a relatively steep rate. A feature more characteristic of the developing model. The anomalousness of Greece remains when we examine the projected rates of growth of crimes by categories. Crimes against the person and against property are both falling at a sharp rate (a feature contrary to both models), while market and economic offenses and vehicular offenses demonstrated marked tendencies toward
increasing. In terms of the categories of crimes being committed in Greece what we see is a trend toward much greater frequency in the commission of the economic crimes characteristic of developed, industrialized countries, such as motor vehicle offenses and white-collar crimes—embezzlement, tax evasion, fraud, forgery, smuggling, and swindling.

2.3. The Geography of Crime: Urbanization

As discussed earlier much of criminological literature places great emphasis on the geography of crime and on the role of urbanization. The data reported in the official organs are aggregated into ten spatial units: Athens, Central Greece, the Peloponnesos, the Ionian Islands, Epeiros, Thessaly, Makedonia, Thrake, the Aegean and Krete. According to both models, the urban areas, in this case Athens and Thessaloniki, should be the two primary crimogenic zones. And indeed, in terms of the total number of crimes committed, they do predominate; Athens
manifested a mean annual average between 1972 and 1986 of 39,626 offenses while Makedonia comes in a distant second with an annual mean of 21,204. Urbanity and thus modernization appear to be important factors. However, if we measure the rate of crime per 100,000 (thus measuring the numbers of crimes per person) and the degree of urbanization based of the percentage of the population recorded as "Urban" in the 1981 census, then a very different picture appears.

The administrative areas aggregated as Central Greece manifested the highest rate of crime (over 1400 offenses per 100,000 inhabitants), yet it is one of the least urbanized areas, being in fact the third most rural area. Equally stark in its disconformity to the expected pattern is Makedonia, which in spite of being the second most urban area has the third lowest crime rate. There does not appear to be the level of correlation in Greece between the crime rate and the degree of urbanization that we would have expected based on the comparative literature. I shall return to this point in section 2.5 and propose an hypothesis which may account for this lack of correlation between urbanity and crime. But first I want to examine the patterns of criminal behavior when we focus on age distribution and
gender.

2.4 By age and gender

Another element of the modernization model focusses on the age and gender of criminals. Turning first to the question of gender. In Greece, the overwhelming preponderance of all crimes is committed by men by a rate of 91.8% to 8.2%. These figures approximate more the rates in developing rather than developed countries, reflecting perhaps the continued existence of certain mechanisms of gender control available to men in Greece. Figure 8 presents the relevant data broken down by gender and age over the period 1972-1986. The data here show only the actual numbers of crimes committed by members of each cohort; they could be misleading because the number of individuals per cohort varies and the cohorts are not of equal duration. Additional analyses were thus undertaken to adjust the results in order to compensate for these problems.

The age pattern among men closely approximates the developed model when we adjust the data for cohort size and duration. (Figure 9). Few crimes were committed by the youngest, those 13 to 17. But there is a very sharp
increase among 18 to 20 year olds; in fact they manifested the second highest rate of crime. There is a slight fall-off among those in their early 20s, followed by the peak period of criminality which occurs among the two cohorts of men between 25 and 35 years of age, and there is a sharp fall off after mid-40s. The dip during the early 20s is puzzling and I suspect that it may be a statistical anomaly, but more research is required on this point.

The pattern among women is markedly different. There is a very low incidence of crime among female juveniles. Also, there does not appear to be the same sharp fluctuations by age cohort among women as there is a among men. In fact the curve for women forms a perfect bell-shaped pattern. But notice that the peak for women is significantly higher for women than for men. Among men, the peak periods were recorded for the 17-20 and the 25-30 year old cohorts, but among women, the two peak periods occur with women
in the 30 to 35 and the 35 to 44 year old cohorts. Note also the very rapid drop-off after the mid-40s. Female criminality follows a rather different age distribution pattern than that for men.

Concerning the project trend of criminal behavior, it appears from the Trend Analyses that the rate of crime amongst both men and women is increasing. Figure 11 depicts crimes committed by men and women over time fitted to an exponential line; using techniques of time series analysis, I then show the predicted line of growth to the year 2000. Note that the scale of magnitude is much greater for men than for women, but that the rate of increase amongst women is steeper than among men.

The question of gender and crime is being fiercely debated by criminologists at the moment. I shall endeavor an explanation for the rise of female crime in Greece in a later section of this paper because it seems to me that female criminality needs to be explained in the context of the overall changing pattern of criminal behavior.

One way by which we might get a better grip on this question of gender distinction is to analyze the types of crime committed by men and women.
Table 2

Daskalakis, et al., Categories of Crime

Category 1: Offenses Against Life and Bodily Harm. Law Code Articles: 299-315
Examples of Acts included: homicide, infanticide, simply bodily harm, grievous bodily harm
and brawling

Category 2: Criminal Negligence: LC Articles:
Examples: negligent bodily injury, exposure

appropriation, armed robbery and criminal damage

Category 4. Crimes Against Property Interests: LC Articles: 385-406. Examples: extortion,
fraud, defrauding creditors, and usury

of infants, and abuse of minors

Category 6: Prostitution: LC Articles: 347-353. Examples: engaging in prostitution,
pandering, and pimping

Category 7: Crimes Against Dispensation of Justice: LC Articles: 224-234. Examples:
perjury and false accusation

Category 8: Economic Crimes: LC Articles: 207-223. Examples: counterfeiting, forgery, and
misuse of stamps

Category 9: Drug Offenses: LC Articles. Examples: possession of a controlled substance

Category 10: Offenses against Public Order: LC Articles: 183-201, 264-289. Examples:
vagrancy, incitement to commit an offense, disturbing the peace, begging.

Examples: insult, defamation, and aggravated defamation

Category 12: Offenses against the Family: LC Articles: 354-360. Examples: adultery,
desertion and bigamy

Category 13: Remainder of the Penal Code

Unfortunately, the official statistics I have accumulated to date do not allow us to
analyze this; but Daskalakis and his co-workers reported the results of their study in a way which does enable us to draw some preliminary conclusions about crime and gender. The categorical scheme they employed is set in Table 2.

They broke the aggregate figures down into 13 groups, labelled on Figure 12 as 1 to 13. The height of the bar corresponds to the percentage that the specific crime category accounts for out of all crimes committed by either men or women, e.g., category 1—crimes against the person account for 8% of all the crimes committed by women and only 6% of all the crimes committed by men. There does appear to be some gender specificity in regard to certain categories of offenses. Crimes of negligence (cat. 2) appear more prominently among men than women, as do morals crimes (cat. 5), prostitution (cat. 6), drug offenses (cat 9) and offenses against public order (cat. 10). Among women, there appears to be greater propensity toward offenses against the dispensation of justice (perjury, false accusation, etc- cat.7), economic and market crimes (cat. 8), crimes against honor (cat. 10), and offenses against family law (Cat. 12).

Turning next to the question of juvenile crime, Figure 13 shows the salient
evidence among men. As we saw earlier, on a per capita basis, young men between the ages of 17 and 20 manifested the second highest crime rate. Further research needs to be done on the categories of crimes committed by this group in comparison to the other older cohorts.

Nevertheless, at this juncture, we can infer that as expected juvenile crime is on the rise and that the take-off seems to occur during the 1970s. Unfortunately, the data are insufficient at this point and so we cannot determine whether they fit best the developed or developing pattern of juvenile crime.

In sum, with regard to gender and age, the Greek data fit neither of the models proposed earlier though they tend to suggest a pattern closer to the developed model. But two patterns stand out clearly and require some explanation; first, is the rising rate of crime among women, and the second is the accelerating rate among juvenile males. I want to attempt in the next section to explain the pattern of criminal behavior manifest in the Greek data.

2.5. Crime and Society in Greece: Some Tentative Observations

2.5.1 Crime, Industrialization and Urbanization

As described above the pattern of crime in Greece does not fit neatly into
either of Shelley's heuristic categories of developed or developing. What I wish to do here is to suggest some possible reasons this may be so utilizing some of the theories set out in the introduction to this section of the paper.

In many important ways, Greece structurally resembles other parts of Europe during their phases of rapid industrialization and urbanization. Beginning during the 1950s and continuing at an accelerated pace through the 1960s, there was a flood of internal migrants to Athens. In 1951, 18.06% of the total population of Greece resided in the greater Athens area; by 1971 the figure had increased 28.97% and by 1981 to 31.08%. In terms of growth rate, that means that Athens grew at an annual rate of 3% during the the 1950s and 3.21% during the 1960s. Within a short space of time, Greece went from being a predominantly rural culture to a markedly urban one. In addition, it was income incentives and the expanding industrial sector which was attracting them to the urban environment. We have then two of the key elements which pertained elsewhere in Europe and which led to crime-- perhaps for reasons of social disorganization or anomie or relative deprivation. But, as we saw earlier, the Greek data do not conform precisely to the expected results set up by these models. We need to explore why.26

The crime rate in Greece did increase, and is still rising, as we should expect given the urban growth and economic change, but two elements stand out as different in the case of Greece. The first is that the timing of the increase in crime appears to commence later than it should based on the comparative models (that is, if the back-projection from the 1970s to 1960s holds true- a matter to be tested later). The second concerns the seeming lack of difference between urban and rural crime. As an hypothesis to explain the first I would propose the following. Even though the structural changes which should have produced a higher crime were evident during the 1960s, the increase did commence until the 1970s because of the large emigration of men from Greece during the 1960s which effectively removed men between the ages of 25-35 disproportionately from the total population (as we saw, this tends to the be the age cohort which manifests the highest rate of crime); 40.2% out of a total of over 690,000 male emigrants were between 25 and 35 years old. Emigration acted as a safety-valve removing members of the group most crime-prone and by enhancing the job opportunities of those who remained behind, one part of the relative deprivation scenario would have been obviated. The factor causing the lag was the brutal regime of the Junta. The effects of urbanization and industrialization were thus delayed. In the post-Junta period, with the return of many former emigrants and

the loosing of the bonds of the authoritarian state, the expected upswing in crime began. As to the geographical pattern, I would suggest the following. All of the urban anthropological literature suggests that frequently the new migrants to the city would settle in close-knit residential quarters which emulated the local from which they came. Herbert Gans in his study of Italian migrants to Boston referred to these people as "urban villagers" because they essentially replicated in important ways the social universe of their former rural community. This meant that there was not the degree of social disorganization or social anomie which might otherwise have developed. In the case of Athens, the evidence shows that most migrants moved directly from their village to the city without any intermediate stop-over in towns. Thus, the similarity in criminal behavior between rural areas and the urban zones. This hypothesis is supported by the survey data gathered by Daskalakis. His group found that in their responses to questions regarding criminal behavior there was a much closer correspondence between rural and urban dwellers than between either of them and semi-urban or town dwellers. 27

This still leaves open the question as to why the crime rate began to rise when it did and, more importantly, why does it continue to rise. The hypothesis I find persuasive and so am working with is the one proposed by Krahn and his associates which looks to a combination of income inequality, population growth in certain areas, and relative deprivation. The question of timing was addressed above. As to the other points, since the early 1970s there has clearly been a change in people's material expectations. In her interviews with working-class men and women from the neighborhood of Yerenia in Piraeus, for example, Hirschon found that they were very much concerned with bettering their material life and that status advancement as measured by home ownership, ownership of a car,

self-employment, and possession of consumer durables were very important to them. What her work and that of others (especially, Karapostolis) have definitively shown is that many people have not been able to match those socially-constructed goals and this has generated resentment. Economic performance, both at the household and at the national level, has not kept pace with peoples' economic expectations; thus laying the ground for strong feelings of relative deprivation as one sector of society enjoys material prosperity while the others do not.

Simultaneously, there has grown a sizeable gap in incomes between various sectors of Greek society. All of the elements of an explanation of crime as proposed by Krahn et al. are therefore found in Greece. Further research is needed in order to determine with more assurity that this is in fact the best explanation, but at the moment it looks promising. 28

2.5.2. Women, Gender and Crime in Greece

Women are committing and are being arrested for crime at higher levels than ever before and the trend in female criminality is upward; this is the case in Greece and in many other areas of the world as well. Many different theories have been expounded to try and explain this phenomena. Clearly, female criminality is part of modernization but other causes need to be uncovered. One explanation focuses on women's changing economic role. Rita Simon and others have argued that as

women entered the workplace, they encountered new opportunities for crime; the motivation for committing crime stems from the fact that women's work often tended to be low-paying and marginal with higher rates of temporary or seasonal unemployment. Others, such as Freda Adler and D.J. Steffensmeier, have looked to role values as the primary agent behind female crime, arguing that with feminism and emancipation, women's roles converge with men's and thus women committed more crimes for the same reason that men did (anomie, relative deprivation, social disorganization, etc.). Boritch and Hagan criticized both views. They examined male and female crime over a long period of time and found that the two rates tended to be correlated; an observation incompatible with explanations which are based on contemporaneous changes in women's social or economic position. Hartnagel's work as well suggests the same point.

Turning to the Greek data, I would propose an hypothesis which combines elements from these various models. Economically, since the 1960s women have participating in the extra-household labor force in greater numbers than ever before. In spite of the popular perception, both single and married women are now active forces in the work place. But the jobs women hold tend to low paying, service-orientated or in light industry. In the neighborhood Hirschon studied, for example, women were frequently hired to knit shirts or stitch clothing. More broadly, Symeonidou found that nearly 50% of all women workers in the urban areas were employed as service workers or as "craftswomen." This greater participation in the workplace does afford women with more opportunities to commit crime, and if the Daskalakis data are reliable, the types of crime they are perpetrating fits well with this explanation. Furthermore, women's roles in Greece have been changing and there is an appreciable convergence of men's and women's roles. Nevertheless, as the critiques by Boritch and Hagan and Hartnagel indicate, these are insufficient explanations. In the end, I would suggest that as with men, the driving force behind female crime in Greece lay in the interplay between income inequality and relative deprivation with the added aspect that

women to be even more economically marginalized than working class men, occupying lower paying positions, experiencing higher rates of unemployment and underemployment, and subject to less secure job tenure.

2.5.3. Juvenile Crime

Juveniles are committing crimes in Greece at a faster rate than any other group, and the trend looks to be continuing. In a seminal essay, David F. Greenberg expounded a materialist explanation of juvenile crime arguing that it can be "understood as a consequence of the historically changing position of juveniles in industrial societies." While not all have gone along with his position, there has been sufficient work to suggest that there is a correlation between the economic...
role of juveniles and crime. The explanation I am working with therefore closely resembles that proposed to account for rising female crime, vis-à-vis much greater workplace participation but in unsteady, low paying, marginal jobs while simultaneously being imbued with a set of cultural expectations about material improvement. My work in this area is at a rudimentary stage and so I put this forward only as a tentative working hypothesis.51

2.6. Tentative Assessment and Future Directions

What I have attempted to do in this section is to test the data on crime in Greece against a set of norms and expectations set up by the two models of 'crime in developing countries' and crime in 'developed countries' as defined and elaborated by Louise Shelly. The results of these tests suggest that criminality in Greece in terms of the categories committed in the past, the rates at which they are changing and are likely to change, the age and gender composition of the criminally active sector of Greek society, and the geographical distribution of crime do not fit easily into either of the proposed models. Crime in Greece in some respects looks markedly modern; while in others, it appears truly traditional; and yet in still others, it falls somewhere in between. What next tried to do was to

utilize the most recent theories concerning crime and the incidence of criminal behavior during the recent and to examine the Greek material in light of this literature. The result was the laying out of a number of possible explanations for the perceived pattern of crime in Greece.

What stands out as possible projections at this point are the expectation that crime among juveniles will continue to increase, particularly more violent I would suggest; that crimes committed by both men and women will continue to rise but the rate among the latter will be higher than among the former; that there will begin to be a divergent pattern of criminality between rural and urban areas as the "urban villager" becomes more and more acculturized to urbanity; that so long as the gap between peoples' expectations of advancement of their material conditions and their economic ability to achieve those advances, crime will continue to rise.

Time will tell if any of this projections are valid. For the moment, the path for future inquiry appears clear. Much more detailed examination of longer time series of crime data and of much more fine-grade data is necessary. Crime and policing (a topic I have not touched on in this paper but which desperately needs to be incorporated into the analysis) in Greece over the last years must be examined in detail using both official sources and newspapers. The cultural context of human behavior deemed to be criminal has to be sketched out and analyzed utilizing the theories and methods of the new social history.
Nonetheless, by putting the material from Greece into a comparative perspective and putting it to the test statistically against hypothetical models based on comparative research, I hope today to have pointed to the necessary direction of future investigations and to have raised a number of important questions. Definitive answers, I am afraid, will have to wait for another occasion.

3. Conclusion

I have attempted in this paper to suggest how analyses of collective action in the form of strikes by trade unions and atomistic action in the form of crime can help us to understand the development of Greek society. I set out my thoughts at the end of each section on those topics. My conclusions and the implications to be drawn from them are both tentative. I see them at this point as guidelines for future inquiry. Collective action and atomistic action are both directly related to deep-set social factors (as well as economic and political ones), and I suggest that they can enable us to comprehend how the interplay between social solidarity and social fragmentation, to borrow from Richard Jules Oestreicher's excellent study of Detroit, have shaped the nature of Greek society.32

In another vein, this study has shown once more the differentness of Greece. Poised Janus-like between the developing and the developed world, trade unionism and crime in Greece do not fit the predicted models proposed by social

scientists for either setting. In regard to crime, the pattern in Greece manifests key elements of both the developed and the developing models as created by modernization theory. In regard to trade unionism and strikes, the system in Greece, historically bound tightly to the paternalistic control of the state, differs in significant ways from labor relations systems in both the developed and the developing worlds. Thus, the challenge to social historians of Greece is engage the theoretical literature and to utilize it recursively both to help explain the Greek case and then to use our results to revise current theories, devised as they are almost exclusively from studies of the "core countries." I would argue that in the sphere of new social history, the study of "peripheral countries" can be even more important to further our understanding of global developments as we look toward the next century. It is now up to students of Greek history and society to pick up that challenge.