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## Research Report

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# DOES DIVERSITY HURT DEMOCRACY?

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While reporting recently on his organization's annual survey of political rights and civil liberties around the world, Freedom House president Adrian Karatnycky repeated the claim—heard often in academic and public discourse alike—that ethnic diversity hinders open politics. Reviewing the findings of the 2001 survey, he concluded that “democracy has been significantly more successful in monoethnic societies than in ethnically divided and multiethnic societies.”<sup>1</sup>

In saying this, Karatnycky was hardly being provocative or counterintuitive. A number of eminent political scientists have seen diverse societies as disadvantaged when it comes to democratization.<sup>2</sup> According to many observers, ethnic differences divide society and make compromise and consensus difficult. Heterogeneity poses the risk of intercommunal violence, which can quickly undermine open politics. What is more, political parties and other organizations coalesce more readily around ethnic than other identities. Political entrepreneurs therefore have an incentive to play on such divisions and to neglect efforts to mobilize citizens around civil rights and class concerns.<sup>3</sup> And in a particularly ironic twist, well-meant efforts to defuse ethnic conflict can take the form of elite bargains, made amid political openings, that later block further democratization.<sup>4</sup>

Empirical evidence seems abundant. Writing in the wake of the Soviet demise, Donald L. Horowitz observed: “Democracy has progressed furthest in those East European countries that have the fewest serious ethnic cleavages (Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland) and progressed more slowly or not at all in those that are deeply divided

(Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and of course the former Yugoslavia)."<sup>5</sup> Many other examples are available. In Asia, the relative smoothness of democratization in monoethnic South Korea contrasts with the rocky course of regime change in collaged Indonesia. In Latin America, democracy seems more robust in Chile and Costa Rica, which are relatively homogeneous, than in fractionalized Peru and Guatemala.

The notion that greater ethnic homogeneity facilitates democracy simply seems to make sense. Who doubts that maintaining popular rule is going to be easier in Poland and Slovenia than it is in Macedonia and Bulgaria? Is it any wonder that ethnically uniform Greece has had a more successful experience with open politics than has Turkey, a fifth of whose population is self-consciously and assertively Kurdish? And does anyone really expect democracy to take firm root in Bosnia, however long the UN stages elections and stands between hostile groups?

Yet closer inspection reveals surprisingly scanty evidence that diversity countervails open politics. Here we present the findings of elementary cross-national analysis.

Much academic writing on democracy's determinants assumes or avers that social heterogeneity dims democracy's prospects. But the effects of social composition often go untested. The main reason is very likely that fractionalization—the degree to which a society is divided up into various distinct groups—is hard to measure. Group identities are complex and contested; quantifying them is problematic. Social science does not yet, and perhaps never will, have uncontroversial measures of social fractionalization.

Until recently, scholars who have sought to assess the effects of social diversity in cross-national analyses have had only a handful of sources from which to draw. Some are badly dated and lack data on certain countries that have emerged from colonial or communist rule in the last few decades. What is more, studies of fractionalization typically treat linguistic distinctions alone as the basis for assessing group membership.<sup>6</sup> While this data has yielded some useable measures, its general inadequacy is well known among scholars.<sup>7</sup>

In addition to scoring for "fractionalization," some experts gauge the diversity of a society by the relative size within it of its largest group: The higher the percentage of the total national population accounted for by this group, the closer the society is to homogeneity. In its annual publications, Freedom House provides information on the size of what it defines as ethnic groups. Freedom House's numbers on ethnic composition are vulnerable to criticism. Perhaps the most serious deficiency is the absence of a uniform criterion to define ethnicity. For some countries, such as South Africa, ethnicity is assessed in terms of race. The country's ethnic profile is characterized as "75 percent black" and "14 percent white." The rest, presumably, are mostly "East

Indians" and mixed-heritage "Cape Coloureds." In other cases, subracial distinctions of tribe and language figure in the Freedom House account. In material on Namibia, for example, the largest group is not "black" but Ovambo—a group that forms about half the population and is distinguished from other and smaller indigenously African groups such as the Kavango. Were the same types of distinctions applied in the case of South Africa, that country's diversity would be more obvious in the numbers. In some cases, religious identity is included in the assessment. Thus the Philippines is judged to be "91.5 percent Christian Malay" and "4 percent Muslim Malay." If language were treated as the main criterion for evaluation, the Philippines would be considered highly diverse.

Thus for Freedom House, "ethnicity" may refer to race (meaning physiognomy and skin color), language, religion, or some combination thereof. Any attempt to assess ethnic composition must take on the thorny task of saying just which criteria are supposed to count, how they can be measured, and why they matter.<sup>8</sup> Assessments that focus on language, as ethnic-fractionalization indices typically do, have the advantage of hewing to one more or less clear criterion, but therein lies one of their drawbacks as well: They miss much of what constitutes sociocultural difference. The numbers that Freedom House uses for "ethnicity," while sometimes transcending the limits of an exclusively linguistic focus, do not stick with a single criterion, which limits their usefulness when it comes to cross-national analysis.

Fortunately, there has lately been a breakthrough in the effort to assess social composition. Alberto Alesina and his colleagues offer scores on "ethnic" (by which they mean, for the most part, racial), linguistic, and religious fractionalization for nearly all the world's countries.<sup>9</sup> This source (hereafter referred to as "Alesina data") provides a useful instrument for measuring social homogeneity and heterogeneity. Since the main components of what is often called "ethnicity" are disaggregated, the influence of each component may be assessed separately. The data make possible a differentiated assessment of the influence of social diversity on political regime. The scores range from zero to one, with lower scores representing lower fractionalization.

We also use the data on ethnicity that Freedom House publishes in its own annual reports. Whatever its shortcomings, the Freedom House material furnishes another way to assess social composition, and also forms the basis for Karatnycky's claim. We treat the size of the largest ethnic group as the measure of "ethnic homogeneity." Karatnycky dubs countries in which the largest group accounts for two-thirds or more of the population "monoethnic"; all other countries he terms "multiethnic."<sup>10</sup> He holds that greater uniformity, understood as stronger numerical predominance by the largest ethnic group, creates better conditions for democracy. We test this hypothesis using the numbers

on ethnic composition that Freedom House published in a recent annual report.<sup>11</sup>

### Analyzing the Effects of Diversity

We seek to evaluate the effect of social homogeneity or heterogeneity on political regime by examining countries with at least a quarter of a million inhabitants as of the year 2000. To assess political regime, we use Freedom House's freedom ratings (hereafter FH ratings), which are published annually for each country in the world. We regard the ratings as a valuable—arguably the best—source of cross-national data on political regimes. Each country's FH rating is an average of the scores that the Freedom House staff assigns it in the areas of "political rights" and "civil liberties," respectively. The scale ranges from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). To make our presentation more intuitive, we reverse the scale so that a higher number means a higher degree of openness (in other words, 7 represents greatest freedom, 1 least freedom). We score countries using an average of their ratings over the five most recent annual surveys (those issued between 1998 and 2002).<sup>12</sup> These scores serve as measures for "political regime"—the dependent variable that we are trying to explain.

Assessing the effects of social fractionalization requires controlling for several other factors that are also widely regarded as determinants of political regime. The first and most obviously indispensable is level of economic development, which we measure as Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc).<sup>13</sup> Scholars have long held that higher economic development is associated with less social conflict, higher political sophistication, and broader social support for popular rule.<sup>14</sup>

Three other controls—the predominance of Islam as the main religion, a British colonial heritage, and membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—are coded as dummy variables (that is, simply present or not). Some scholars have noted what appears to be a deficit of democracy in the Muslim world.<sup>15</sup> According to their analysis, the fusion of temporal and spiritual authority in Islamic thought, the subordination of women, and a culture of intolerance predispose Muslim societies to authoritarianism. Conversely, argue other experts, a British colonial heritage is most often good for democracy.<sup>16</sup> The British, in this view, handed down traditions of law, parliamentarism, and civil-service professionalism that left their former colonies in a better position to sustain open rule than the former colonies of other European powers.

The presence of abundant raw materials—especially oil—has sometimes been regarded as a harbinger of woe for democratic prospects. Oil wealth may buy public quiescence, finance a large security apparatus to repress opposition, and promote a type of economic growth that does not engender genuine modernization.<sup>17</sup>

TABLE 1—REGRESSIONS OF FREEDOM HOUSE RATINGS ON HYPOTHESIZED DETERMINANTS

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Constant	5.52*** (0.31)	-3.33** (1.24)	-2.86* (1.22)	5.06*** (0.27)	-4.04*** (1.06)	-2.46* (1.10)	3.98*** (0.31)	-4.54*** (0.83)	-2.40* (0.98)	3.10*** (0.42)	-4.52*** (0.95)	-3.22** (1.06)
Ethnic/Racial Fractionalization	-2.63*** (0.53)	-0.62 (0.57)	0.11 (0.50)									
Linguistic Fractionalization				-1.80*** (0.47)	-0.07 (0.45)	0.05 (0.41)						
Religious Fractionalization							0.76 (0.61)	0.81 (0.50)	-0.48 (0.47)			
Ethnic Homogeneity										0.015* (0.006)	-0.0002 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.005)
Economic Development		2.22*** (0.30)	2.13*** (0.28)		2.34*** (0.27)	2.03*** (0.27)		2.38*** (0.23)	2.07*** (0.24)		2.44*** (0.31)	2.34*** (0.28)
Islam			-1.46*** (0.28)			-1.50*** (0.28)			-1.52*** (0.29)			-1.28*** (0.29)
Former British Colony			0.16 (0.29)			0.13 (0.29)			0.25 (0.31)			0.16 (0.33)
OPEC Member			-1.46** (0.52)			-1.42** (0.50)			-1.47** (0.52)			-1.61** (0.51)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>		.166			.161			.166			.138	
N	.11	.36	.54	.06	.36	.55	.00	.36	.54	.03	.34	.53

Note: OLS regressions. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with White-corrected robust standard errors in parentheses. \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Sources: For ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization: Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg, "Fractionalization," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 9411, January 2003; for ethnic homogeneity, Freedom House, *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1999-2000* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); for economic development, *CIA World Factbook 2000* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2000).

A disclaimer is in order: We are well aware that these controls do not exhaust the possible determinants of political regime. We intend merely to test the impact of social fractionalization on political regime under a set of rudimentary controls, not to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the causes of cross-national variation in political regime.

That said, the 12 columns of Table 1 present the results of our regression analyses. The models in columns 1 through 9 show the analyses using the Alesina fractionalization data in three different dimensions: ethnic (1 through 3); linguistic (4 through 6); and religious (7 through 9). The Alesina data set lacks scores on ethnicity for Maldives and Yemen, on language for Cuba, El Salvador, Haiti, Maldives, Rwanda, and Yugoslavia, and on religion for Maldives and Yugoslavia. The analyses of the effects of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization therefore include 166, 161, and 166 observations, respectively. Models 10 through 12 present the results of analyses that use the size of the largest ethnic group as a proportion of the total population as the indicator for ethnic homogeneity. Our source for relative ethnic-group sizes is the published Freedom House data, which covers 138 of the world's 168 countries with populations of at least a quarter-million each.

The analyses strongly support the hypothesis that economic development affects political regime. Greater wealth is associated with more open government. So too do the regressions show that predominantly Muslim countries are marked underachievers in democracy. Resource abundance also seems to frustrate open politics. A British colonial heritage, by contrast, does not affect democracy's prospects either way.

Our main concern, however, is the effect of social diversity on democracy. Model 1, which presents a simple bivariate regression, shows that ethnic fractionalization is negatively correlated with political openness. The correlation is not high, however, and the ethnicity variable is not robust to the inclusion of controls, as is evident in models 2 and 3. Model 2 adds the control for economic development and model 3 includes the other controls as well. In neither of these models is ethnic fractionalization statistically or substantively significant.

Analysis of the effect of linguistic fractionalization, shown in models 4 through 6, yields similar results. The correlation is modest in the bivariate regression, and in neither specification that includes controls is linguistic fractionalization statistically significant. In the regressions that test the effects of religious fractionalization, shown in models 7 through 9, diversity again fails to hold up as a predictor of political regime. In the bivariate regression, shown in model 7, and in the multivariate regression that adds the control for economic development alone (shown in model 8) the coefficient for fractionalization is actually positive. Greater religious fractionalization is therefore associated with better FH scores, though the relationship is not statistically significant.

Likewise, applying the data on ethnic homogeneity yields no evi-



dence of a sturdy, sizeable link between social homogeneity and democracy. Contrary to Karatnycky's claim, we see that the relative size of the largest ethnic group is not a good predictor of democratic achievement. In the bivariate regression (model 10) the correlation between the size of the largest ethnic group and the FH ratings is paltry. Models 11 and 12 show that when controls are added the link between homogeneity and democracy actually becomes negative, though the relationship is not statistically significant. Greater ethnic homogeneity is *not* associated with more open political regimes.

Some scholars have suggested that social fractionalization may be important, but with complicated and nonlinear or curvilinear effects that might not appear in regression analyses. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler argue that countries in which one finds "ethnic dominance"—meaning that a single ethnic group makes up 45 to 90 percent of the population—are more prone to major civil conflict than *either* those highly homogeneous countries where one group forms more than 90 percent of the population *or* those highly fractionalized countries where each group comprises less than 45 percent of the population.<sup>18</sup> Collier and Hoeffler focus on ethnic composition's effect on conflict rather than on democracy, but the logic of the claim may be applied readily to democracy as well.

If a hazardous intermediate zone between very high homogeneity and very high fractionalization actually exists, one should see evidence of a U- or J-shaped curve in diagrams that plot the correlation between FH scores and four indicators of social diversity. We assembled scatter plots using these four indicators.<sup>19</sup> These plots reveal no such telltale U- or J-shaped arc. They do, however, illustrate what is evident in the regressions: There is scant correlation between social diversity and political regime.

In sum, the degree of diversity is not shown to influence democracy's prospects. What social scientists call the "null hypothesis"—the proposition that social diversity has no appreciable effect on political regime—is one that in this case we cannot readily reject.

### Diversity in Nonwealthy Democracies

We can extend the investigation and check our results by narrowing the universe and briefly examining a set of cases that share certain traits. It may be especially useful to focus on the developing world. There, multiethnicity is often viewed as presenting especially daunting challenges. Perhaps Belgium, Switzerland, and Canada, with their wealth and their traditions of popular rule, can maintain democratic regimes despite diversity, while in developing countries this might be harder.

To separate wealthy from developing countries we use a threshold that has recently become a benchmark in writings on democracy's requisites. In an influential article, Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi



TABLE 2—FRACTIONALIZATION IN LOW-INCOME DEMOCRACIES ( $\leq$  US\$6,000 Annual GDPpc)

COUNTRIES	ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION*	LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION*	RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION*	LARGEST ETHNIC GROUP AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL POPULATION**
Benin	.79	.79	.55	NA
Bolivia	.74	.22	.21	30
Botswana	.41	.41	.60	95
Bulgaria	.40	.30	.60	85
Cape Verde	.42	NA	.08	71
Dominican Republic	.43	.04	.31	73
El Salvador	.20	NA	.36	94
Estonia	.51	.49	.50	64
Guyana	.62	.07	.79	49
India	.42	.81	.33	72
Jamaica	.42	.11	.62	76
Latvia	.59	.58	.56	57
Lithuania	.32	.32	.41	80
Mali	.69	.84	.18	50
Mongolia	.37	.37	.08	90
Namibia	.63	.70	.66	50
Papua New Guinea	.27	.35	.55	NA
Philippines	.24	.84	.31	92
Romania	.31	.17	.24	89
<b>Mean: Low-Income Democracies</b>	<b>.46</b>	<b>.44</b>	<b>.42</b>	<b>71</b>
<b>Mean: World</b>	<b>.46</b>	<b>.40</b>	<b>.43</b>	<b>72</b>

\*0=lowest, 1=highest fractionalization; \*\*100=greatest homogeneity

Sources: For ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization: Alberto Alesina et al., "Fractionalization"; for largest group as a percentage of population, *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, 1999–2000.

reported that above an income of \$6,000 per capita no major country that has become a democracy has ever reverted to authoritarianism.<sup>20</sup> The number provides a reasonable threshold for distinguishing between wealthy and developing countries. As of 1998, income per capita was less than \$6,000 per year in 1998 U.S. dollars at Purchasing Power Parity in 107 of the 168 countries with populations of more than a quarter-million. (These 107 were home to about three-quarters of the people in the world.) Within this realm of developing countries, 19 received FH ratings in each of the five annual surveys between 1998 and 2002 that placed them in Freedom House's category of "Free" polities. They are exceptions to the generalization that open politics is a luxury that only the rich can afford. These low-income, relatively liberal democracies, which are listed in Table 2 on the preceding page, make up a variegated club. There is no hint of geographical concentration. While Protestant and Catholic countries are especially well represented, all other major religious traditions have a place in this category as well. Orthodox Christianity predominates in Bulgaria and Romania, Hinduism in India, Buddhism in Mongolia, Islam in Mali, and traditional animism (Vodou) in Benin. The colonial heritage of the countries in this group is also obviously anything but uniform.

Of even greater interest than the heterogeneity of the set of countries as a whole is the diversity on display within each of them. Table 2 presents the data on social fractionalization and ethnic homogeneity for each country. The overall picture reinforces the findings of the statistical analysis. The average ethnic fractionalization score for the developing-world states that Freedom House rates as "Free" is identical to the global average. Linguistic fractionalization is moderately *higher* than the global mean. Religious fractionalization is virtually identical to the average for the world as a whole. And finally, the relative size of the largest ethnic group is nearly the same when averaged across the nonwealthy democracies as it is when averaged across the world as a whole. Open politics is not tethered to social uniformity.

### Why Doesn't Diversity Matter?

An important question arises from the findings: Why does social fractionalization not matter for democracy? In order to address the matter, one must ask: Why *should* diversity hinder democracy? One argument associates greater diversity with a higher propensity for major civil conflict. Some scholars even use fractionalization as a proxy for the degree of conflict in society, operating on the assumption that higher fractionalization automatically translates into more conflict.<sup>21</sup> Since there is obviously good reason to regard violence as an antagonist of open rule, if higher fractionalization does mean more violence, one would indeed expect diversity to make things hard for democracy.

Several recent studies, however, challenge the soundness of the idea that heterogeneity is linked to violence. James Fearon and David Laitin report, "It appears *not* to be true that a greater degree of ethnic or religious diversity—or indeed any particular cultural demography—by itself makes a country more prone to civil war." Fearon and Laitin note that their finding "runs contrary to a common view among journalists, policy makers, and academics, which holds 'plural' societies to be especially conflict-prone due to ethnic or religious tensions or antagonisms."<sup>22</sup>

In a major review of the politics of identity in Africa, Crawford Young argues that the recent growth of violence there does not spring primarily from social heterogeneity, even if the latter often becomes an axis of cleavage once violence breaks out. Young notes that "once armed conflict is interwoven with politics, identity is virtually certain to become part of the larger patterns of confrontation." Still, the new patterns and intensity of conflict "have nothing to do with religion, ethnicity, and race." In fact, "cultural pluralism alone is not the prime determinant [of conflict]; countries that have escaped disorder are no less diverse than those in which armed conflict has erupted."<sup>23</sup>

While much more research needs to be done on the topic of fractionalization and conflict (now a vigorously debated one among political scientists and economists), the present state of understanding raises the possibility that there is little or no connection between the two phenomena.

Another basis for regarding fractionalization as an antagonist of open politics is diversity's supposedly pernicious effect on economic performance. In a celebrated article, William Easterly and Ross Levine reported that high ethnic fractionalization provided a powerful explanation for slow growth in Africa.<sup>24</sup> If diversity undermines growth and if growth promotes democratization, one might expect heterogeneity to counter-vail political opening.

Easterly and Levine's 1997 article furnishes sound evidence, but the question of whether diversity spells adversity remains open, for much remains unknown and scholars as yet have no firm grasp of whether and how social heterogeneity affects politics. In subsequent work Easterly has qualified his earlier conclusions, arguing that "high-quality institutions, such as rule of law, bureaucratic quality, freedom from government expropriation, and freedom from government repudiation of contracts mitigate the adverse economic effects of ethnic fractionalization."<sup>25</sup> Other writers, moreover, have found no link between high diversity and low growth.<sup>26</sup> While we have not undertaken systematic study of the problem, in preliminary analysis we too have found little evidence for a strong link between social diversity and economic performance.<sup>27</sup>

In sum, even though our knowledge is far from complete, we do know

enough to hazard that the common assumptions about heterogeneity promoting conflict and stifling growth should be judged "not proven."

### Implications for Politics

If the empirical evidence plainly pointed to the conclusion that multiethnicity dims democracy's prospects, the finding might be a "hard truth" for democratic idealists but would nevertheless merit sober acceptance. But this claim is not demonstrably true, and indeed is not even well supported by straightforward cross-national analysis.

This is not to say that our rudimentary examination provides the last word on the matter. On the contrary, it is intended merely as a single and preliminary contribution to the broader effort, now gaining momentum among social scientists, to assess the political influence of fractionalization. Our findings, which are based on analysis of some high-quality, highly differentiated new data, provide grounds for doubt about the idea that monoethnic societies have an edge when it comes to founding and preserving democratic rule.

This is no mere intellectual debate among experts. While the idea that monoethnic societies have advantages may be the brainchild of honest scholars and commentators, its logically implied converse—that ethnically fragmented societies are intrinsically troubled—is ruthlessly manipulated by undemocratic rulers the world over. Few excuses for authoritarianism are trotted out more frequently than the claim that multiethnic societies need a strong hand to prevent all hell from breaking loose. Singapore's longtime strongman, Lee Kuan Yew, has argued for decades that his country's diversity makes democracy a bad fit. Highhanded premier Mohamad Mahathir of Malaysia has long made the same argument about his society. The president of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, continues to ban multipartism on the grounds that allowing it will lead to interethnic war. China's rulers, having long since abandoned state ownership and rule on behalf of the poor as rationalizations for authoritarianism, now justify their dictatorship in part by invoking China's multinational character and potential for social strife. Dictators in Burma as well as all five of the post-Soviet Central Asian republics make precisely the same argument.

According to their logic, democracy is inappropriate in diverse societies precisely because it is unsustainable; political opening will only spark mass conflict and thereby undermine even the scant rights and security that the populace enjoys under authoritarianism. Western leaders mostly accept this line, at least tacitly, and expect less from multiethnic polities.

Examining the evidence reveals the tenuousness of such reasoning. If a robust connection between social homogeneity and political openness does not exist in global perspective, and if a substantial number of the developing world's relatively liberal democracies are decidedly multiethnic, then the number of plausible pretexts for despotism falls by one.

## NOTES

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7. See, for example, David D. Laitin and Daniel N. Posner, "The Implications of Constructivism for Constructing Ethnic Fractionalization Indices," *Newsletter of the Comparative Politics Section of the American Political Science Association* 12 (Winter 2001): 13–17.

8. See Ashutosh Varshney, "Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality," *Perspectives on Politics* 1 (March 2003): 85–99.

9. Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg, "Fractionalization," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 9411, January 2003. This study is not the only potentially fruitful recent effort to overcome the limitations of the older measures of social diversity. See also, for example, Daniel N. Posner, "Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa: How Should It Be Measured? What Does It Explain About Economic Growth?" Paper presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Ga., September 1999.

10. Adrian Karatnycky, "The 2001 Freedom House Survey," endnote 1.

11. *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1999–2000* (New York: Freedom House, 2000).

12. See Freedom House's "Annual Survey of Freedom, Country Ratings," at [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org).

13. *CIA World Factbook 2000* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2000). In the regression analysis we use log GDP per capita in 1998 at Purchasing Power Parity as the measure of economic development.

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24. William Easterly and Ross Levine, "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112 (November 1997): 1203–50.
25. William Easterly, "Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2482, February 2000. See [www.eldis.org](http://www.eldis.org).
26. Brad Lian and John R. Oncal, "Cultural Diversity and Economic Development: A Cross-National Study of 98 Countries, 1960–85," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 46 (October 1997): 61–77.
27. In partial correlations that control for log GDP at Purchasing Power Parity in 1998, none of the four indicators of social diversity used in the present article are correlated at a statistically significant level with annual average growth rate of GDP per capita during the period 1990–99. Source of data on economic growth rates: United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2001* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 178–81.

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### *Correction*

In the article “Does Diversity Hurt Democracy?” by M. Steven Fish and Robin S. Brooks in the January 2004 issue, there was an error in Table 1—Regressions of Freedom House Ratings on Hypothesized Determinants. The contents of the two rows labeled Adj.  $R^2$  and N should be reversed, and every three columns in the table should appear consolidated in the N row. The corrected table is available on the *Journal* website at [www.journalofdemocracy.org/Articles/FishandBrooksTable-15-1.pdf](http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/Articles/FishandBrooksTable-15-1.pdf).